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ABSTRACT
The purposes of this study were to epply standards of rhetorical 
analysis and criticism to the presidential press conference as an 
oral communication situation, and more specifically, to examine 
Lyndon Johnson's effectiveness in his official, presidential news 
conferences.
Before Woodrow Wilson, few presidents had direct, regular deal­
ings with reporters. Under Wilson, the presidential news conference 
became an institution, as he and later chief executives continued 
the practice with varying degrees of success. While most modern 
presidents have contributed to the evolution of the conference, 
Franklin Roosevelt and John Kennedy were unusually productive in 
establishing and maintaining presidential leadership through that 
channel of communication.
President Johnson experimented with a variety of formats, but 
preferred informal, impromptu meetings with reporters. Johnson's 
press relations were mercurial and were criticized severely by news­
men. Reporters complained of his secrecy, his lack of candor, and 
the propagandists nature of his press communications. President 
Johnson was annoyed by personal criticisms, speculation, and inter­
pretative journalism. Johnson's goals were to explain, publicize, 
promote, and defend his administration. Further, he wanted to improve 
his image. He also wanted to control the conference and to regulate 
what correspondents reported.
iv
President Johnson's opening statements and reporters' questions 
generated the content of the meetings. Johnson frequently used 
lengthy opening remarks to announce executive appointments, deci­
sions, and policies. Newsmen asked about presidential, political, 
domestic, and foreign affairs. They inquired more about Vietnam 
than about any other matter.
The development of Johnson's opening statements was characterized 
by the use of statistics, details, narration, and testimony. Repe­
tition and restatement were used often for amplification. Johnson's 
announcements were presented to avoid specific Issues, to anticipate 
and direct inquiry, to demonstrate progress of "Great Society" pro­
grams, to reply to critics, and to reiterate policy statements. Many 
of the announcements were newsworthy. Some were dramatic. Often, 
however, they were so redundant, long, and promotional that they ap­
peared to be ineffective.
Reporters' questions were timely, important, and appropriate 
for the situation. Newsmen seemed to have been clear, concise, and 
tactful for the most part.
President Johnson used a variety of techniques to control and 
fence with the press in his answers. He anticipated questions, inter­
rupted and instructed reporters, demanded sources, attacked questions, 
and used sarcasm and humor. Johnson employed the devices of back­
grounding, repeating, amplifying, exhausting, generalizing, arguing, 
and appealing to discuss issues in his replies. To avoid answering, 
he used a variety of tactics associated with the strategies of refusing 
to answer, referring questions, and circumventing specific ideas raised
v
by questions. In general, he probably avoided Inquiry so exten­
sively that his general effectiveness was diminished. In terms 
of audience adaptation, Johnson may have been too unresponsive to 
the needs of the press and the public to fulfill his presidential 
press conference purposes.
vi
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Introduction to the Study 
The presidential press conference is an unusual communication 
situation. The format challenges the nation’s leader to stand be­
fore representatives of the news media for an extemporaneous exchange 
of questions and answers. The meeting is a test of the president’s 
character, especially his skills in listening and speaking. A chief 
executive who meets the press in this manner has much to gain, de­
pending upon those skills. He listens to understand more than the 
substance of inquiry and he replies for more than a mere release of 
information, just as he analyzes his audiences and carefully prepares 
for such other communications as formal addresses to the nation. The 
news conference provides more than a passive expression of leader­
ship. The situation allows a salient demonstration of ability and a 
platform for persuasion.
For these reasons, a president's performance in his attempts to 
Influence the press and, ultimately, the public seem highly amenable 
to analysis and evaluation. Unfortunately, few attempts to study the 
presidential press conference from other than a historical or descrip­
tive standpoint have been made. Moreover, rhetorical assessments of 
communication in the news conference situation do not appear in 
many academic studies, let alone professional publications.
1
2Another Impetus for the present work lies In the speaker selected. 
Lyndon Johnson's speaking has received little attention from research­
ers in speech. This partial void Is probably due to several factors. 
Johnson is a fairly recent president and background materials on his 
administration are just now becoming available. Further, Johnson's 
public speaking, while forceful and probably very persuasive at times, 
lacked the polish and charm of such previous presidents as John Ken­
nedy. Finally, Johnson left office without accomplishing an end to 
what is and was one of the nation's most serious problems, a war. 
Johnson retired from public life with low national esteem. Many more 
years may pass before major consideration is given to his spoken 
communication.
Nevertheless, Johnson was a fascinating and powerful politician 
and president. More significantly, his approach to the presidential 
press conference was unlike that of any other individual president.
His dealings with reporters and even the variety of ways he held news 
conferences became the subject of much reporting and commentary by 
contemporary print and broadcast journalists. Further, Johnson met 
so often with reporters, both informally and officially, that a large 
body of transcripts of the press conferences became available. Be­
cause President Johnson's press conferences were not only news events 
but often yielded important communications to the public, they merit 
more than cursory consideration.
This study may be of value in demonstrating some ways in which 
speech critics can evaluate the performance of speakers in question 
and answer sessions, especially press conferences involving important 
government officials. The paper may also contribute to a fuller
3understanding of Lyndon Johnson's speaking abilities and his effective­
ness with press relations.
The problem then Is two-fold. First, previous studies of presi­
dential press conferences do not use the viewpoint of rhetorical 
criticism, so models for applying speech criticism to the format do 
not exist. A major purpose of the study has been to discover and 
apply appropriate standards of rhetorical evaluation to the press con­
ference situation. Second, the study seeks to assess Johnson's com­
munication skills in the meetings with reporters. This study attempts 
to describe and evaluate Johnson's attitudes toward the press and the 
press conference situation, his general and specific preparation, his 
aims, and the techniques he used. Also Included are such aspects as 
the Importance of the content of the conferences and the quality of 
the questioning. The main objective of this study, then. Is to deter­
mine President Johnson's effectiveness in his press conferences.
A variety of materials are used In the paper. Historical studies 
of the press in America and of the history, evolution, and Institu­
tion of the presidential press conference give important background 
material. Books and essays on the presidency and on presidential 
press relations further contribute bases for analysis. Newspaper 
and magazine articles found in a variety of periodicals help explain 
Johnson's press conference style as do biographical and autobiographi­
cal pieces on various presidents, especially those on Lyndon Johnson.
Taped interviews with George Christian, correspondence with Bill 
Moyers, and books by Pierre Salinger and by George Reedy provide data 
and reflections from the men who were Johnson's press secretaries at 
different times between 1963 and 1969.
Specifically, Johnson's one hundred and thirty-five official 
news conferences are studied. Only written transcripts of the meetings 
are presently available for extensive research. All but one and the 
opening of another of the conferences appear in transcripts released 
by the White House which are published in Johnson's Public Papers by 
the Government Printing Office. The published transcripts correspond 
with transcripts published in the New York Times and assure textual 
authenticity.
The conferences have been examined carefully. First, each con­
ference was read to gain a general idea of the content, questions, 
announcements, and answers. Next, each transcript was analyzed for 
specific content in tenns of general topic areas and with regard to 
specific Issues. The subject areas were studied quantitatively to 
discover trends in announcements and in questions. Newspaper and maga­
zine articles and chronologies of current events surrounding various 
conferences provided reference materials by which to gauge the quali­
ty of the content.
Criteria from traditional and contemporary works on persuasion, 
communication, and speech criticism were refined to devise a means 
for qualitative assessment of the opening statements, the questions, 
and the answers. The conferences were then restudied in light of those 
criteria.
Finally, a few terms bear brief explanation. Words such as "the 
press," "correspondents," "reporters," and "newsmen" generally refer 
to representatives of newspapers, syndicates and agencies, wire 
services, and broadcast networks or stations. The term "press con­
ference" (or "news conference") refers to official question and answer
5sessions end not to "briefings" or other encounters with the press, 
unless otherwise stipulated. "Impromptu" press conferences are those 
held without advance notice. "Formal" conferences were announced, 
usually at least twenty-four hours in advance. "Broadcast" con­
ferences were usually "live," although a few were taped or filmed 
for later broadcast. The terms "desk" and "office" conference 
occasionally appear in related literature and refer to informal, 
usually impromptu meetings in the president's office in the White 
House.
Introduction to the Presidential Press Conference 
The remainder of this chapter provides a background for under­
standing the institution of the presidential press conference. Four 
sections present (1) a discussion of the functions of the presiden­
tial press conference, (2) a general characterization of the confer­
ence, (3) a brief history of early presidential relations with the 
press, and (U) a review of the modern evolution of the conference.
Functions of the Presidential Press Conference
The purposes and functions of the presidential press conference 
must be considered from the point of view of the participants: the 
president and the press. The conference also serves the needs of 
the public and. In this country, the purposes of a democratic society. 
Because of the nature of this study, the purposes of the press con­
ference from the president's point of view will be prominent in the 
following discussion.
A president has numerous means of communicating with a variety 
of audiences. Among his audiences are the citizens of the country.
6the congress, government employees, heeds end citisens of foreign 
governments, special Interest groups, end the press itself.* The 
meens of communication available to the president to reach those 
audiences aw also numerous. Pollard has listed twenty-five "chan-
p
nels and devices" for the president's communications. Among these 
are formal addresses, written messages and proclamations, briefing 
sessions, press releases, correspondence, executive orders, and press 
conferences.
Of all channels of presidential communication, one of the most 
unusual Is the press conference, which, according to Zelko, is "the 
most challenging communication experience of the President's many 
public appearances."-^  Rosslter has referred to the conference as 
"The most influential channel of public communication to and from
lx
the President ..."
A president has several purposes in using the press conference 
for communication. Generally, they are to Inform, to persuade, 
and to receive feedback.
The first presidential purpose is to provide information to 
the public about the affairs of government. The chief executive 
does this through opening announcements and with replies to questions.
*Douglass Cater, The Fourth Branch of Government (New York: Vin­
tage, 1965). pp. 26-27.
^James E. Pollard, The Presidents and the Press: Truman to Johnson 
(Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 19&+T, pp. 13-15.
3Harold P. Zelko, "President Kennedy’s Press Conferences: Some 
Observations," Speaker and Gavel. I (1963)» 21.
^Clinton Rosslter, The American Presidency, rev. ed., (New York: 
Harcourt, Brace & Company, i960), p. Il4.
7Llppmann has carried the informational aspect of the press conference 
further by saying that "The purpose of the press conference Is to 
explain the news . . not just to provide it, ^ Indeed, the presi­
dential press conference can serve this purpose of explaining, since 
reporters can probe for clarification in the questions they ask.
The second purpose, persuasion, is best understood with refer­
ence to the leadership role of the president, especially as it has 
emerged in the twentieth century. Few students of government would 
deny that the office of the president has become more and more impor­
tant and powerful over the years, especially in this century. This is 
due to several factors, including the many roles that the chief execu­
tive must play. The president is "Chief of State, Chief Executive, 
Commander in Chief, Chief Diplomat, Chief Legislator . . He is
also head of his party, the "Voice of the People," "Protector of the
7
Peace," "Manager of Prosperity" and "World Leader." All of these are 
roles of leadership, and as Rosslter asserts, these roles have made
Q
"external leadership a requisite of effective operation,"
To carry out the leadership functions of the executive, a presi­
dent has the power to command and, more importantly, the power to per­
suade. The most important aspect of presidential power, according to
9
Neustadt, is the power to persuade. Neustadt's thesis is taken from
^Walter Lippmann, "The President and the Press," Newsweek. March 1, 
1965. P. 17.
^Rosslter, p. 30*
7Ibid., pp. 30-40.
8Ibid.. p. 28.
^Richard £. Neustadt, Presidential Power (New York: Mentor, 1964), 
p. 41; and Douglass Cater, Power in Washington (New York: Vintage, 1964). 
p. 104.
8a cue by Truman, who analysed the presidency by saying, "I sit here 
all day trying to persuade people to do the things they ought to 
have sense enough to do without my persuading them. . . . That's 
all the powers of the President amount to."^ Among the chief ob­
jects of presidential persuasion are congress and the public. To 
reach congress, the president must sometimes use the force of public 
opinion. As Sorenson wrote, "He has a responsibility to lead public 
opinion as well as to respect it, to shape it, to inform It, to woo 
it, and win it. It can be his sword as well as his compass."**
The president has more of an advantage, perhaps, in persuasion 
than does any of his competitors. This Is partially because of the
12nature of the office and the great amount of public Interest in it.
There Is Increasing evidence that the president has been able to use 
his advantage to win public attention. The competition for publicity 
between the president and congress is usually won by the president.*-^
A definite historical change in news patterns exists. This trend 
shows increased attention to the president at the expense of con­
gressional news since World War I,***’
Attracting public attention is only part of the persuasive as­
pect of the presidential press conference. While the president must
*®Neustadt, p. 22.
**Theodore Sorensen, "The President as Political Leader," in The 
American President, ed. Sidney Warren (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice- 
Hall, 1967), p. 85.
*2Dorothy Buckton James, The Contemporary Presidency (New York: 
Pegasus, 1969), p. 5^* Cater, Power in Washington, p. 76; and Daniel 
Moynlhan, "The Presidency & the Press," Commentary. Mar. 1971, p.
* C^ater, The Fourth Branch of Government, pp. 9-11.
*\lmer £. Cornwell, Jr., "Presidential News: The Expanding Public 
Image," Journalism Quarterly. 36 (Summer 1959). 275-283.
9try to persuade congress and the public, he must also win reporters. 
Former White House correspondent Tom Wicker has said that the presi­
dent "has to make his case to the press; it's Just like an advocate 
in court. He has to cover up his weak points and emphasise his 
strong points and the government does it all the time."*5 Added 
to his other persuasive goals, the president, then, has the persuasive 
function of building rapport with the press.^ This follows, because 
the press determines, in some cases, the effect of the presidential 
news conference on the public by what it reports in substance and 
in tone. The press not only helps to determine the persuasive ef­
fect of the president's programs, it molds the president's public 
image as well.*?
The third function of the press conference from the presiden­
tial point of view is that the conference can serve as a vehicle 
of feedback. To the extent that reporters are in tune with public 
attitudes and Interests, the questions asked at the conference may 
reveal to the president some of the main concerns of the public at
the time. The questions, to some ertsnt, are an index of public
18opinion and interest. Awareness of public opinion is vital to 
the leadership function of the chief executive.
*^ As quoted in G.R. Berdes, Friendly Adversaries: The Press and 
Government (Marquette University: Center for the Study of the Ameri­
can Press, 1969). p. 110.
16
Emory S. Bogardus, "Sociology of the Presidential TV Press Con­
ference," Sociology and Social Research. (Jan. 1962), 182; and 
Zelko, p. 26.
17Cater, Power in Washington, pp. 228-229.
18
Faunell J. Rinn, "The Presidential Press Conference," in ^ ie 
Presidency, ed. Aaron Wildavsky (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 19^ 9)»
PP* 33^ -335; Hugh A. Bone, "The Presidential Press Conference," Parlia­
mentary Affairs. *1 (Spring 1958), 1^ *8; and Rosslter, p. 117.
10
The purposes and functions of the presidential news conference 
from the standpoint of the press must he mentioned. The conference 
allows reporters to get new information. Reporters compete for news 
and news becomes a commodity in a s e n s e .^  The conference allows the 
press not only news, but the opportunity to gain deeper understanding 
of current affairs. Direct contact with the president also provides 
reporters and commentators with stories on the president's health
OA
and his moods. While most newsmen would prefer private interviews 
with the president, most of them use the press conference extensively
pi
as an important source. A
In some ways, the press acts as an "arbiter" of public opinion.22 
According to Kraft, "the chief function of the Washington press, in­
deed, is to put forward the conflicting arguments of the various ele­
ments of the government and the Congress for public favor."23 The 
presidential press conference thus serves the press in this role by 
allowing it to present and elicit elements of differing points of view 
in the questions that are asked and with the replies of the president. 
As the "fourth estate," the correspondents may even use the confer­
ence to influence the president. For example, "as one systematic 
channel of communication between Congress and the executive," reporters
^^ Cater, Power in Washington, p. 225.
20Harry W. Sharp, Jr., "The Kennedy News Conference," Dlss.
Purdue 1967. p. 104.
2*Dan D. Nimmo, Newsgatherlng in Washington (New York: Atherton, 
1964), p. 146.
22Cater, Power in Washington, p. 225.
23joseph Kraft, "Politics of the Washington Press Corps,"
Harper's. June 1965. P* 102.
11
may serve the congress to assert that branch of government's post- 
tion.£ According to Reston, however, the idea that the press
serves as a "restraining influence" on the president is largely 
igythlcal now since that power has gradually decreased.25 This notion 
of the press as a "check" on the president is clarified in the dlscus- 
sion that immediately follows. Ultimately, the presidential press 
conference chiefly functions for the press as a staple of news.
Aside from the functions of the presidential press conference 
in meeting the needs of the president and of the press, the conference 
also serves the Interests of government and of the society as a whole. 
Inherent in this idea is the suggestion that the press conference can 
hold the president accountable for his actions. In this way, the
conference is seen to serve as a "check and balance" mechanism on
26the executive branch. As an extension, perhaps, of the idea that 
the press is a "fourth branch" of government is the common analogy 
of the American presidential press conference to the question period 
of the British Parliament. In the House of Commons, a daily thirty- 
minute segment is devoted to questions from members of the House to 
the various ministers.2?
Cater, The Fourth Branch of Government, p. 14.
2^James B. Reston, "The Press, the President and Foreign Policy," 
Foreign Affairs. 44 (July 1966), 559-562.
2 R^inn, pp. 330-332; Fauneil Rinn, "The Presidential Press Con­
ference as a Communication Process," Studies in Public Communication.
1 (Summer 1957), 6-10; James E. Pollard, "The White House News Con­
ference as a Channel of Communication," Public Opinion Quarterly.
15 (Winter 1951-52), 677.
2?For a discussion of this institution, see Robert R. James, An 
Introduction to the House of Commons (London: Collins, 1961), pp. 5T-
dS~.
12
Enough differences between the presidential press conference and 
the question hour exist to merit discussion at this point. These dif­
ferences have been noted by C a t e r , R i n n , 2 ^  Bone,and Rosslter. 
First, the question period is a fixed, legal part of British govern­
ment; the press conference is completely extra-legal. Second, the 
question period is a daily affair in the House, save Fridays; the 
presidential press conference is only as regular as the president 
decides. Third, questions are put to ministers of the British govern­
ment by elected representatives, not by reporters. Fourth, the ques­
tion period is initiated by written questions from members, although 
oral "supplementaries" may follow. This allows ministers time to do 
research. Questions at presidential press conferences are oral. 
Further, the British institution differs here in that there is a 
built in system for follow-up questions, which is not always possible 
in the American press conference. Fifth, answers to questions put by 
members of the House of Commons may be in writing or oral, or both, 
depending upon a variety of circumstances; answers at presidential 
press conferences are immediate and oral. Sixth, ministers of the 
British government are under more duress to provide satisfactory 
answers to members' questions than is the president to reporters' 
questions. Seventh, queries at question time are screened by the 
government for appropriateness in tone and content, while a reporter 
at a news conference is free to ask any question in his own way.
pQ
The Fourth Branch of Government, pp. 1^ 2-155*
Z^ "The Presidential Press Conference," pp. 330-331*
30Bone, p. 150.
Rosslter, p. 117.
32R.R. James, p. 8ln.
Along this line, reporters may ask a wide variety of questions of 
one man, the president: questions from the House are filtered auto­
matically to appropriate ministers. An eighth difference is that 
the question period can be used to advantage by the opposition party 
to exploit weaknesses of the party in power; this is not always true 
in the press conference because of the power of the president and be­
cause of the reportorial role of the correspondent. Reporters tend 
to play a non-partisan role in the press conference. Ninth, the 
question period is only held when the House of Commons is in session; 
presidential press conferences often occur when congress is not in 
session. Tenth, the presidential press conference is largely designed 
to Inform and persuade the public and to give the reporters news; the 
question period Is more a function of government and has less news 
value. Finally, the question period is more institutionalised and 
has a more formal procedural arrangement than the presidential press 
conference.
The question period has some advantages over the press conference. 
One is that the ministers can be pressed more severely for responsive 
answers. Also, the question hour is held regularly, when policy is 
still being made, allowing the members of the House to Influence the 
formulation of policy in a direct way. In this manner, the question 
period does more to hold the government responsible or accountable 
for its actions.^
Other societal and governmental functions of the presidential 
press conference exist. The conference can serve as an executive
33
Cater, The Fourth Branch of Government, pp. 148-151.
"check" on the congress and even on the Supreme Court.^ The presi­
dent can use the conference to prod congress as well as to help deter­
mine the impact of a decision of the courts. The press conference 
serves society by providing Immediate information.^ The conference 
can help develop a "social nearness" between the public and the presl- 
dent. Along this line, a broadcast conference can give the public 
a sense of participation in government and can heighten public in­
terest in governmental affairs. Further, the public can monitor 
governmental action and gauge the effectiveness of its leadership.3^
A final societal function of the conference is that it demonstrates 
democratic ideals, that democratic government is working.39
In summary, the functions and purposes of the American presi­
dential press conference are many. The conference serves the presi­
dent in his leadership roles. The president informs the nation. More 
importantly, he uses the conference as a channel of persuasion to 
reach public opinion, the congress, the press, and the world. The 
president gains publicity, argues for his policies, and defends his 
actions. The conference functions for the press to provide news.
The conference serves the government as a source of communication 
and information and as a "check and balance." The conference serves 
society in providing prompt information, in holding the executive 
accountable, and by allowing society to judge its leader's effectiveness,
^Rinn, "The Presidential Press Conference," pp. 331-332.
33Bogardus, p. 181.
^Ibid.
3?Rinn, "The Presidential Press Conference," pp. 332-333.
39Ibld.. pp. 333-335.
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Characteristics of the Presidential Press Conference
The presidential press conference in this country is an extra- 
legal and extra-Constitutional phenomenon. As shall be explained 
later, the institution simply evolved over a period of years, chiefly 
in our own centuiy, at the initiative of various presidents. Fur­
ther, most of the characteristics of the press conference are deter­
mined by the individual president, although some features are con­
stant and somewhat institutionalised.
The chief participants of the conference are the president and 
attending reporters. There are two variations to this composition. 
Sometimes a president may share his conference with another official 
or dignitary. In 19M, President Roosevelt and Winston Churchill 
met the Washington press together, both responding to questions.
More commonly, a president will hold a joint conference with one of 
his own cabinet members. While the president usually faces the press 
alone, he often has advisers, such as his own press secretary, nearby 
to call upon for specific information if necessary. Any number of 
reporters, from twenty to five hundred, may attend, depending upon 
the circumstances and the location of the conference. Generally, any 
reporter, domestic or foreign, with official credentials may attend.
The second variation to the composition of the conference is the broad­
cast news conference, where the listening or viewing audience becomes 
an indirect participant.
Locations vary. Most conferences take place in Washington, D.C. 
Recent presidents have held conferences in foreign countries as well 
as at various sites within the United States while on tour or on vaca­
tion. Within the Capitol, specific locations also vary. Some presi­
dents meet the press in their White House office or in other rooms in
16
the White House. Large conferences, such as those which are televised, 
meet in auditoriums such as that of the State Department Building.
Another varying characteristic is the scheduling of the news con­
ference. Timing is at the discretion of the president. Some presi­
dents have tried to meet regularly, at fairly predictable intervals, 
with the press; others have been unpredictable in scheduling, as will 
be seen later. Some presidents have had favorite days and times for 
their conferences while others have tried to accommodate reporters' 
deadline problems by varying their scheduling. The frequency of hold­
ing the conferences has also varied considerably. Finally, most con­
ferences are announced in advance, although some presidents, notably 
Lyndon Johnson, have held Impromptu meetings with the press.
The standard length of a press conference is thirty minutes, 
especially if it is broadcast. Some conferences have lasted only 
ten minutes while others have gone beyond an hour. Ostensibly, the 
length of the conference is determined by the press. By tradition, 
the senior wire service correspondent ends the conference.
The degree of formality is another variant of the presidential 
press conference. Televised conferences are the most formal. Frank­
lin Roosevelt and Lyndon Johnson preferred small, informal conferences 
in their offices, while they sat at their desks with reporters either 
standing or sitting around them. The degree of formality is also 
influenced by the size of the group of correspondents, the location 
of the conference, and the individual president's personality.
The basic pattern of the conference is as follows. After the 
reporters have gathered, the president walks in and usually begins 
the conference with a series of announcements. He then calls for
17
questions. The president recognizes whichever reporter he happens 
to notice. The reporter states his questlon(s). The president re­
sponds and then calls upon another questioner. Presidents before 
F.D. R. required written queries and rarely entertained oral ques­
tions. Since F.D.R., only oral questions have been asked. Sometimes, 
before the conference begins, presidential aides will "plant” ques­
tions with reporters to make sure that certain topics are brought 
up. The conference ends, sometimes abruptly, with the senior wire 
service correspondent's traditional "Thank you, Mr. President."
The conference is usually "wrapped up" an hour later with a distribu­
tion of transcripts of the conference prepared by the White House 
staff.
Early Presidential Relations with the Press
Although the presidential press conference is a development of 
the twentieth century in America, its foundations can be seen in 
the evolution of presidential relations with the press since the 
American Revolution. This section traces those relations and the 
way that Presidents Washington through Taft dealt with the press.
Up until the time of the Civil War, the most important periodi­
cal publications were political, partisan organs.^ Administration
organs were used by the various presidents through the administration
UOof Buchanan. Some presidents were able to use the same organ as 
their predecessors. For example, the National Intelligencer served
■ F^rank L. Mott, American Journalism (New York: Macmillan, 19*H), 
p. 253.
antes E. Pollard, The Presidents and the Press (New York: Mac­
millan, 19^ 7), pp. 291-292.
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most of the presidents from Jefferson through John Quincy Adams.***
Rival publications were numerous and espoused the views of anti­
administration factions and parties. To some extent, a president’s 
press relations depended upon his capacity to use such party organs 
effectively. The administration organs not only became almost the 
sole sources of White House news, but, to some degree, they controlled
II?
much government news.
George Washington found the press useful in two ways before be­
coming president. The press served during the Revolution to provide 
military information.Also, Washington sought press approval and
i tii
support for the new Constitution. Washington, like most presidents 
until Jackson, had little direct contact with the press.^ But 
Washington was aware of the publicity power of the press as he sought 
publication of his "Farewell Address."^
John Adams was a prolific writer for newspapers but had no direct 
contact with reporters.**? He did propose an official government paper, 
but the proposal was never taken seriously and partisan papers continued
Ml
to dominate. Thomas Jefferson, one of the nation's leading champions
***Cater, The Fourth Branch of Government, pp. 75-76.
**^ William L. Rivers, The Qplnionmakers (Boston: Beacon, 1967). p. 3. 
-^^ Pollard, The Presidents and the Press, pp. 1-2.
****Ibld.. p. k.
^Ibld.. pp. 1, 6.
**^ William L. Rivers, The Adversaries: Politics and the Press (Bos­
ton: Beacon, 1970), p. 10; and John K. Boas, "The Presidential Press 
Conference," Diss. Wayne State 1969. P» I**1-
^?Pollard, The Presidents and the Press, pp. 36,*f6.
^Ibld.. pp. U5J46.
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for press freedoms, also worked behind the scenes. He Is famous 
for his attitude, expressed before the adoption of the Constitution, 
when he said, "Were It left to me to decide whether we should have a 
government without newspapers or newspapers without a government, I 
should not hesitate to prefer the latter."^9 Jefferson carried his 
zeal for freedom of the press Into the presidency by pardoning edi­
tors and publishers who had been convicted under the Alien and Sedi­
tion Acts of 1795 for disagreeable criticisms of the previous adminis­
trations.^® As President, Jefferson was able to establish his own 
organ, the National Intelligencer, under the direction of Philip Fre- 
neau. He did this by offering Freneau a position in government, a 
practice to be followed by other presidents.^
Madison, Monroe, and John Quincy Adams continued the use of the 
administration organ to release news. Both Madison and Adams had 
written for newspapers and were able to use the press to advantage. 
Monroe was largely ineffectual in his press relationships. 52 Madison 
suggested the establishment of a bi-partisan publication, but the 
idea did not bear fruit.^
Until the time of Jackson, no president had been aggressive in 
his use of the nation's press. Jackson reversed the trend. According 
to divers, "Jackson used the party press so astutely that one noted
^Quoted in Mott, p. 170.
°^Mott, p. 152; and Pollard, The Presidents and the Press, p. 71.
^Rivers, The Adversaries, pp. 10-11; and Pollard, The Presidents 
and the Press, p. 70.
52Pollard, The Presidents and the Press, pp. 96-1 **6.
53Mott, p. 175.
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historian claims that Jackson actually ruled the country by means of
54
newspapers.Jackson accomplished favorable press coverage in
various ways. One method was to award government printing contracts
to friendly publishers, a device used by previous presidents, and one
which remained useful until i860 when the Government Printing Office
was established.'^ Jackson also appointed many Journalists to important
government positions, perhaps as many as fifty-seven, including three
of the five members of his ''Kitchen Cabinet."^ Pollard concluded:
Andrew Jackson excelled in aggressive, partisan use of the 
press. He knew what he wanted, he meant to have his own 
way, and he was fortunate in finding journalists devoted 
to him and capable of carrying out his desires. The result 
was the most effective employment of the press for partisan 
purposes in the long history of the Presidency.57
The presidents between Jackson and Lincoln were generally undis­
tinguished in their use of the press. Van Buren continued use of the 
party organ and may be the first president who allowed publication of 
an interview by a Journalist.^® William Harrison revived the National 
Intelligencer for his administration^9 and used the press to defend 
his war record, to refute chtiges of being an abolitionist, and to 
campaign for the presidency.^ Tyler, who was a "strong believer in
54
The Adversaries, p. 12.
^Cater, The Fourth Branch of Government, p. 76; and Pollard,
The Presidents and the Press, p. 15^ .
56
Pollard, The Presidents and the Press. p. 1^ 7; Rivers, The 
Adversaries, pp. 5-6; Cater, The Fourth Branch of Government, p. 76; 
and Mott, pp. 179-190.
cn
Pollard, The Presidents and the Press, p. 1^ 7.
5®Ibid.. pp. 181-195; and Rivers, The Adversaries. p. 13.
59M0tt, p. 225.
®®Pollard, The Presidents and the Press, pp. 201-208.
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the power of the press . . . set up a new paper, the Madisonian. In 
Washington, and an organ in nearly every state, all of them bound to 
the administration by patronage."**1 To those and other favorable 
papers he submitted articles from time to time.^  ^ Polk again changed 
organs to the Washington Union^ It was during the Polk administra­
tion, in 1846, that a law was passed to give printing contracts to
the lowest bidder, a blow to the patronage powers of the presidency 
64with the press. Polk disliked public attention and was distrustful 
of the press, although he appointed journalists to government posi­
tions.^^ While Polk realized the powers of the press, he was basically
unsuccessful in using them to presidential advantage.^ Taylor also
67established a new paper but took little initiative with the press. 
Although Fillmore had previously used the press to present informa­
tion and publicize his opinions, his presidential efforts at using
the press were limited to the establishment of relations with a small
use
69
68group of publishers. Pierce and Buchanan d the Union as their
spokesman but made minimal use of the press.
6lMott, p. 256.
62Pollard, The Presidents and the Press, pp. 214-225.
63Mott, p. 256. 
w ibid.
^%*ollard, The Presidents and the Press, pp. 230,241, 252. 
66Ibld.. p. 252.
67Ibid.. pp. 256-267; and Mott, p. 257.
**®Pollard, The Presidents and the Press, pp. 268-276. 
69ibld.. pp. 282-292; and Mott. p. 257.
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Like Jackson, Lincoln once again changed the pattern of presi­
dential press relations. Lincoln was a frequent contributor of re­
ports and editorials to Illinois newspapers and discovered the power 
of the press over public opinion early in his political career.7®
Dy making friends in the press, Lincoln was able to gain publicity 
locally and nationally in his various attempts to gain office. Among 
these friends was the powerful Chicago Tribune.^ One way in which 
Lincoln gained a favorable press was to provide copies of his speeches 
to various papers, including his famous "House Divided" speech and his 
address at Cooper Union. Lincoln even took the trouble to read news­
paper proofs to assure accuracy and emphasis in the printing of his 
speeches.7  ^ Lincoln was an "Inveterate newspaper reader" and well 
understood the workings of the press.?3
In the White House, Lincoln dropped the use of the partisan ad­
ministration organ so that he might establish favorable relationships
7u
with a variety of publishers.' In fact, Lincoln sought to win under­
standing and support of such antagonistic papers as Horace Greeley's 
Tribune as well as the New York Herald. perhaps even more important
is the fact that Lincoln cultivated the first really direct relations
76with Washington reporters. As President, he saw reporters often and
7®Pollard, The Presidents and the Press, pp. 312-313.
71Mott, pp. 284-285.
72Pollard, The Presidents and the Press, pp. 325* 33^ .
73Ibld.. p. 313.
^Rivers, The Onlnlonmakers. p. 7.
7^Rivers, The Adversaries, pp. 15-16.
76
Boaz, pp. 22-23*
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at length and occasionally gave Impromptu Interviews. He had many 
informal dealings with correspondents and his accessibility laid the 
groundwork for more extensive presidential press relationships. ?? In 
sum, Lincoln’s press relations were probably better than those of any 
previous president.
Johnson, Grant, Hayes, Garfield, and Arthur were undistinguished 
in their press relations. Johnson's chief contribution was to give a 
number of exclusive Interviews with reporters.78 Grant had had little
prior contact with the press and was not effective in dealing with it. ^9
80Hayes knew mapy publishers well and attempted good press relations. 
Garfield, too, had "extensive dealings with the press," but these
O 1
were more "personal than official," and were not used to advantage. 
Arthur began with bad press relations and stayed away from reporters, 
preferring to work directly with congressional leaders.
While Grover Cleveland carried an "active antipathy" toward the 
press throughout his years in office, he was fairly successful in
Q-a
using the press to support his programs. Cleveland received ques­
tions from reporters through his staff and often provided answers in 
return, but indirectly. He occasionally gave interviews to individual
77Pollard, The Presidents and the Press, pp. 348, 369-373.
78lbid.. pp. 413-427. 
79Ibid.. pp. 434-452. 
8QIbid.. p. 455. 
8*Ibid.. p. 480.
82Ibld.. pp. 488-497.
83Ibld.. pp. 499, 533.
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and groups of reporters. He frequently prepared news releases to 
make announcements. He also wrote a number of letters to papers In
order to defend and explain his policies, sometimes rebutting criti-
84
cism. Cleveland disliked press speculation, was angered when re­
porters interfered with his personal life, and he distrusted papers 
so much that he was against the practice of providing advance texts
of his speeches and messages.
Benjamin Harrison and McKinley remained inaccessible to Washing­
ton correspondents. Harrison did not get along well with the press,
although he appointed a number of journalists to positions in govern-
86
ment. Falling to understand the power of the press, he was unable
to use it to his advantage.®? McKinley, an avid newspaper reader,
also remained aloof to reporters. His chief contribution to develop­
ing relations between the White House and the press was to provide
QQ
chairs for reporters in a corridor of the White House.
It was Theodore Roosevelt, cognisant of the value of publi­
city and not reticent about projecting his ego into the 
front pages of the land, who first began to treat the news­
papermen with a consideration calculated to have its
rewards.89
As Governor, Roosevelt had met the press twice daily with a free oral 
^Ibld.. pp. 501. 513 , 516 , 528.
85Ibid.. pp. 500-501, 515, 522; and Mott, pp. 510-511.
R6Mott, p. 511.
8 P^ollard, The Presidents and the Press, pp. 538-539, 557. 
^ Ibld.. pp. 551-557.
®^Leo C. Rosten, The Washlngton Correspondents (New York: Har- 
court. Brace and Co., 1937), p. 21.
25
Interchange of questions and answers, although direct quotation was 
never permitted.9^  He carried his basic attitudes toward the press
to the White House. "The thrust of his method was orchestration;
91both courting the correspondents and commanding them." Roosevelt 
established the first White House press room for correspondents.^
He wrote for several publications, prepared press releases, and sug­
gested news Items to reporters. Roosevelt timed his press releases 
carefully. Knowing, for example, that publishers lacked news for 
Monday papers, he made a practice of Issuing news releases on Sundays 
to capture attention In the next day's press.9** Roosevelt is also 
credited with being the first president to use the "trial balloon" 
technique, a device which allowed him to publicize an idea without 
public knowledge of the s o u r c e .95
Roosevelt's presidential press conferences were not the types of 
meeting ordinarily thought of as press conferences in the modern sense. 
He did not meet with large groups of reporters. Instead, Roosevelt 
called in selected "favorites," who would give him favorable publi­
city.^ To these chosen few he gave exclusive interviews and answered 
questions, but he always molded and directed these meetings to suit
9®Pollard, The Presidents and the Press, p. 510.
9*Rivers, The Adversaries, p. 18.
9^Ibld.; and Pollard, The Presidents and the Press, p. 57^ .
93pollard, The Presidents and the Press, pp. 573• 59^ .
9^Ibid.. p. 573; and Boaz, p. 36.
95Raymond P. Brandt, "The President's Press Conference," Survey 
Graphic. 28 (July 1939), ^ 8; and Rosten, p. 22.
96flosten, p. 22.
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his own designs. He continued the rule prohibiting direct quotation.97
The meetings were held at various times and were not scheduled on a 
regular basis, although Roosevelt remained accessible to reporters 
throughout his administration. Roosevelt's relations with corres­
pondents were as mercurial as his personality. He charmed reporters, 
bullied them, lectured to them, and vented his wrath upon those who 
(or whose papers) printed unfriendly articles. Reporters who violated 
Roosevelt's trust were "elected" to the "Ananias Club" and were likely 
not to see the President again."
Roosevelt was highly sensitive to press criticism, and he in 
turn responded with criticism as well as legal action. In his first 
message to Congress he placed a share of the blame for McKinley's 
assassination on the press." In 1909* he Instructed the Attorney 
General to file libel suits against two publishers, including Joseph 
Pulitzer, for stories on corruption in his administration.**^ He 
Initiated other suits after he left office.
Roosevelt, then, was probably the most effective president since
Lincoln in his dealings with the press. He saw reporters as public
102servants, and he went out of his way to cultivate their services.
97
Ibid.: and Rivers, The Adversaries, p. 18.
"Rivers, The Adversaries, pp. 18-19; Pollard, The Presidents and 
the Press, pp. 5^ 9. 572, 57^ +; Rosten, p. 22; and Mott, p. 60&.
"Mott, p. 5^ 1.
100Ibid.. pp. 605-606.
*°*Ibld.. pp. 606, 608.
102Pollard, The Presidents and the Press, p. 59^ .
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His understanding of the workings of the press and his deliberate 
wooing of reporters paid off In large measure.
Taft's relations with reporters were not as successful. Taft had 
a working knowledge of the press, since, after graduation from college, 
he had been a reporter in Cincinnati.Secretary of War, Taft 
held daily afternoon press conferences. "He enjoyed the cross-fire 
of questions at his conferences. . . ,»104 in the White House, Taft 
attempted to hold weekly press conferences.*®^ Because of sensitivity 
to press criticism and an inability to follow his predecessor's rapport 
with reporters, Taft came to see the press less frequently and his 
press relations came to be ineffective.*®^ It is paradoxical that 
Taft was unable to utilize well his newspaper experience and relations 
with the press as War Secretary to advantage during his term as presi- 
dent.
In reviewing this section on the early history of presidential 
relations with the press, several points emerge. Presidents Washing­
ton through Buchanan relied chiefly upon partisan political organs to 
promote their administrations. Early presidents remained aloof from 
the press. They declined direct relations with reporters although 
they favored editors and publishers with various types of patronage 
and friendship. The most successful early presidents were Jackson,
l03Ibld.. p .  601.
1 a / l
Mott, p. 608; and Rivers, The Adversaries, p. 20.
*®^ Rosten, p. 23; and Mott, p. 608.
*®^ Pollard, The Presidents and the Press, pp. 605-620.
*®^ Ibid.. p. 627; Rivers, The Adversaries. p. 20; and Boaz, 
pp. 37-*0.
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Lincoln, and Theodore Roosevelt. Jackson cultivated relationships 
with many journalists and was thus able to have. In effect, more than 
one administration organ. Lincoln was the first president to become 
accessible to reporters, and he vigorously sought press support in a 
number of ways. Roosevelt set the stage for the modem press con­
ference In his meetings with reporters and used his contacts with 
the press better than any previous chief executive. How the modern 
press conference evolved Is the subject of the last section of this 
chapter.
The Twentieth Century Evolution of the Presidential Press Conference
The ten presidents that followed Taft developed relations with 
the press In more sophisticated ways than those before them. The 
twentieth century witnessed a rise In the Influence of Independent 
newspapers, an Increase In the powers of the presidency, and the 
establishment and Institutionalisation of the presidential press con­
ference. The following discussion describes the evolution of the 
presidential press conference as well as the Increased reliance of 
the presidency upon the press. Each president's press relations and 
contributions to the press conference are considered separately.
Woodrow Wilson. Most historians of the institution credit Wilson 
with the formal establishment of the presidential press conference. 
Wilson was probably the first president to have a stenographer present
*^®Bogardus, p. 181, says Cleveland was the first to hold press 
conferences, possibly because Cleveland granted interviews to report­
ers. Other historians cite Theodore Roosevelt and Taft with the In­
vention. But Wilson was first to hold formal and regular press con­
ferences open to all accredited correspondents; see Pollard, The 
Presidents and the Press, pp. 630-631.
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109at press meetings. He may have been the first to have a staff 
member who served as a press secretary.1*0 Since Wilson did not 
permit direct quotation, the "official spokesman" technique for 
attribution was initiated under Wilson.***
Wilson held his conferences twice weekly, on Mondays and Thurs­
days, during the first two years of his administration. Beginning
112
in 1915» he held only one a week, on Tuesdays. After the sinking 
of the "Lusitania," Wilson discontinued his press conferences, par­
tially as a security precaution, since foreign correspondents were
113allowed to attend.
Wilson's conferences were of three types. In some he answered 
a broad range of questions. Other conferences were held on one sub­
ject only. In the third type, Wilson lectured at length on his atti-
114
tudes and policies. In the first type of conference, Wilson took 
little initiative and allowed reporters to determine the content and 
direction of the meeting. He had a "self-imposed rule of passivity.m11  ^
In the conferences with a single topic, Wilson "fenced" with corres­
pondents and was probably more aggressive.The third typ® of
10^Elmer E. Cornwell, Jr., "The Press Conferences of Woodrow 
Wilson," Journalism Quarterly. 39 (Summer 1962), 293; and Boaz, p. 94.
** B^oas, p. 48; and Pollard, The Presidents and the Press, p. 632.
***Rosten, pp. 24-25.
**^Cornwell, "The Press Conferences of Woodrow Wilson," p. 294. 
11^Rosten, p. 25; and Boas, p. 56.
**^Boas, pp. 54-55.
1^Cornwell, "The Press Conferences of Woodrow Wilson," p. 299. 
ll6Boaz, p. 54.
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conference revealed Wilson's habit of lecturing to reporters. "There
was In Wilson's manner something of a professor facing a classroom.
117He regarded newspapermen as Intellectual inferiors. ..." In 
general he was somewhat unresponsive in his press conferences. He 
remained cautious, aloof, and at times terse with reporters. He was 
even evasive and misleading on occasion.**®
Although reporters were friendly with Wilson, several factors 
lessened the effectiveness of his conferences and his press relations. 
There Is evidence that Wilson did not really like the cross examina­
tion atmosphere of the news conference.**^ His tendency to lecture 
to reporters did not help. He was especially sensitive toward ques­
tions about his personal and family life and rebuked prying repor- 
120ters. Wilson was bothered by criticism in papers and was hurt by
121
unfavorable publicity about his administration.
122Wilson was probably glad to discontinue his conferences. When
he did, he turned his press relations over to his secretary, Joseph
Tumulty, who met the press daily to provide news and answer questions.
This practice was the forerunner of contemporary press secretaries'
123news conferences, now usually held twice dally in Washington. In
117Rosten, p. 25; and M.L. Stein, When Presidents Meet the Press 
(New York: Messner, 19^ 9)» PP» 55-56.
1.18
Boas, p. 46; and Brandt, p. 448.
**^Cornwell, "The Press Conferences of Woodrow Wilson," pp. 298- 
299; and Stein, pp. 56-57.
120
Pollard, The Presidents and the Press, pp. 633-638.
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19171 the White House became less of a news source. Wilson estab- 
llshed the Committee on Public Information, headed by George Creel, 
to coordinate and disclose government information. Although Wil­
son no longer had many direct contacts with the press, he continued 
to be irritated by "leaks," by speculation in the press, and by inade­
quate publicity for his programs.
Warren Harding. Harding published his own paper in Marion, Ohio, 
many years before he entered politics. His prowess in understanding 
the needs of newspapermen was shown in his campaign for the presidency,
as he made special efforts to accommodate reporters and meet with 
126
them.
After the election, Harding reinstated the press conference. "He 
was affable and communicative, the epitome of good-fellowship. He 
met the corps twice a week and enjoyed a high degree of popularity.
He was the first President to divulge, quite carelessly, what went on
127
at cabinet meetings." Harding liked the press, treated it well,
and enjoyed his meetings with reporters. He was, in turn, treated
1
well by reporters. His conferences were on Tuesday and Friday 
afternoons, after cabinet meetings.
The basic policies of Harding's conferences were as follows.
Like Wilson, Harding occasionally spoke off-the-record. As Roosevelt 
124
Ibid.. pp. 659-687.
123Ibid.. pp. 654-655, 658, 690, 686-687.
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had done, Harding demanded that reporters not break that confidence 
when he did speak off-the-record. Another rule was that Harding was 
not to be quoted directly without permission.*3® In November of 
1921, another change came about: written questions were to be sub­
mitted in advance. This rule evolved as a consequence of an embaras-
sing slip of mind and tongue on a delicate matter of foreign policy
131during a news conference. The rule was relaxed as time went on so
as to allow oral follow-up questions and oral questions on topics
132
initiated by Harding.
Toward the end of his administration, press criticism and breaches
of his trust led Harding to become more cautious in his dealings with 
133reporters. In sum, Harding had made a contribution to presidential 
press relations. He helped the development of the press conference 
by making it permanent and regular and by participating with reporters 
actively.
Calvin Coolldge. Coolldge continued most of Harding's press
conference practices, meeting reporters twice a week on Tuesdays and
13^Fridays. Written questions were required and Coolldge answered as 
many or as few as he liked. He so rarely allowed direct quotation 
that his conferences were basically off-the-record. Coolldge viewed
the press conference as a source of background information rather
*3®Pollard, The Presidents and the Press, p. 70*f; and Boas, p. 6l.
*3*Pollard, The Presidents and the Press, p. 705.
132Rosten, p. 27.
133Pollard, The Presidents and the Press, p. 705; *nd Stein, p. 71. 
*^Boas, p. 67,
135than a source of news. His penchant for forcing reporters to use
the "White House spokesman" attribution device led Lyle Wilson to
suggest that. "Calvin Coolidge was t.he contriver of the most persis-
116tent and transparent political hoax of twentieth-century America." 
Coolldge would not even permit reporters to publish the fact that he 
refused to comment on a particular question. Coolidge sometimes 
used his conferences to make announcements, but his replies to ques­
tions provided so little and such dry information for reporters that 
the press was forced to manufacture news and to embellish Coolidge's 
remarks. The correspondents "exploited the trivial material he 
gave them. ..."
Coolidge was friendly with the press and actively sought its 
support. The real story of Coolidge's success with the press lay in 
his use of the press conference to promote himself* politically, since 
he had no substantive legislative program to p u b l i c i z e . With the 
help of reporters who dramatized his statements, Coolldge rose to
prominence from an unknown because of his ability to focus public
140attention on the White House. He courted the press on vacations 
and on the election trail and used the press to his advantage to win
135Ibld.
*^In The Talkative President: The Off-the-Record Press Confer­
ences of Calvin Coolidge. ed. Howard H. Quint and Robert H. Ferrell 
(Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 196^ ). P» v.
* ^Brandt, p. ^ 8; and Rosten, p. 31.
13®Brandt, p. ^+8; and Rosten, p. 3^ «
Elmer E. Cornwell, Jr., "Coolidge and Presidential Leader­
ship," Public Opinion Quarterly. 21 (Summer 1957), 273-277.
1^ 0 . ,
the 1924 election.1^ 1 The press made Coolldge a public legend. As 
Rosten put It.
The Washington correspondents had been presented with the 
considerable task of popularising a man of no historic talents, 
no engaging graces, no compelling personality. Ihey had to 
transform a New England politician Into a statesman. . . .
The press hammered the Coolldge legend into the public mind.
Mr. Coolldge was astute enough to let newspapermen pressed 
for copy endow him with extravagant talents which he did not 
possess, and magnify him to a stature which he could not have 
achieved by deliberate exertion.
Proportionately speaking, Coolidge held more news conferences 
than any previous or later president. He held 520 conferences for 
an average of about eight a month during his tenure.
In a way, Coolidge's only contribution to the evolution of presi­
dential press conferences was that he held them unfailingly. More 
important was his contribution to presidential press relations. He 
demonstrated, even more sharply than Theodore Roosevelt, the use of 
the press to gain personal political advantage. He was one of the 
few presidents to enjoy mutually cordial relations with the Washing­
ton press throughout his administration.
Herbert Hoover. While Commerce Secretary under Harding, Hoover 
had developed unusually good rapport with the press. He had met with 
reporters informally and often and proved to be a valuable source of 
news.^^ His high popularity with the press and his favorable dealings
*^*Brandt, p. 448.
Rosten, pp. 38-39.
*^Boaz, pp. 63-65.
* iji
Pollard, The Presidents and the Press, p. 717.
^^Rosten, p. 39.
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with reporters came to an end, as had Taft's, when Hoover came into 
146
the White House.
Hoover changed several of the policies of his predecessor. Hoover 
met the reporters less frequently than had Coolidge. In his first year, 
he averaged only two conferences a month. In his last three years, he 
held slightly more than an average of one conference a month, for a to­
tal of only sixty-six in four years.Another change involved the 
abolition of the "White House spokesman" attribution device. Hoover 
set up three categories of answers: (1) direct quotation by permission,
(2) background information for use but not for quotation, and (3) con­
fidential data which could not be used in any way. Hoover retained 
the requirement of written questions, which had to be submitted twenty- 
four hours in advance of a given conference.***^  Hoover's press secre­
tary then screened the questions, and many never reached the Presi- 
150
dent's eyes. Like Coolldge, Hoover then decided which of the re­
porters' questions he wanted to answer and went as far as denying that 
he had received a question if a reporter pressed for an a n s w e r . *^ 1
Hoover's press conferences and press relations were marred in a 
number of ways. Hoover read his answers, which were not particularly 
informative anyway. He demeaned reporters. He often gave out mis­
leading and Inaccurate information and was generally reticent. *52
146Pollard, The Presidents and the Press, p. 737; and Boaz, p. 73.
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Hoover disliked stories about his personal and family life and grew
more and more resentful of press criticisms of the policies of his
1 S3administration. He attempted to coordinate all news in the execu­
tive branch through the White House press secretary and reporters 
cried "censorship."jn « downward spiral of distrust and dislike. 
Hoover became increasingly distant and the press more bitter in criti­
cism. Relations deteriorated to such an extent that in September of 
1932, Hoover discontinued meeting with the press.
Hoover contributed little to the evolution of the presidential 
press conference and the development of presidential press relations. 
Many reasons account for his failures with the press. An economic 
depression, problems with congress, and a hostile press added to his 
demise. Hoover's administration was also to blame. Pollard con­
cluded:
Much of its personal failure and political tragedy lay in 
his inability to keep the confidence of correspondents.
It remained for his successor to prove over a far longer 
and vastly world-shaking time what really skillful and 
adroit handling of press corps could accomplish in fat 
years and lean.*5°
Franklin Roosevelt. As Governor of New York, F.D.R. had estab­
lished the practice of holding regular press conferences. He carried
157that practice into office as President.
*^Rosten, pp. *K)-^ 1.
1^*Ibld.. pp. i+2-^ 4.
*- P^ollard, The Presidents and the Press, p. 768.
1^ 6Ibld.. p. 770
157james Pollard, "Franklin D, Roosevelt and the Press," 
Journalism Quarterly. 22 (Sept. 19^ 5)* 198.
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As President, Roosevelt met the press twice a week, holding 998
158
conferences In all. He dropped the requirement of written ques­
tions. He had four categories of replies which Included (1) direct 
quotation, (2) Indirect quotation, (3) background information unattribu- 
table to him, and (^ ) off-the-record, confidential information not for 
publication in any form. The second of those categories was an inno­
vation.*-^
Roosevelt seemed just the opposite of Hoover. He was friendly,
frank, and forceful. He flattered reporters with his candor and by
the amount of background and off-the-record Information he provided
them. According to Rosten,
His answers were swift, positive, illuminating. . . .  He was 
informal, communicative, gay. When he evaded a question it 
was done frankly. He was thoroughly at ease. He made no 
effort to conceal his pleasure in the give and take of the 
situation.160
Like Wilson, Roosevelt prepared for his conferences. He was 
adept at anticipating questions and sometimes used prepared answers.*^* 
Roosevelt may have been the first president to use the "planted" 
qu es tion.To further guide reporters, he even suggested how sto­
ries might be w r i t t e n . H e  used other tactics in his conferences.
He used the "trial balloon," for example, on his idea to restructure
* ^Ibld.. p. 197; and Pollard, The Presidents and the Press, p. 773. 
*59ft08t,erif p# 48.
160Ibid.. p. 49.
*^ *Pollard, "Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Press," p. 199.
l62
Dorothy B. James, p. 7^; «nd Brandt, p. Mr6,
*^Cater, The Fourth Branch of Government, p. 35.
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164the Supreme Court. He sometimes made lengthy announcements In 
anticipation of reporters' questions.Roosevelt also set prece­
dent by holding special conferences for groups other than the White 
House press corps.Roosevelt was probably the first president to 
hold a news conference with a visiting head of state when he invited 
Winston Churchill to join him in his conference of December 23. 1941.*^ 
Roosevelt's strength with the press was shown in other ways. He 
was often critical of newspapers and occasionally took reporters to 
task, threatening to revive the "Ananias Club." and sending reporters 
"into the corner" or telling them to put on a dunce cap. He once 
presented a reporter with a German cross. "He lectured the reporters.
He called them liars and used the mighty weight of his high office in
l66pile-driving fashion against the press." These attacks, however, 
were usually more a result of his hostilities with a number of Repub­
lican publishers. Aside from occasional flare-ups, Roosevelt general­
ly got along extremely well with Washington correspondents.
Roosevelt deserves mention here for other novel features of his 
public relations program. First, Mrs. Roosevelt played an important 
role in publicizing F.D.R.*s administration with her travels, speeches,
l6^ Brandt, p. 447.
l^^ Pollard, The Presidents and the Press, pp. 779-780.
l66Ibld.. pp. 783. 803.
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Bone, p. 144.
l68Merriman Smith, Thank You. Mr. President (New York: Harper, 
1946), p. 15.
* ^Pollard, "Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Press," pp. 200-
202.
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newspaper columns, and her own press conferences. *7® Another innova­
tion was Roosevelt's use of the "Fireside Chat," although, according
to Rivers, Koosevelt. preferred to communicate with the public through
171his press conferences, ' Further, Koosevelt made such extensive use 
of public relations personnel that a congressional investigating com­
mittee reported discovering 270 public information officers working 
for him.172
Roosevelt's publicity campaign paid off. He won a large and sym­
pathetic following among the Washington press corps.^7  ^ More tangible 
results followed. Cornwell analyzed selected periods in the adminis­
trations of Roosevelt, Truman, and Elsenhower and found that F.D.R.
got more news stories per press conference than either of the other 
174
two presidents.
Toward the end of his career, as the United States became more 
involved in the war, some changes marked Roosevelt's press policies 
and relations. Roosevelt cancelled a few of his news conferences.
In his meetings, some topics were not discussed, and the off-the- 
record method was employed more frequently. The tone of the confer­
ences became less jovial. To some extent, the White House coordinated 
news from various agencies, and there was a degree of censorship and
*^ Pollard, The Presidents and the Press, p. 774; and Rosten, 
pp. 51-52.
171The Oplnlonmakers. p. 137.
172
ir Ibid.. p. 139.
7^ R^osten, pp. 49-51.
17\lmer E. Cornwell, Jr., "The Presidential Press Conference:
A Study in Institutionalization," Midwest Journal of Political 
Science. 4 (Nov. i960), 387-389.
0^secrecy which aroused complaint from the press. Roosevelt also became
The reasons for Roosevelt's extraordinary success with the press 
were summarized by Raymond Clapper, a Washington correspondent:
Clapper gave five reasons for Mr. Roosevelt's high 
standing with the White House corps. One was that their 
personal contacts were not only pleasant but often inti­
mate. Another was that his press conferences were almost 
always certain to yield live news. Again, they admired his 
political skill and craftsmanship and, even when they disa­
greed with him, they generally believed in his sincerity, 
his courage and his readiness to experiment. Finally,
Clapper observed that the original Roosevelt theme of doing
otten man struck a responsive chord
On balance, Roosevelt did more than any previous administration to 
develop and utilize the presidential press conference to its fullest 
advantage. By scrapping the written questions, spontaneity was 
added. By holding frequent and regular conferences, Roosevelt fur­
thered the institutionalization of the news conference. Roosevelt's 
personality and his interest in newspapers led him to improve presi­
dential press relations more than any previous president. He delib­
erately courted the press, understood reporters' problems, and enjoyed 
being with correspondents. He used every possible public relations 
technique in his dealings with the press. His carefully planned strat­
egies as well as his habitual congeniality with reporters were highly 
successful.
Harry Truman. Truman must have learned much from his predeces­
sor, for he followed many of Roosevelt's practices in press relations.
^ - ’Pollard, The Presidents and the Press, pp. 83O-836.
less available to reporters.
176Ibld.. p. 780.
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Nevertheless, Truman injected his own personality and made some minor 
changes.
In his press conferences, Truman kept the four categories of an­
swers used by Roosevelt. Unlike Roosevelt, Truman rarely employed
178
the off-the-record reply. Truman also chose to meet reporters
179once a week rather than twice, Roosevelt had met reporters while 
seated at his desk in his White House office. The size of the White 
House press corps had grown to such an extent that, in 1950, Truman
moved the location to the Indian Treaty Room of the old State, War,
l80
and Navy Building. Another change was to require reporters to 
identify themselves by name before asking a question.Further, 
Truman stood behind a desk and reporters sat, whereas in Roosevelt's 
conferences reporters stood and Roosevelt sat.*®^ Truman's con­
ferences also varied in length from Roosevelt's. They were shorter, 
occasionally lasting only ten minutes or so.
Changes in the content of the conferences also emerged. Truman 
did not make use of the "trial balloon" device as had F.D.R. Although 
he was willing to allow partisan political questions, Truman did not
*^Pollard, The Presidents and the Press; Truman to Johnson, 
p. 27.
*^ ®A.L. Lorenz, Jr., "Truman and the Press Conference," Journa­
lism Quarterly. 43 (Winter 1966), 678.
^^James £. Pollard, "President Truman and the Press," Journa- 
lism Quarterly. 28 (Fall 1951)# 457.
1®°Lorenz, p. 679.
^Pollard, "President Truman and the Press," p. 458. 
l82Pollard, The Presidents and the Press; Truman to Johnson.
p. 28.
lg3Ibid.
l> 2
like to comment on pending Supremo C’ourt cases and did not elucidate 
foreign policy matters. He was not good at explanations and inter­
pretations of policy and "hesitated to use the press conference to 
introduce and promote legislation, as previous Presidents had done. "I8** 
Truman's answers tended to be shorter than his p r e d e c e s s o r ' s . j n 
the latter part of his administration, Truman used announcements and 
prepared statements more frequently in his news conferences. In 
1951# Truman began the practice of allowing edited excerpts of his 
conferences to be broadcast on radio, the first president to do so.^8?
Truman went beyond Roosevelt in preparing for his conferences. 
Truman held meetings with his staff about thirty minutes before his 
conferences in order to anticipate questions and gather information.
By 1952# the preparation process was so systematized that Truman's
press aides put together a notebook of information for Truman to
IBPreview before each conference.
Truman's press conferences sometimes proved to be embarrassing.
On several occasions Truman made statements, which, when interpreted 
by the press, caused the White House to issue corrections and clari­
fications, a problem also faced by Eisenhower. Perhaps the most 
famous of these incidents was Truman's statement in his conference
* ^Lorenz, p. 675.
1^ 5pollard, "President Truman and the Press," p. 5^8. 
l86Ibid.. pp. ^63-^ 6*+. 
l8?Lorenz, p, 679. 
l88Ibid.. p. 674.
I* 3
of November 16, 1950, on the possible use of nuclear weapons. The 
impulsiveness of his remarks and misinterpretation by reporters 
forced the White House to release an angry denial several hours 
l.ter.'89
Other aspects of Truman's policies led to a waning of his rela­
tions with the press. Truman angered reporters when he gave an exclu­
sive interview to Arthur Krock in 1 9 5 0 . When Truman placed restric­
tions on dissemination of military information by government agencies, 
he further displeased the press.*9* jn his conference of April 17,
1952, Truman caused a stir when he implied that he had the power to 
take over the nation's press just as he had the steel mills.*92 
Other developments led to exchanges of criticism between Truman and 
the press, especially in the last two years of his administration.
As a whole, Truman's press relations were good. Although Truman 
was sometimes at odds with the press, he seemed to enjoy his confer­
ences and established a fair degree of rapport with reporters.*93 
As he gained confidence in himself and when he was elected in his 
own right, he matured in his dealings with the press. Although he 
made a few minor changes in his conferences, he generally followed 
Roosevelt's pattern, rie did less than Roosevelt to use his conferences 
to promote legislation. In spite of that, his concern for publicity 
led Truman to develop a public relations staff larger than any of his
1 8 9Pollard, The Presidents and the Press: Truman to Johnson, p. 37.
190ibid.
^ P ollard, "Truman and the Press: Final Phase, 1951-53," 
Journalism Quarterly. 30 (Summer 1953)» 275.
*92Ibld.. p. 280. 
193Ibld.. pp. 273, 286.
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predecessors. His administration employed over 3.000 public informa­
tion officers at one time, according to one investigation.^** Truman, 
then, contributed to the development of the presidential press con­
ference and to presidential relations with the press with a good degree 
of success.
Dwight Eisenhower. The army of information officers amassed by 
Truman was even doubled under Eisenhower. "In 1957. the Civil Service 
Commission was listing 6,8?8 'Information and Editorial Employees.'
The increase continued during the second term."*9  ^ Eisenhower had 
dealt with the press often during his military career and was aware 
of its value,
Eisenhower continued many of Truman's press conference policies 
and added his own innovations. Eisenhower met less frequently with 
the press, averaging only one conference every two w e e k s . T h e  
conferences were held in the same location as Truman's, Eisenhower 
stood and so did reporters asking questions. Reporters identified 
themselves as they had for Truman. The average conference lasted 
thirty minutes, and the President did not like exceeding that length.*97
The conferences were usually held on Thursdays, the favorite day of
i q P
Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman. Eisenhower tried to aid re­
porters by varying the time of his conferences so that writers for
1 9 9 Rivers, The Oplnionmakers. p. l9l.
19^ Ibid.. p. 1 9 2 .
196james Pollard, "Eisenhower and the Press: The First TWo 
Years," Journalism Quarterly. 32 (Summer 1955). 285.
*9^ Pollard, The Presidents and the Press: Truman to Johnson, p. 69.
1 9 8 Douglass Cater, "The President and the Press," Reporter.
April 28, 1953, p. 27.
<*5
morning papers would have an equal advantage with correspondents for
afternoon papers In breaking the news which resulted from his con- 
1 9 9ferences. Other changes Included allowing reporters greater free­
dom In direct quotation and a more extensive use of opening state­
ments.^® Eisenhower's staff Issued transcripts of the conference, 
but the replies were edited.2®*
In 195^ » Eisenhower became the first president to allow live 
radio broadcast of his press conference.2®2 And in 1955 he permitted 
filmed recordings of his conferences to be televised, having hired 
actor Robert Montgomery as television adviser.2®^ The White House 
reserved the right to edit the sound track of the television film.2®** 
The delayed television broadcasts of Eisenhower's press conferences 
caught the interest of the public at first, but as time wore on, 
fewer broadcasts were carried because of decreased popularity.205
Eisenhower was more reserved with the press than Truman or Roose- 
velt. He saw reporters less frequently. He made it a habit to
^^Pollard, "Eisenhower and the Press: The First Two Years," 
p. 285.
200iMd.
20Cornwell, "The Presidential Press Conference: A Study in 
Institutionalization," pp. 382-383.
202Pollard, "Eisenhower and the Press: The First TVo Years," 
p. 293.
203
Ibid.. p. 285.
20I4.
Pollard, The Presidents and the Press: Truman to Johnson.
p. 77.
2^"*Bone, p. 1^5.
2®^James E, Pollard, "Eisenhower and the Press: The Final Phase," 
Journalism Quarterly. 38 (Spring 1961), 183.
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207refuse personal interviews. Elsenhower carried his aloofness into 
his conferences, remaining formal and business-like in his deportment. 
"There was little of the banter that sometimes cropped out under 
Franklin Roosevelt or Truman,
In many ways, Eisenhower failed to use his potential initiative 
in his conferences. He was not forceful enough in pushing legisla­
tion. He refused to criticize his opponents or congress and avoided 
discussion of personalities and partisan political matters.Eisen­
hower also had difficulties expressing himself. His famous convoluted
210syntax provided one reason for editing his conferences. Eisen­
hower's occasional bursts of temper at news conferences were also 
counter-productive to his press relations. In his conference of
April 29. 195^ * *n irritating question caused him to walk out of the
211conference abruptly. Eisenhower was criticized for giving ambiguous
21 2answers and for failing to understand the intent of some questions.
Lapses in control were seldom, and Eisenhower generally got 
along well with reporters. He was not intimate, but he won respect,
20 P^ollard, The Presidents and the Press: Truman to Johnson, p. 62. 
208Ibld.. p. 64.
2®^Cater, "The President and the Press," pp. 27-28; and Wallace 
Carroll, "Press Conferences: Five Men, Five Methods," New York Times 
Magazine. Feb. 21, I960, p. 16.
^l^For an examination of Eisenhower's problems with language in 
his press conferences, see Charles L. Marlin, "Eisenhower Before the 
Press," Today's Speech. 9 (April 1961), 23-25.
2**Pollard, "Eisenhower and the Press: The First Two Years," 
p. 295.
2*2Pollard, The Presidents and the Press: Truman to Johnson,
P. 75.
Eisenhower contributed to the evolution of the presidential press 
conference by gradually allowing more freedom in direct quotation 
and by permitting broadcasts of his conferences.
John Kennedy. Both Kennedy and his wife had gained valuable 
newspaper* magazine, and broadcasting experience before Kennedy en­
tered public office. As President, Kennedy "revolutionized relations 
between press and P r e s i d e n t . ^ e  expanded presidential press rela­
tions in numerous ways, and his policies brought praise, criticism, 
and success to his administration.
The press conference was for Kennedy "the primary communications 
arm" of his administration. Kennedy moved the conference to the
State Department's auditorium. He met the press about twice a month, 
for a total of sixty-five conferences in thirty-four months. His most 
remarkable innovation was to hold his conferences before live tele­
vision. Kennedy also changed the time of the meetings, holding most
215of them in the late afternoon. J Televising and carefully timing his 
conferences helped Kennedy achieve his primary goal with them, which 
was "to inform and impress the public more than the press.
Other aspects of Kennedy's press policies were innovative. He 
granted frequent exclusive interviews. He held luncheons with groups 
of editors and publishers. He established close personal and social
21\orth Bingham and Ward S. Just, "The President and the Press," 
Reporter. Apr. 12, 1962, p. 18.
2***Sharp, p. 1.
215pollard, The Presidents and the Press; Truman to Johnson.
p. 96.
^l^Theodore C. Sorensen, Kennedy (New York; Bantam, 1966), 
p. 361.
relationships with a number of reporters and he frequently held off- 
the-record meetings with them. "The personal approach was used in 
the Kennedy administration to a degree unmatched previously."217 
Sensitive to the value of newspaper publicity, Kennedy read the papers 
voraciously. He developed the habit of issuing reprimands and plau­
dits to reporters for their stories, either personally or through his 
press secretary. According to Knebel, his administration paid "closer 
attention to the press than any in modern times."219
Kennedy probably prepared for his conferences more elaborately 
than his predecessors, although "His own extensive reading, and his 
participation in every level of government, was his best p r e p a r a t i o n . " 2 1 9  
The preparation process began on Tuesdays at Press Secretary Salinger's 
weekly meetings with public information officers of the various execu­
tive departments. At these meetings, the press agents anticipated 
questions of reporters and prepared a briefing book. Kennedy then 
reviewed the information which had been prepared. On the morning of 
the day of his conference, Kennedy met with Salinger* Vice-President 
Johnson, Kennedy's aides, and cabinet members. In these breakfast 
sessions, Salinger would review the questions for Kennedy and Kennedy 
would decide if more information was needed on particular topics.
Salinger would gather any additional data, presenting them to Kennedy 
about an hour before the conference began. A last minute review of 
the latest news and government information took place about ten minutes
^*^James £. Pollard, "The Kennedy Administration and the Press," 
Journalism Quarterly. 1^ (Winter 1964), 13»
^^Fletcher Knebel, "Kennedy vs. the Press," Look, Aug. 28, 19&2, 
p. 18.
219
Sorensen, p. 362.
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before the conference, Kennedy never rehearsed nor did he write
out or attempt to memorize answers, but he was fully prepared.
Kennedy and his staff were so adept at anticipating questions that
the only times when Kennedy was not prepared for a question was when
the question dealt with some local affair or some minor subject 
222area.
In the press conference, Kennedy appeared warm, frank, and witty.
He was "quicker and more articulate than Eisenhower."223 His answers 
were also more direct and brief than his predecessor's.
Kennedy usually opened his conferences with some short announce­
ments. Facing a sea of often more than **00 correspondents, he then 
recognized one reporter after another. He occasionally employed 
planted questions.22^  The conference lasted thirty minutes. After 
each conference, transcripts were distributed. Kennedy returned to 
the White House and watched a tape of the conference, making notes
and criticizing his p e r f o r m a n c e . 225
Kennedy's press conference techniques brought criticisms. One 
was that correspondents used the occasion to gain publicity for them­
selves, to ask lengthy questions, and even give s p e e c h e s .226 Some 
reporters complained about the size of the group of correspondents.
22®Pierre Salinger, With Kennedy (New York: Avon, 1966), pp. 181- 
183; Sharp, pp. 116-127; and Sorensen, pp. 362-363.
22*Sorensen, p. 362.
222Salinger, pp. 182-183.
22 P^ollard, "The Kennedy Administration and the Press," p. 6.
^^Salinger, p. I87.
225ibld.. p. 186.
226pollard, The Presidents and the Press; Truman to Johnson, p. 101,
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There were also complaints of favoritism in recognizing correspondents
to ask questions. Others contended that the lack of privacy afforded
227by the conferences made the President, more cautious in his replies.
Displeasure with other aspects of Kennedy's press policies led 
to a series of articles charging Kennedy with "management of the news," 
a phrase coined by James Reston. The way that Kennedy flattered some 
reporters and his habits of praising and blaming writers were disliked. 
Suspicion arose because of Kennedy's frequent interviews with reporters 
and the number of "favorites" he purportedly had among the White House 
press corps.22  ^ Kennedy was even accused of using the F.B.I. to seek 
out sources of news leaks within his administration.22^ Further sus­
picion and criticism came about when the White House Issued orders to 
other executive agencies on the release of information to the press.
This attempt to coordinate all news was designed to avoid conflicting 
statements but was viewed as another form of news management or excessive 
control.2 ®^ So many complaints were made that in March, 19^ 3. the 
House's sub-committee on Government Information undertook hearings on 
the administration's news policies.2^
On balance, Kennedy proved to be more effective than any previous 
president, save Franklin Roosevelt. Kennedy made the White House the 
chief source of news in the nation. His many efforts to win the respect
227Bingham and Just, p. 20.
22®Arthur Krock, "Mr. Kennedy's Management of the News," Fortune. 
Mar. 1963, pp. 82, 199-202.
229Ibld.. p. 201.
2 °^Ibid., p. 199; end Pollard, "The Kennedy Administration and the 
Press," p. 7.
23*John H. Kessel, "Mr. Kennedy and the Manufacture of News," 
Parliamentary Affairs. 16 (1963)* 293.
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and favor of reporters were highly successful. J.F.K. made effective 
use of television to promote his personal image and gain favorable 
public opinion. He conducted his press conferences astutely. De­
spite complaints over somo of his practices, Kennedy made great strides. 
"News management, and mismanagement, did not mar the Kennedy image for 
a simple reason: He was the most sophisticated shaper of public
opinion in Presidential history."2-^2
Lyndon Johnson. Johnson's press practices were a result of many
factors, including habits formed while he was in the Senate and, possi-
2 3 3bly, an emulation of F.D.R.'s policies with the press. In the Senate,
Johnson met daily with reporters and held numerous background sessions 
0 3 /4.
with writers. As Majority Leader, Johnson's relations with the 
press were sometimes stormy. He carefully controlled his meetings 
with correspondents. He was so sensitive to criticism that he casti­
gated some reporters and was known to dismiss a reporter who proved
? 3 5to be unfriendly. Johnson's press relations as Vice-President were 
limited to interviews and off-the-record meetings. According to Jack 
Bell, Johnson
. . . always had on the desk before him written answers to 
every conceivable question, just as he had carried written 
statements into the Senate to read to reporters at his center 
aisle desk a few minutes before that body convened. 3°
212Rivers, The Opinlonmakers. p. 155.
2-^ L.L.L. Golden, "The President and the Press," Saturday Review,
May 9, 1965* p. 65.
2^\jack Bell, The Johnson Treatment: How Lyndon Johnson Took Over 
the Presidency and Made It His Own (New fork: Harper and Row, 19^ 5T» 
pp. 139-1^ 0.
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Johnson went to the White House with a determination to win 
press support. His policies went beyond Kennedy's in intensity, 
lie employed almost every technique that his predecessor had used to 
court the press. For example, he cave 17^  individual interviews 
with correspondents in his first fifteen months in office.2^  He 
also met frequently with groups of writers in off-the-record encoun­
ters. "His private background sessions rarely lasted less than an 
hour. Three hours was not unusual. One Saturday meeting with staff 
and reporters went for seven hours. . . . "238
Johnson's press conferences were markedly different from Kenne­
dy's. On Salinger's advice, Johnson undertook a program of experi­
mentation in news conference formats,2^  fjQ other president used 
such a variety of press conference types. He met with small groups 
in his office. Johnson had conferences as he strolled around the 
lawn of the White House. He held conferences outdoors at his ranch 
in Texas. He once held a conference with reporters and their wives 
and children on the lawn in front of the White House. He waited 
until his hundredth day in office to hold a televised press confer­
ence, the type he disliked most and used least. His favorite format 
seemed to be the impromptu conference, which he held in his office 
for the thirty or forty reporters who happened to be in the White 
House at the time. He was unpredictable in his scheduling. In the 
span of a week in November, 1966, he held five press conferences.
23?Kraft, P- 104•
23®Hugh Sidey, £ Very Personal Presidency; Lyndon Johnson in the 
White House (New York: Atheneum, 1968), p. 117.
^^Salinger, pp.
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He sometimes held two In one day. In his first six months he held 
twenty-six news conferences, twice as many as Kennedy had in a simi­
lar period. Later, months would go hy with only one or no meetings 
with the press. In all, he held 135 official conferences in his 
sixty-two months in office, for an average of two a month.
Johnson's press conferences varied in other ways. He used longer 
opening announcements than any of his predecessors. His answers to 
questions were much longer than Kennedy's. The length of his con­
ferences ranged from ten minutes to over an hour. Johnson also ten­
ded to be more informal and "folksy" in his conferences than either
Oilf)Eisenhower or Kennedy.
Despite his massive efforts, Johnson encountered so many diffi­
culties with the press that they will only be summarised here. There 
were many criticisms of his press conference techniques. Johnson 
was faulted for holding surprise conferences, for failing to hold 
many televised conferences, and for failing to hold his conferences 
with regularity. Other aspects of his press relations were challenged. 
Whereas the Kennedy administration was known for its "news management," 
Johnson's was the administration of the "credibility gap." L.B.J. 
was accused of undue secrecy, prevarication, ambiguity, excessive 
control over other government agencies, and censorship. He was criti­
cized for his obvious attempts to woo and manipulate reporters and 
even for spending too much time with the press, Johnson's own sensi­
tivity to criticism led him to retaliate to such an extent that after 
five months his press relations had reached a point of mutual antagonism
2i|0Pollardt The Presidents and the Press; Truman to Johnson, 
p. 113.
5^and distrust between the President and the press. During his five 
years in office these relations waxed and waned but were never excep­
tionally good.
Cornwell described Johnson's approach as follows:
This then is the Johnson public relations style: 
massive and unrelenting use of available channels to 
reach the public, a restless experimentation about 
technique, a tremendous (to the point of being dys­
functional) amount of personal Presidential involve­
ment in the process and a determination to wring 
the maximum in favorable and tactically useful publi­
city out of a pattern of feverish and carefully con­
trived White House activity.2^ 1
Kennedy's chief success with the press had been to build his image
and gain favorable public opinion. Johnson, on the other hand, was
never able to establish a high degree of rapport with the press.
Nevertheless, Johnson was able to gain considerable attention in
the media for his programs, especially for his domestic legislation.
Johnson's impressive legislative record may have been due, to some
extent, to his ability to use the press to arouse public attention
and interest.
Richard Nixon. Nixon did not enter the White House with good 
press relations. His problems with the press began as early as his
I960 campaign against Kennedy. "The candidate and his staff decided
2^2very early in the year that the press was their enemy. ..."
Nixon then saw reporters in a "hostile conspiracy" against him, and 
his lack of trust in reporters and in the value of good press coverage
Elmer E. Cornwell, Jr., "The Johnson Press Relations Style," 
Journalism Quarterly. ^3 (Spring 1966), 8.
Theodore H. White, The Making of the President, i960 (New 
fork: Pocket Books, 1961), pp. 329-330*
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hindered him.^*^ Two years later, losing the race for Governor of 
California, he attacked reporters with his well-known statement,
"Yon won't have Nixon to kick aronnd any more, because, gentlemen, 
this is my last press conference."2**^ Poor press relations and a 
negative image had to be overcome to win the 1968 election. One way 
in which Nixon overcame these difficulties was to exploit the medium 
of television, circumventing, to some extent, direct relations with 
the press.
As President, Nixon, like Johnson prefers direct radio and tele- 
vion contact with the public. Nixon has kept his policy of avoiding 
reporters. "President Nixon is the most aloof President of modern 
times, maybe in history," wrote one editorialist.2**** Nixon had eight 
press conferences in his first year of office, four in 1970, and nine 
in 1971, averaging fewer than one a month. Nixon seems to prefer 
the live television conference and evidently makes elaborate prepa­
rations for them.^ **^  Nixon has also done some experimentation with 
formats. An example is his televised interview with one correspondent, 
Howard K. Smith, March 22, 1971, the first of its kind.
2**3lbid. • pp. ^02-^3; and Rivers, The Adversaries, pp. 35-^ 2.
2^ Theodore H. White, The Making of the President. 1968 (New 
York: Atheneum, 1969)# p. ^8.
2**%or a discussion of Nixon's television techniques in the 
1968 campaign, see Joe McGinnis, The Selling of the President. 1968 
(New York: Pocket Eooks, 1970).
2**^ TRB, "Nixon the Aloof," New Republic. Feb. 12, 1972, p.
2**^ News Conferences Really Put Pressure on Nixon," Sunday Advo­
cate (Baton Rouge), July 11, 1971, p. 2-B; and William A. Linsley,
"90 Per Cent Proof," Southern Speech Communication Journal. 37 
(Winter 1971), 200-201.
5*
Nixon's press policies have been faulted on several counts. First, 
he has been criticized for his reluctance to see reporters. The 
Washington News Committee of the American Press Managing Editors 
Association commented that "It is obvious that the President's rela­
tions with the press are more restricted and controlled in his behalf 
than those of any modern-day president." Further, Nixon's policies 
have led to a renewal of charges of a "credibility gap" in his adminis- 
tration. 7 Nixon's effectiveness in his dealings with the press re­
mains to be seen, but there is growing evidence that he has contributed 
little to the development of the presidential press conference and to 
presidential press relations in general, 5^0
Summary. The twentieth century evolution of the press conference 
and of presidential press relations reveals several trends. The press 
conference emerged from haphazard meetings between the chief execu­
tive and reporters into institutionalization under Wilson. The first 
of the modern presidents were detached and cautious with correspon­
dents. Formal categories of answers and strict rules regarding attri­
bution gave way to more directness and openness as well as more infor­
mality in presidential dealings with the press. The passage of time 
also showed an increase in presidential use of the news conference as
2^3"(jixon is Blasted by APME Group," State-Tlmes (Baton Rouge),
Feb. 5. 1972, p. 6-A.
the Credibility Gap?" Time. Apr. 5* 1971. p. 13.
250pPesident Nixon's press philosophy was explained in a letter 
from Press Secretary, Ronald Ziegler, Oct. 6, 1972. Other informa­
tion about Nixon's views may be found in transcripts of his presiden­
tial news conferences of December 8, 19^ 9* December 10, 1970, and 
June 29, 1972, available in releases from the White House.
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a means of power. More and more, presidents have learned to use the 
conferences to gain favorable public opinion, push legislation, and 
publicize their programs. Increases in the amount of presidential 
leadership have gone hand in hand with increased exploitation of the 
news conference as a means of communication and persuasion, beginning 
especially with Franklin Roosevelt’s press conferences.
The development of the broadcast media is another trend affecting 
the press conference and presidential press relations. Our last 
three presidents have shown more interest in going to the public 
directly rather than through the press, although both Kennedy and 
Johnson evidenced a high regard for the power of the press in reach­
ing public opinion. Televising the press conference has made the 
public an immediate, if not direct, participant in the event, thereby 
diminishing, to some extent, the importance of the press. If future 
presidents continue to seek direct communication with the public, 
bypassing adversary proceedings with the White House press corps, 
the institution of the presidential press conference will no longer 
have Importance as a means of presidential communication.
CHAPTER II
JOHNSON'S USE OF THE PRESIDENTIAL PRESS CONFERENCE
This chapter provides detailed Information on President Johnson's 
handling of the presidential press conference. The chapter's purpose 
is to present a contextual setting preceding the chapters which analyse 
the conferences. Included here is a brief discussion of Johnson's 
background before becoming President, with emphasis on his press rela­
tions as Senator and as Vice-President. Next is a section on Johnson's 
attitudes toward and relations with the press. A third part describes 
Johnson's philosophy of the presidential press conference. The last 
section treats Johnson's press conference practices, including prepa­
ration, timing, and other details.
Johnson's Background
A brief investigation of Johnson's background may provide some
understanding of the president's press conference habits, since, as
former Press Secretary George Christian wrote, Johnson "could not break
1
habits formed in his youth" in presidential relations with the press.
Johnson became interested in speech activities in high school. As
a student at the Johnson City (Texas) Consolidated High School he entered
2
various contests in public speaking and debate. These interests grew
*The President Steps Down; A Personal Memoir of the Transfer of 
Power (New York; Macmillan, 1970X, p. 187.
William C. Pool, Emmie Craddock, and David E. Conrad, Lyndon 
Baines Johnson; The Formative Years (San Marcos; Southwest Texas State 
College Press, 1965). PP« 6^ -65.
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when he entered Southwest Texes Teachers College in 1927. Johnson was a
member of the college's debate team and was apparently successful. He
3
was reported to be especially good In refutation. Also relevant was 
Johnson's interest in journalism while in college. He wrote for the
**
college's student paper, contributing many editorials and other pieces.
Johnson's interest in speech continued in his brief career as a
teacher. In 1928, while still a student at Southwest Texas, Johnson
taught public speaking and debate in Cotulla, Texas. After graduation,
he accepted the position of debate coach at Sam Houston High School in
Houston. There he taught public speaking and debate and was successful
5
in directing extra-curricular debate.
More important than those early experiences, perhaps, were the 
habits that Johnson formed with the press as he rose to power in congress, 
especially during his years as Senator and Senate Majority Leader. John­
son's early associations with reporters were good. "As a young Congress­
man back in the Roosevelt days, he was remembered as one of the best,
most vigorous and earthiest conversationalists of the younger thinkers
6
who were then remaking America." White described one aspect of Johnson's
image with the press as follows:
Among these men, for years Lyndon Johnson had been a folk 
character, the man who dominated any conversations about the 
Hill— at once respected, feared, admired, a huge yet often comic 
figure. His almost daily briefings in the Senate when he was
3
Ibid.. pp. 101-102; and Robert N. Hall, "A Rhetorical Analysis of 
Selected Speeches of Senator Iyndon B. Johnson, 1955-1961," Dlss.
Michigan 1963, ch. 2.
P^ool, Craddock, and Conrad, pp. 112-136.
5Ibld.. pp. lh-9-158.
6Theodore H. White, The Making of the President. 196** (New York: 
Signet, I965)t P» 71.
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Majority Loader, his hunger for reaognltlon, his salty 
phrases, his virtuosity In negotiation and compromise, 
his professional dexterity as a lawmaker had enlivened 
Washington conversation for decades.'
8
In the Senate Johnson preferred the small group approach. As
Senate Majority Leader, "his press conferences were fiascoes," and he
9
was more effective in private sessions with reporters. Johnson 
developed the habit of "surprise" press conferences. But Johnson did 
not like the press conference fomat In dealing with reporters. "He
10
had little patience for the normal press conference give and take. ..."
One of the characteristics of Johnson's relations with reporters in his
11
press conferences was the amount of control he exerted. Aside from
timing, another aspect of this control was Johnson's determination of
what questions might be asked. According to Sherrill, Johnson would
throw out a reporter who "veered too far off the course" with his ques- 
12
tlons.
^Ibld.. p. 69.
^Robert N. Hall, "Lyndon Johnson's Speech Preparation," Quarterly 
Journal of Speech. 51 (Feb. 1965), 168; and Elmer E. Cornwell, Jr., "The 
Johnson Press Relations Style," Journalism Quarterly. *0 (Spring 1966), 5.
^Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, Lyndon B. Johnson: The Exercise of 
Power (New York: New American Library, 19557, p. 106; and "President Keeps 
Press on Alert," New York Times. Dec. 19, 1963. P* 17*
10Willlam Me Gaff in and Erwin Knoll, Anything But the Truth: The 
Credibility Gap— How the News is Managed In Washington (New York:
Putnam's, 1955), p. 1^9? and "Johnson and the Press— What the Grumbling 
is About," U.S. News and World Report. Mar. 22, 1965. p. 51.
^-Personal interview with Sam Wood, editor, (Austin) Amerlcan- 
Statesman. Aug. 17, 1971; and personal interview with Richard Morehead, 
Capitol Bureau Chief, Dallas Morning News. Aug. 16, 1971.
12Robert Sherrill, The Aoddental President (New York: Grossman, 
1967), p. 39.
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Johnson was even mor© forceful In his private sessions with
reporters. Stuart Alsop described one of these as follows:
E(y gradual stages the relaxed, friendly and reminiscent 
mood gave way to something rather like a human hurricane.
Johnson was up, striding about his office, talking without 
pause, occasionally leaning over, his nose almost touching 
the mesmerised reporter's, to shake the reporter's shoulder 
or grab his knee. Secretaries were rung for. Memoranda 
appeared and then more memoranda, as well as letters, news­
paper articles and unidentifiable scraps of paper, which were 
proffered in quick succession and then snatched away. Ap­
peals were made, to the Almighty, to the shades of the departed 
great, to the reporter's finer instincts and better nature, 
while the reporter, unable to get a word in edgewise, sat 
collapsed upon a leather sofa, eyes glazed, mouth half open.
Treatment A ended a full two hours later, when the majority 
leader, a friendly arm around the shoulder of the dazed 
journalist, ushered him into the outer office.
Johnson was generally successful in his courting of the press while 
Senator, but his attempts to control reporters and his developing sensi­
tivity to press criticism led to problems. According to Bell, "As the 
Senate's Democratic leader, Johnson had been known among the newsmen who 
covered him as a whiner."^ White described that sensitivity:
As Senate Majority Leader and as Vice-President he would grow 
furious at indignity or neglect to himself in print— he could 
denounce in ugly terms an old friend who had reported on the 
enormous gold cufflinks he wore with his shirts; or dress 
down like a top sergeant the eminent head of a broadcastings 
bureau who had been forced to cancel a broadcast with him.
Johnson's sensitivity toward criticism caused him to become wary of the
press. He "developed a fine contempt for reporters.His sessions
*^William L. Rivers, The Qplnlonmakers (Boston: Beacon, 1967),
pp. 167-168.
l^Jack Bell, The Johnson Treatment: How Lyndon B. Johnson Took Over 
the presidency and Made It His Own ('New York: Harper and Row, 1965). p. 139.
15White, pp. 71-72.
^Evans and Novak, p. 1^0.
6?
with reporters were often stormy. Coincidentelly, Johnson suffered a 
major coronary after one explosive meeting with reporters in July,
1955.17
There was nothing remarkable about Johnson's press relations 
during his three years as Vice-President. "As Vice-President, John­
son confined his remarks largely to off-the-record and background
18
interviews." No longer in the public eye and no longer a major force 
in congress, he was less of a news source than previously. The Vice- 
Presidency did provide Johnson an opportunity to view closely the 
techniques of one of the most successful presidents in dealing with 
correspondents. For example, Johnson was a regular participant at 
Kennedy's press conference preparation breakfasts.
Three other aspects of Johnson's background may have influenced 
his later press conference practices. The first was a possible emula­
tion of F.D.R.*s style. An editor, who had covered the press conferences
of Presidents Roosevelt through Johnson, opined that Johnson had "wor-
1 9shipped" Roosevelt and based almost everything on the letter's styxe. 7
Discussing Johnson's press relations. Golden expressed the same idea
when he wrote that "there is no closer student of how President Franklin
20
D. Roosevelt conducted himself than Mr. Johnson." When asked if other 
presidents' press practices had influenced Johnson, a former press 
secretary under Johnson responded, "He liked FDR's press conferences
17Ibld.. pp. 90-91. 
l8Bell, p. 139.
^Interview with Sam Wood.
20L.L.L. Golden, "The President and the Press," Saturday Review.
May 8, 1965, p. 65.
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In the Oval Office around his desk, and was most comfortable in
21imitating them,"
Another aspect in Johnson's background was his "contempt" for,
rather than rapport with, what has been stereotyped as the "Eastern 
22
press." Johnson entered the presidency with "a great uncertainty
and uneasiness about the press," and was especially concerned about
his image with the Eastern press, which he felt was not favorable.
Johnson had reservations about running for president in 1964 because
of that fear. Concerning his possible election, he wrote*.
I was convinced. . . that the metropolitan press of the 
Eastern seaboard would never permit it. My experience 
in office had confirmed this reaction. I was not thinking 
just of the derisive articles about my style, my clothes, 
my manner, my accent and my family— although I admit I 
received enough of that kind of treatment in my first few 
months as President to last a lifetime. I was also think­
ing of a more deep-seated and far-reaching attitude— a 
disdain for the South that seems to be woven into the fabric 
of Northern experience. This is a subject that deserves a 
more profound exploration than I can give it here— a subject 
that has never been sufficiently examined. Perhaps it all 
stems from the deep-rooted bitterness engendered by civil 
strife over a hundred years ago, for emotional cliches 
outlast all others and the Southern cllchl is perhaps the 
most emotional of all. Perhaps someday new understandings 
will cause this bias to disappear from our national life.
I hope so, but it is with us still. To ny mind, these 
attitudes represent an automatic reflex, unconscious or 
deliberate, on the part of opinion molders of the North 
and East in the press and television.
I expressed this feeling to James Reston of The New 
York Times in the spring of 1964. Scotty Reston disagreed 
with me, and a few days later he asked James Rowe to per­
suade me I was wrong. Jim wrote to me expressing his belief 
that as long as Reston and Walter Llppmann supported me, I 
would "get a good press" from the rest of the Washington
^Letter from Bill Moyers to the writer, Feb. 7, 1972.
^Philip Geyelin, Lyndon B. Johnson and the World (New York: 
Praeger, 1966), p. 125.
23Bell, p. 140.
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nows corps, who represent newspapers all over the country.
But It was not long before those two reporters ceased to 
support me and began their tireless assaults on me and ny 
administration. What then happened, I could not help noting 
that It was hard to find many words of support anywhere In 
the Washington press corps or television media,‘4
The passage, although written after Johnson's tenure in office, reveals
25something of his distrust of the "established" press.
A final factor, not unrelated to Johnson's feelings toward the
Eastern press, was the new President's sensitivity to being compared with
26his predecessor. One way in which this was manifested was in Johnson's 
selection of a press conference format. Johnson had looked at Kennedy's 
news conferences with "awe and secret admiration."27 According to 
Moyers, "He feared . . . contrast with JFK's style and resisted televised 
press conferences in the State Department Auditorium, where Kennedy had
pQ
been so successful." Since Johnson and Kennedy were so unlike in style 
and personality and since Kennedy had developed considerable rapport 
with the press, it is not surprising that Johnson wanted to avoid being 
compared with Kennedy.
In Johnson's background, then, were a number of factors which had 
some influence on his relations with the press and his news conference 
practices. His early interest and activities in speech and in journa­
lism provided some knowledge and experience. Johnson's press relations
^lyndon B. Johnson, The Vantage Point: Perspectives on the 
Presidency. 1963-1969 (Now York: Holt, 1971). pp. 96-97«~'
^Johnson's biographer, also a newsman, shared a similar view: 
William S. White, The Professional: Lyndon B^ Johnson (New York: Crest, 
196*0, p. 44.
2^ Geyelin, p. 128.
27Bell, p. 1^ 5.
28Moyers, letter; and Tom Wicker, "Johnson Seeks Policy on Press," 
New York Times. Feb. 9, 1964, sec. IV, p. 8*
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as Senate Majority Leader were narked with informality and a degree 
of control over meetings with reporters. Johnson also developed the 
habit of holding surprise conferences and small, background sessions 
with reporters. It was in the Senate, also, that Johnson's sensitivity 
to press criticism began. Finally, Johnson's distrust of the Eastern 
press, a possible emulation of F.D.R., and a dislike for being compared 
with Kennedy may have figured in his background as determinants of his 
presidential press policies.
Johnson's Attitudes Toward the Press 
This section outlines Johnson's interest in and attitudes toward 
the press, including his ideas regarding publicity, his relations with 
individual reporters, his concept of journalism, and what he disliked 
about the press.
To begin, the daily workings of the press were of great interest 
to Johnson, "He was fascinated by the news media,"^ Johnson was not 
only interested in newspapers and television news, he was curious
about the craft of both broadcast and print media. He liked to analyse
3 0content and the use of emphasis in the news media. Johnson's reading 
habits also demonstrated this interest. Aside from the Congressional 
Record and other government documents, Johnson's reading was limited
31
almost exclusively to newspapers and magazines. Other government of­
ficials often began their day reading the Washington Post. But, accord­
ing to Christian,
^Christian, p. 187.
•^ ®Harry Provence, Lyndon B. Johnson: A Biography (New York: Fleet, 
19610, pp. 156-157.
■^ Geyelin, p. 3^ .
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Johnson was already ahead of them on reading the Post.
He had seen the bulldog edition at eleven o'clock last night.
So he gave the city edition . . . only a cursory reading and 
turned to the other four papers he always rummaged through In 
bed— the Hew York Times. Baltimore Sun. Wall Street Journal. 
Christian Science Monitor. News stories and editorials were 
first, followed by the columns and the business page. The 
society section of the Post was always good for a few Washing­
ton gossip Items and a "hard” news story or two. The sports 
section was Ignored as too unrelated to business. Between 
newspaper items, he listened to network news on the push-button 
set the Signal Corps had devised for him. Three coordinated 
television sets were on at seven o'clock, each tuned to a net­
work. The sound was on Channel b, NBC, for a Presidential 
favorite, the Today Show. If something Interested him on 
Channel 7 or Channel 9» he changed the sound by remote control.
lyndon Johnson absorbed news and current events like a 
blotter. During the day he listened to as many radio newscasts 
as he could. And In the Oval Office the Associated Press and 
United Press International teletypes clacked away until he 
retired to the Mansion late at right. Whenever he entered 
his office, morning or afternoon, he walked straight to the 
tickers. And he monitored them regularly during the day.32
Johnson's extensive reading of papers and monitoring of news broad­
casts went beyond a desire to keep current. Johnson was also highly 
conscious of publicity. This desire was revealed in the instructions 
he gave his staff. Theodore White recounts a pertinent episode which 
took place in 1963:
Before going off for Christmas week, he assembled the senior 
press officers of Defense, of State, of Justice and half a 
dozen other departments at the White House, kept them waiting 
for forty-five minutes in a small chamber, then came to give 
them a brisk four minute dressing down: he was going off to
a reception with some important officials, and all he had to 
say was they better get on the ball. The White House had been 
on the front page with only one story that week— the lighting 
of the Christmas tree, and he had done that himself. He was 
going down to Texas now and they had to let Pierre (Salinger) 
have as many stories as possible so he could release them down 
there. Then, as a parting shot, the president added that he'd 
been checking the Budget and the government was spending almost 
a billion dollars on people like them and they better start 
earning it.^3
32christian, pp. 6-7. 
33|,rhite, p. 72.
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A further measure of this publicity consciousness extended to an Interest 
In the dally affairs of his press secretary.-^ * Johnson even took the time 
to read the transcripts of his press secretary's press conferences, ana­
lysing the questions that were a s k e d . ^5 Johnson, as was mentioned, also 
monitored the teletypes of the wire services to see what was written about 
him, sometimes immediately after a meeting with reporters. On one occa­
sion, following an announcement to the press, Alvin Spivak of United Press 
International dictated a story over the phone in the White House press 
Room. The story was Immediately being sent out over the U.P.I. wire and 
the following occurred;
"I reached about the fifth paragraph," Spivak recalls,
"and suddenly I realised that Bill Moyers was pounding on 
the door of the phone booth. I stopped a minute and opened 
it a crack and Bill said, 'Al, the President Is reading 
your story as it comes into his office. He feels you've 
given the wrong emphasis to the lead.'"36
Johnson's concern for good publicity led him to adopt Kennedy's prac­
tice of calling reporters to praise them and having aides call writers 
to complain about unfavorable stories.3? Pierre Salinger, who served as 
Kennedy's press secretary, and for a time Johnson's, put it this way:
Both Presidents Johnson and Kennedy frequently told me 
to call reporters to complain of unfair or inaccurate stories.
With JFK I knew that in most cases it was just a passing 
irritation, and I wouldn't follow through. But I couldn't
3*ty,L. Stein, When Presidents Meet the Press (New Tories Messner,
1969). pp. 166-167.
^Charles Roberts, LBJ's Inner Circle (New York; Delacorte, 1965), 
p. 119; "End of the Honeymoon," Newsweek, Feb. 15, 1965, pp. 62-63; and 
Christian, p. 229 fn.
^Lis Carpenter, Ruffles and Flourishes (New York; Pocket Books,
1 9 7 0 ) ,  p .  8 6 .
^Ben H. Bagdikian, "Washington Letter: JFK to U3J: Paradoxes of 
Change," Columbia Journalism Review. 2 (Winter 196*0, 36.
get sway with that with LBJ. He not only expected me tp_make 
the call but to report back to him on the conversation.
Johnson's views of the press and of individual reporters were mixed.
According to Strout, "He is divided about the press: he affects to decry
it, and reverences it; he patronizes it, and he writhes under it; he
will over-react in an extraordinary way to woo some individual reporter."
Johnson had many battles with the press, but he seemed to enjoy repor-
UOters. Not only had he "liked them," he "enjoyed the adversary rela­
tionship" that existed. He took pleasure in debating with reporters
ill
and even "relished" some of his rows with the press. While Johnson may 
have liked many reporters, he was unlike Kennedy in that he generally
iip
eschewed personal relationships with them.
Johnson's attitudes toward the press are more clearly seen in his 
expectations of correspondents. To some extent, he expected loyalty.
In an interview for Newsweek magazine Johnson was quoted as saying,
"The press is one of the best servants I have."^ a s  Bill Moyers wrote, 
"Like other Presidents he looked upon the press corps at the White 
House as an adjunct of the Office, a tool to help him advance his
ifJf.
interests, almost as a member of the White House family. . . . "  Johnson
^^ Wlth Kennedy (New York: Avon, 1966), pp. M6-417.
■ ^ R i c h a r d  l . strout, "Presidential Press Conference," The Quill,
5^  (May 1966), 9.
^°"The Widening No Man's Land: President vs. the Press," Life,
May 7, 1965, p. 36.
^personal interview with George Christian, May 26, 1971; and 
Christian, The President Steps Down, pp. 186-187.
^^Chrlstian, The President Steps Down, p. 186.
^ " T h e  Politics of Power: portrait of a Master," Newsweek. Aug. 2, 
1965. P. 25.
^Moyers, letter.
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seemed to have what one correspondent called a "mutual aid concept"
in dealing with reporters. He tried to make a "deal" with them early
in his administration. One story illustrating this has been recounted
so often that it has credibility and deserves mentioning here;
Flying back to Washington from the ranch after the 
holidays of his first winter as President, LBJ laid out his 
press doctrine to a group of astonished reporters, lnoludlng 
such luminaries as the Hew York Time's Reston, who had been 
a ranch guest. In the course of that rambling lecture he 
declared that it was his desire to "make big men" out of the 
newsmen who covered him. He would confide in them and treat 
them as his friends. In return for that, he would expect 
them to forget certain of his indiscretions and to purposely 
look the other way when he was doing something that would 
embarrass him if it showed up in print. It was clearly im­
plied that he wanted them to write their stories as he sug­
gested.
If his expectations of reporters was demanding, so was Johnson's 
concept of what a good journalist should be. He discussed the qualifi­
cations and requisites of a good reporter as follows:
I think that a good journalist should know American 
and world history as intimately as does a competent his­
torian. He should have a substantial and specific under­
standing of economics and politics and foreign affairs, 
especially under the most recent five or six Presidents.
He should be able to find the meaningful in the welter of 
data thrown at him— and not simply rely on someone's cyni­
cal evaluation for a sensational lead sentence.
Second, I suggest that it may be time to change the 
basic attitude of journalism. Too little attention is 
devoted to the common everyday problems that plague 
society and to the efforts that succeed and therefore 
contain lessons we need to knew. '
What Johnson disliked in the press also adds to an understanding 
of his attitudes. Among those dislikes were criticisms of him,
^^Frank Cormier, "Johnson and the Press," Saturday Review.
Sept. 10, 1966, pp. 70-71.
^ H u g h  Sidey, A Very Personal Presidency: Lyndon Johnson in the 
White House (New York: Atheneum, 1968), p. 172.
^Lyndon B. Johnson, The Choices We Face (New York: Bantam,
1969), pp. 1^ 0-1U1.
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especially personal criticisms, speculation. Interpretations of his 
motives, exaggeration, and "leaks."
Johnson's reactions to mistakes by reporters led to personal calls
to Individual writers, as has been discussed. Even a typographical
URerror could send the President to the phone to get a correction.
A more volatile sensitivity was to personal criticisms of himself
or his family. An incident at the L.B.J. Ranch provides an example:
A curtain of ice first descended between press and President 
in March, 1964, after reporters wrote that Johnson had sped at 
80 or 90 miles an hour dc*rn a Texas highway in his white 
Lincoln Continental with a Dixie cup of Pearl beer close at 
hand. The President had entertained us at his ranch that 
day. There was precious little drinking— of beer or any­
thing else. When the first stories appeared, he felt, with 
some justification, that his hospitality had been violated.^9
Robert Sherrill wrote that, "On no point is Johnson more sensitive than
on the coverage he receives from the society writers . . .• He reads
every line of what the major society writers say about him."50 Johnson
defended his sensitivity to criticism after he left office when he
wrote;
Criticism of the errors committed by public leaders is a 
necessary function of a free press in a democratic society.
Criticism of their character, in terras so stark that it makes 
them appear monsters who have imposed themselves on a helpless 
people, is likely to destroy any hope that they might unite 
and lQfd the nation toward the goals it must achieve for great­
ness.^1
Another of Johnson's dislikes with regard to the press was journal­
istic speculation and unauthorised news "leaks." If the media publi­
cized an appointment or a policy before Johnson was ready to announce it,
^®Rivers, pp. 172-173.
^Charles Roberts, "Fearsome Antagonist," Nation. 203 (Oct. 24, 1966),
406.
5°Sherrill, p. 49.
^Johnson, The Choices We Face, p. 137.
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he often became so irritated that he would withhold the appointment
52or not cariy through with the policy. Johnson's policy on specula­
tion led to what reporters called the "Oshkosh rule." In his press 
conference of September 22, 1966, the President explained it as 
follows:
The point I want to make to you— when you see on the ticker 
that Oshkosh says that Bob Pierpoint may be Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, you don't necessarily need to give 
much oredence to it, because the very fact that it is on there 
is the best indication that it is not likely to happen.5^
The policy led to many charges of unwarranted secrecy, Johnson defended
his practice of what he called "keeping his options open." By doing so
he was able, as he said, "to maintain as much flexibility as a man can
until the moment a decision becomes final. ... I took no action that
would automatically trap me into a decision.
Another aspect of journalism disliked by Johnson was what he often
cited as exaggeration. He was especially sensitive to stories on the
war in Vietnam. He described reporting on the 1967 Tet offensive as
"emotional and exaggerated reporting. . . . The media seemed to be in
competition as to who could provide the most lurid and depressing
accounts,"^ Reporting on domestic affairs sometimes evoked the same
57complaint from Johnson.
^Daniel p, Moynihan, "The Presidency and the Press," Commentary. 
Mar. 1971, p. kk.
^Arthur Kroek, Memoirs (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1968), p. 383»
^ Public papers of the Presidents of the United States? Lyndon B. 
Johnson. 1966. v. 2 (Washington: GPO, 1957), P* 105&*
-^Johnson, The Vantage Point, p. 96.
^Ibld.. p.
57Ibld.. p. kkZ.
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A final sensitivity toward the press was revealed In Johnson's 
attitude toward interpretative writing and broadcasting. Editorials 
critical of his policies bothered him, Christian explained this and 
Johnson's preference for factual reporting as follows:
The President had a special liking for reporters who 
stuck to the "what, where, when, who" philosophy taught in 
sophomore Journalism classes. When they wrote about the 
"why" they were in dangerous waters, he believed. . . .
Johnson's attitude toward interpretive reporting had a 
sounder base than one might imagine. He felt that most of 
the interpretations were not calculated to help him adminis­
ter the business of the nation in the manner he thought best,
and he reacted. To read abrasive editorials and columns
every morning of the world does not help digestion, . . .
This is a negative power of the "opinion makers" as seen 
through the eyes of a Chief Executive.
Johnson's attitudes toward the press can be summarised briefly at 
this point. Johnson was fascinated with the news media. He read news­
papers and monitored news programs extensively. He had a keen interest 
in publicity and made attempts to get attention for his programs in the 
media. He liked reporters but was not personally close to them. He
expected reporters to help him achieve his administrative goals. John­
son was also sensitive to the press. He was displeased with much of 
what he perceived, including mistakes, attacks on his personality, specu­
lation, exaggeration, and interpretative Journalism.
Johnson's Press Conference Philosophy 
If by "philosophy" is meant "an organized system of beliefs," 
President Johnson probably did not have a formalized philosophy to 
shape his use of the presidential press conference.^9 Nevertheless, an
^^hristlan. The President Steps Down, p. 180.
59Mpy®rs, letter; and Glen D. Phillips, "The Use of Radio and 
Television by Presidents of the United States," Diss. Michigan 1968, 
p. 132.
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examination of Johnson's purposes, preferences, ideas, and attitudes 
toward the press conference provides a general and useful understanding.
Johnson was indeed purposive in his view. He wanted his news con­
ferences to function for him. Bill Moyers, Johnson's second press secre­
tary, wrote: "He approached the press conference pragmatically, trying 
to construct it the best way for his purpose. . . Another of
Johnson's press secretaries, George Christian, said that Johnson wanted 
to use his conferences to get "his position over to the public and to the 
w o r l d . T h e  press conference was, then, a means of reaching public 
opinion, a forum for presidential persuasion. As Reston put it,
From the start of his administration. President Johnson 
regarded the press conference not primarily as a duty to
respond to questions about his stewardship, but as an oppor­
tunity to put over his views— an old FDR device— and he 
quickly learned that the more he talked, the less time
there was for questions. . , . 2
Johnson occasionally used the press conference to prod congress by
arousing public opinion. As he said, "When traditional methods fail,
a President must be willing to bypass the Congress and take the issue
to the people . . . sometimes a President has to put Congress' feet
to the fire."^ Johnson went on to cite an example of his use of the
news conference for that purpose.^*- The President saw the conference
as a means of presenting new information. He made extensive use of
^®Moyers, letter.
^Christian, interview.
62James Reston, The Artillery of the Press (New York: Harper and 
Row, 1967), pp. 52-53.
63Johnson, The Vantage Point, p. 5^0.
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announcements and opening statements to announce presidential appoint­
ments and to publicise new programs.^
Johnson was probably less concerned for the reporters' purposes at 
the news conference. As was mentioned, Johnson saw the reporters in a 
role of serving the government. Frank van der Linden of the (Dayton,
Ohio) Journal Herald commented, "Johnson uses the press merely as one
more group of spear-carriers in the grand opera of his public relations
66
build-up to the exclusion of the conference's stated purpose."
Another aspect of Johnson's philosophy was his preference for 
informality, a habit developed before he became President. His first 
presidential press conference was held with reporters in the Oval 
Office over coffee. After a few of these informal, impromptu meetings 
criticism arose. Responding to that criticism, Johnson, at his con­
ference of January 25, 196^ , stated:
Don't run out of here if you have any questions you 
want to ask. Ask them. This is not a quicky news con­
ference. I don't know what you call a formal one. I guess 
I ought to wear a white tie. I came to work this morning 
and I didn't think it was formal. I just thought I was 
supposed to be here, and if you.are all here, I will give 
you anything I know at anytime.
A further attitude affecting Johnson's press conference philosophy 
was the President's preference for direct communication with the public. 
Moyers, commenting on Johnson's attitude toward the press conference, 
wrote, "At times he seemed to think of them as ways of reaching the public 
at large, but in fact, he preferred the televised announcement for that
65Bell, p. 151.
^As quoted in Delbert MCGuire, "The Performance of the Presidential 
Press Conference as a Medium of Communication Between the President and 
the Nation Through the Mass Media," Diss. Iowa 1966, p. U4.
^Public Papers. 1963-6^ , v. 1, p. 230.
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purpose . . . with no reporters to get between him end the viewers."®® 
This desire for direct conteet with the nation through television is 
Illustrated in several ways. For example, the networks set up "a 
highly expensive TV room in the White House with warm cameras manned 
throughout the day . . . meeting high weekly bills for its operation."^* 
Johnson used the facilities to make dramatic announcements of strike 
settlements, to appeal for calm during the Watts riots, to announce 
U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic, to announce hostilities 
in the Gulf of Tonkin, and in other ways. During the period of November,
1963, through November, 1966, he pre-empted network television twenty-
7 0eight times. Aware of the power of television to reach the public, 
Johnson scheduled his televised messages to congress in the evenings, 
to get larger audiences.7* He also used the media of radio and tele­
vision for major addresses, such as his policy statements on Vietnam.
Johnson's attitudes toward the televised news conference provides 
a paradox, in light of his preference for direct communication with the 
populace. Johnson once told an interviewer for Newsweek. "They are a 
kind of prearranged show where some reporters get to stand up and be 
on TV."^ As Moyers put it, "Usually he'd rather go to the dentist 
than submit to the formal setting of a televised conference which he 
felt was more the making of the press than of his own design."73
®®Moyers, letter.
^George E. Reedy, The Twilight of the Presidency (New York:
Mentor, 1970), pp. 10 —^105-
7°phillips, pp. 307-308.
^Cornwell, p. 6; and Reedy, p. 155»
72«End of the Honeymoon," p. 62.
^Moyers, letter.
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Johnson's sttituds was that the tslsvlssd format did mors to suit the 
needs of the press than his own. As was noted, Johnson did not want to 
be compared with Kennedy in that situation. Also, Johnson was uncom­
fortable in the televised situation because he was concerned about his 
image and did not feel that he was capable in the broadcast setting.7** 
Admirers of the Kennedy format and network representatives criticized 
Johnson's failure to hold televised conferences and because of the 
pressure of that criticism Johnson finally began to hold them from time 
to time. After leaving office Johnson wrote:
I believe I should have held more regular televised news con­
ferences. I was always more comfortable meeting with reporters 
around my desk, as President Roosevelt did, because it often 
gave us the opportunity to explore questions in greater depth 
than in a televised spectacular. Yet broadcast news conferences 
are an effective means of communicating with the public and 
should be widely used by national leaders.75
Aside from being more comfortable, Johnson preferred the non-broadcast
situation for other reasons. One was that, in the informal conference.
If he made a mistake, he could recover easily. Also, he preferred to
have a more natural give and take with reporters. He liked "to have
newsmen a bit more Irreverent" in their questions than they might be
on television.7^ It is somewhat ironic that despite his dislike of
the televised news conference, his standing in the public opinion polls
often went up after he held that type of conference.77
^Phillips, pp. 123-124; and Salinger, pp. 188-189.
?5j0hnson. The Choices We Face, p. 138.
76Phillips, p. 35.
77Reedy, p. 156; and "Poll Finds Johnson Reverses His Popularity 
Loss," New York Times. Dec. 5. 1967. p» 18.
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Three other aspects of Johnson's personality came to bear on his 
attitudes toward the presidential press conference. First was Johnson's 
love of secrecy and surprise. Johnson had used that tactic of surprise 
In holding his press conferences as Senate Majority Leader, This habit 
helps explain Johnson's preference for impromptu press conferences as 
President.^®
A second and related habit was Johnson's desire to be in control of 
his press relations. Deakin wrote. "As President, Mr. Johnson wants to 
announce all the news himself, at times and places of his own choosing."79 
This urge for control extended to the handling of his news conferences.
In his conference of March 20, 1965, Johnson made it clear to reporters 
what his position regarding his dissemination of Information was, saying, 
"How and where I do that is a decision that I reserve for myself, and 
shall continue to reserve for myself." He promised the same with regard
to meeting reporters; "I will continue seeing the press at different
80times, different places and different ways at my own choosing." The
desire for control also led Johnson to disregard suggestions for improve-
81ment of his press conferences which came from his staff. Cne way in 
which Johnson exercised control over his conferences was to call them on
the spur of the moment, which led to criticism. James Reston postulated
that Johnson called Impromptu conferences when only the White House 
correspondents were around in order to avoid the penetrating questions
^®Geyelin, p. 156; and Warren Rogers, "The Truth About LBJ's 
Credibility," Look. May 2, 19&7, P» 72.
^James Deakin, "I've Got a Secret; president Johnson and the 
Press," Hew Republic. Jan. 30, 1965. P» 13.
®^Public papers. 19&5. 1. P« 303.
®*Christian, interview; and Moyers, letter.
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that night be asked by specialists, thereby giving Johnson control 
over the content of the c o n f e r e n c e s . Johnson offered this rebuttal:
MT often wished that these critics had to subject themselves to the 
questions of these bashful reporters. I assure you they would be 
singing a different tune."®^ Critics also saw Johnson as controlling 
his conferences by opening them with lengthy announcements and by reply­
ing to questions with long answers, thus limiting the number of questions
Oh
that might be asked,
A final Influence on Johnson's press conference philosophy was his 
proclivity for experimentation. During his first few weeks in office 
Press Secretary Salinger advised Johnson to experiment until he found 
the format he liked best.®'* And that he did. Johnson experimented with 
a number of locations for his conferences. He tried holding conferences 
while seated, while standing, and even walking. Almost every possible 
situation was explored. Johnson hired a television executive, Robert 
Fleming, to help with the experiments in broadcasting.®® A variety of 
innovations were attempted with the televised conferences. Johnson 
tried a number of lighting techniques. For a while he used contact lenses. 
He experimented with a teleprompter. In terms of delivery, the best of
®2James B. Reston, "The Press, the President and Foreign Policy," 
Foreign Affairs, 44 (July 1966), 563*
®^ Johnson, The Choices We Face, p. 138.
® T^his criticism was not without justification. One study showed 
that the average number of questions at Johnson's conferences was 16.8, 
while Elsenhower averaged 22.5 and Kennedy, 27.9; »•« MoGuire, pp. 58-70.
®^ Salinger, pp. 413-414.
®®John D. Pomfret, "The President and the Press; Their Relationship 
Continues to Be Uneasy," Hew York Times. Feb. 28, 1966* p. 13.
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Johnson's press conferences came as a result of an experiment. In that
conference. Johnson freed himself from the lectern and used a lavalier
microphone. As Reed described It, Johnson
stepped out from behind the podium and walked up and down in 
front of the camera like a revival preacher.
He waved his arms, chopped the air, drew Imaginary lines 
with his fingers, clutched his glasses, scowled, laughed, and 
ran his voice through a range of sound from hlgh-volume to 
quiet, self-deprecating greatness. Beyond theatrics, he en­
livened the content of the news conference with historical 
comparisons, scriptural quotations. Jokes and a bit of sar­
casm. 87
But this was only an experiment. He never did it again for television. 
Further, he thought that the favorable reaction he got for the perform-
OQ
ance was "silly."
Several points have been made in this section regarding Johnson's 
presidential press conference philosophy. His approach was pragmatic.
His purposes were to inform and to persuade the public, congress, and 
the world. His preferences for informality and for direct communication 
with the public shaped his philosophy. His habits of secrecy, surprise, 
his desire for control, and his urge to experiment also affected that 
philosophy, or rationale behind his press conferences as President.
Johnson's Press Conference Practices 
Perhaps Johnson's philosophy toward the press conference is best 
revealed in his actual news conference policies and practloes, as described 
in this section. The following discussion treats the types of confer­
ences and his strategies in timing his conferences. Also discussed are
On
Roy Reed, "A New Presidential Style: That Was the 'Real Johnson,'
His Old Friends Say," New York Times. Nov. 18, 19^ 7, p. 1.
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Christian, interview. According to Christian, the suggestion for 
Johnson's getting away from the lectern came from Senator John Pastore.
MO
the scheduling, locations, and other details of the President's meetings 
with correspondents.
TVpes of Conferences
Johnson used several types of meetings with reporters, including 
background and off-the-record sessions; official news conferences, both 
formal and informal, scheduled and impromptu, filmed, broadcast "live," 
and not broadcast; private interviews and televised interviews. Johnson 
held a lot of meetings with writers, was fond of counting them and was 
sensitive to criticisms of being inaccessible to reporters. In his con­
ference of March 20, 19^ 5. Johnson reminded reporters:
Today marks the 39th on-the-record press conference that I 
have held, 18 off-the-record, or a total of 57. I have had 
18 press conferences with advance notice, 16 covered by radio 
and television. Bight of these were live television in 
addition to 3 live television joint sessions in the little 
over a year that I have been president.
There have been other occasions upon which I have seen 
the White House press corps on an Informal basis in order to 
give them some insight into vjy thinking. In addition to 
these 56 formal meetings I have had 9 informal, lengthy walks 
with the White House press corpe. Some of you who used to enjoy 
those walks when they were scheduled a little earlier with 
President Truman and from time to time those of you who enjoy 
them will be invited back again.
On various occasions I have had conferences with pools 
representing the White House press. We have had 173 airplane 
flights with pools where they visited— two pool visits while 
I was in the hospital with a bad cold, and one pool visit in 
tny bedroom in the Executive Mansion when I thought I was recu­
perating from it.
I have had additional visits from 37^ accredited press 
representatives at their request; in addition, 6k who requested 
meetings with bureau chiefs, plus 200 telephone discussions 
that I have responded to.
There have been 9 other occasions where I have met with 
the press ranging from a barbeque at the Ranch to addresses 
made to the American Society of Newspaper Editors, the Associ­
ated Press luncheon, and of course last year each one of the 
social affairs. White House press conference and gridiron, 
etc., I believe numbered 8.
I have had 9 special appearances renting from a television
interview with all 3 networks to special statements concerning
Vietnam and the railroad strike. 9^
Perhaps the most frequently used type of meeting was the off-the- 
record conference and background briefing session held for individuals 
and groups of reporters. According to Strout, the reason that Johnson 
liked this type of meeting was that Johnson's "ideal is a private audi­
ence with selected reporters where he can talk and they can listen and 
nobody asks too many unexpected questions."9° At least one correspondent, 
Arthur Krock, found the off-the-record sessions productive, even more so 
than official press conferences.^^
According to George Christian, the off-the-record sessions were held 
almost every day, and they often lasted two or three hours.^ Although 
no agenda was used, the sessions were often arranged in advance. When 
they were scheduled, Christian made a list of seven or eight corres­
pondents who were compatible with one another and then made invitations.
In those meetings there was a good "give and take" between the reporters 
and the president, and Johnson was "at his best."^ The four categories 
of attribution employed by F.D.R. were followed. Johnson sometimes used 
the meetings to "leak" information. He also occasionally practiced the 
"trial balloon" device. Usually, no recordings or stenographic records 
were kept of the meetings, although a press aide was always present to
^Public Papers. 19^ 5, v. 1, p. 303.
90Strout, p. 9.
^Arthur Krock, "Johnson and the Press," New York Times. Dec. 20, 
196**, sec. IV, p. 9; Krock, "Johnson and News TLeaks,*" New York Times. 
Jan. 2k, 1965, sec. IV, p. 11; and Krock, "The Mirrors of 1600 Pennsyl­
vania Avenue," New York Times. Feb. 18, 1965. p. 32.
92p©rsonal interview with George Christian, Aug. 19, 1971.
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take notes on the proceedings. According to Christian, this type of
Oil
meeting was helpful to both the press and the President.7^
Another type of meeting with the press was the television inter­
view with a small group of reporters. For example, William Lawrence, 
Eric Sevaried, and David Brinkley interviewed the President in March 
of 196^.
The third general type of meeting with the press was the official, 
or on-the-record press conference. There were 135 of these. According 
to Johnson, over fifty of these were televised, either by video tape or 
live.95 Most of the official conferences were impromptu and informal as 
opposed to scheduled in advance and formal. Johnson once held a "double 
header," in which a non-televised meeting was followed by a televised
conference on the three most important topics (as selected by reporters)
96
of the first one.7
Preparation for press Conferences
Like Kennedy, Johnson's best preparation for a conference lay in 
his daily work and his extensive reading.9? Johnson reported that he 
read 10 or 15 newspapers daily.9® Johnson also read the Congressional 
Record daily, as well as volumes of other government memoranda and
documents.99
9*»lbld.
^Johnson, The Choices We Face, p. 13?•
9^"0nce More, With Feeling," Newsweek. July 4, 1966, p. 5**.
9?Moyers, letter; and Christian, interview. May 26, 1971.
9®Television interview of March 15, 196^ . in Public Papers.
1963-6^, v. 1, p. 365.
^Christian, The President Steps Down, p. 6.
President Johnson made no preparation for his Impromptu conferences, 
some preparation for his formal ones, and even more careful preparation 
for his broadcast conferences.*®®
The formal preparation process began two days in advance of the con­
ference. Notice was given to the various executive offices and cabinet 
agencies, which prepared lists of anticipated questions and briefing 
books of information to answer the questions. Next, the presidents 
press secretary and staff digested and filtered the briefing books and 
added other anticipated questions and background information. A press 
aide prepared a notebook of the digested and refined materials for 
Johnson to read the night before the conference. Eisenhower and Ken­
nedy's habit of holding breakfast sessions with staff and cabinet mem­
bers was not a general practice during the Johnson administration.
Johnson occasionally held a pre-conference briefing session, especially 
in the earlier years of his administration. Later, this practice 
tapered off. "In critical times he might call a special meeting of 
his foreign policy advisers in advance of the conference to discuss 
his handling of key issues."*®*' Johnson sometimes got advisers such 
as Rostow and Rusk to prepare answers. He also sometimes used prepared, 
written replies on "delicate" subjects to avoid error and to make sure 
that his statements conformed to previous positions as stated by the 
administration. Johnson frequently took notes with him to his formal 
conferences. He did not rehearse his answers.
*®®This and the following information is based upon the two inter­
views with Christian and the letter from Moyers; both sources were 
presidential press secretaries and participated directly in the prepa­
ration process.
*®*Christian, The President Steps Down, p. 199*
Johnson tended to prepare more carefully for his broadcast con­
ferences because he felt the public would notice If he was caught off 
guard. He was very well prepared on the matters he felt most important 
or on toplos he wanted to emphasize during the conference.
Johnson’s preparation for his formal conferences was more extensive 
in the earlier part of his administration than later. He gradually did 
less reading of the briefing books and sometimes just flipped through 
them or did not look at them at all. Alsof he gradually discontinued 
seeing advisers before the conferences. As Moyers put it, "That practice 
disappeared as time went on, partly because I think the President thought 
he knew more than we did and partly because the President did in fact 
know more than we did. There is no better preparation for the Presi­
dential press conference than the president at work. . • ."102
In any event, the preparation was successful, at least in antici­
pating reporters' questions. Seldom was a question asked that had not 
already been guessed by Johnson or his staff prior to the conference.
Press Conference Timing
Johnson was so unpredictable in the scheduling of his presidential 
press conferences that it could easily be said that his personal whim 
was the principal deciding factor. Indeed, being unpredictable may have 
been a strategy in itself since Johnson had a predilection for the 
tactic of surprise. But closer examination reveals other strategies.
An examination of the timing of Johnson's conferences shows five other
*®^ Moyers, letter.
103Christian, interview, Aug. 19. 1971s *nd G.R. Berdes, Friendly 
Adversaries: The press and Government (Marquette University: Center 
for the Study of the American Press, 1969), PP« 35-36.
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chief determinants. Johnson was strategic in timing his conferences 
(1) to make important announcements, (2) to make immediate refutation 
to criticisms of his administration, (3) to promote pending legislation 
and to reach other objects of his persuasion, (4) to gain personal 
publicity and political advantage, and (5) to provide explanations to 
reporters on current technical matters.
The first strategy in timing was to make important announcements.
It was not infrequent for Johnson to begin a press conference, espe­
cially a formal one, with the announcement of appointments and changes 
in personnel in the cabinet, the military and on the Supreme Court. For 
example, in his conference of April 10, 1968, Johnson announced the 
resignation of Larry O'Brien as Postmaster General and the appointment 
of Marvin Watson as successor, the appointment of two new presidential 
aides, the appointment of a new Commander in Chief of the Pacific, the 
appointment of General Abrams to succeed Westmoreland as Commander of 
forces in Vietnam, the appointment of a successor to Abrams as well as 
the announcement of the passage of the President's civil rights bill.
In his conference of June 26, 1968, the President announced the resig­
nation of Chief Justice Earl Warren, the nomination of Abe Fortas to 
succeed Warren, and the nomination of Homer Thornberry to the Supreme 
Court. Announcements were also made to disclose new plans and develop­
ments. In a conference on August 3, 1967, Johnson announced a new tax 
package and a build up of troops in Vietnam. Other examples abound.
Another strategy of timing was to use the press conference for 
refutation. For example, on November 16 of 1967, the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee passed a series of resolutions on curtailing the 
Vietnam war and urging the president to act in halting the war. The 
following day Johnson held a conference in which he attacked critics
of his policies In Vietnam. On June 1, 1965, Johnson responded to criti­
cisms of his use of troops in the Dominican Republic. Johnson used his 
conference of May 3, 196?, to refute rumors of a proposed troop increase 
for Vietnam.
A further reason for scheduling conferences was to push congressional 
legislation which was deadlocked and to reach other objects of persuasion. 
On February 2, 1967, Johnson used a conference to urge the Senate to ap­
prove a treaty with the U.S.S.R. In November of 1967, Johnson went to a 
press conference to press congress to act on pending tax legislation. On 
September 1 of the same year the President criticised the steel industry 
for recent price increases. Also, the same day (July 1, 1968) that Bethle­
hem Steel announced price hikes, the President opened a news conference 
with a lengthy criticism of Bethlehem’s actions. In March of 1965, * 
civil rights protest and march was held in Selma, Alabama. Two days after 
the death of one of the demonstrators, Johnson called a conference to urge 
Governor Wallace to act in protecting the marchers (despite the fact that 
he had met with Wallace personally that same morning, before the news 
conference).
A fourth strategy in timing the conferences was to gain personal 
and political advantage and attention. During the campaign of 1969, this 
was done. After a formal press conference in September of that year, 
Johnson called reporters back in to point out the results of a primary 
election in Arizona. Johnson held press conferences both before and 
after his nomination by the Democratic Party on August 26, 1969. Johnson 
sometimes competed for attention by holding conferences at the same time 
that others were. On June 17, 1965, Johnson held an impromptu conference 
lasting almost an hour and a half in his office at the same time that
P7
Senator Goldwater was holding a news conference, Johnson used the same 
tactic in 1965, when Charles deGaulle was holding one of his highly 
Infrequent meetings with the press, and "many correspondents decided 
that deGaulle had been undercut."*®^ Johnson held news conferences on 
March 12, 1966, three different times to publicize results of a Gover­
nor's Conference which included a resolution supporting Johnson's 
policies in Vietnam, Finally, Johnson used his November 3. 1966, con­
ference to gain personal attention by announcing that he would soon 
have surgery.
The final strategy in timing was to hold news conferences in order 
to explain crucial technical matters. This was a regular practice of 
Franklin Roosevelt, For example, on August 3, 1967, the President sent 
a special message to congress on the budget. At the same time he held 
a press conference and explained in detail various aspects of the tax 
message, using a blackboard. A similar situation led to a news con­
ference on March 9, 1967, the same day that another special message 
was sent to congress.
Before concluding this section it is important to point out that 
Johnson often failed to hold conferences at strategic times. Sometimes 
he made nationwide television announcements instead. At other times, he 
simply avoided public statements. For example, between February 1 and 
February 29 of 196^ , no conferences were held. During that period Cuba 
cut off the water supply to the naval base at Guantanamo, a major civil 
rights bill was in congress, problems had developed on the island of 
Cyprus and the Kashmir question was before the United Nations. In 1967, 
the President did not hold a conference between March 21 and May 5, * 
period of over six weeks. During those weeks U.N. Secretary-General
10^ Rivers, p. 172.
m0 Thant made two peace proposals to the United States, the United States 
was carrying on extensive bombing raids in North Vietnam, and a coup d» 
etat took place in Greece, among other events. On many other occasions 
Johnson neglected to hold a press conference when it might have been to 
his advantage and to the advantage of reporters as well as the public.
Other Details of Johnson's press Conferences
To round out the present consideration of Johnson's press conference 
practices attention is given in this section to such matters as the 
scheduling and locations of the conferences as well as other details.
Johnson was prone to schedule his conferences to suit his own con­
venience. During his first year, the Saturday conference, held about 
noon, was most common. Johnson rarely held news conferences in the 
morning or late in the evening. About half of his conferences were held 
within an hour or two of noon. The other favorite time was the late 
afternoon, around five p.m. Johnson's favorite days were Saturday, 
Thursday, and Friday, in that order. The televised conferences were 
usually at noon or in the afternoon, on various days of the week.
Locations varied considerably, although Johnson preferred his own 
office in the White House. Other locations at the White House Included 
the Fish Room, the Theatre, the East Room (for televised conferences), 
the Cabinet Room, the Press Office, the Blue Room, the Rose Garden, and 
the South Lawn. On occasion Johnson used the State Department's audi­
torium. Thirty official press conferences took place outside Washington. 
Many of those were held at the L.B.J. Ranch in Johnson City and in other 
locations in Texas. Johnson's travels provided other locations, including 
the New York World's Fair, St. Louis, Missouri, and Guam.
39
Johnson was fairly frequent, if not regular, in meeting the press. 
From November 22 until the end of 1963, he had three conferences. He held 
thirty-two in 196^ , seventeen in 1965. forty-one in 1966, twenty-two in 
1967, nineteen in 1968, and one in January of 1969, his last month as 
President. Johnson's average was two conferences per month.
Attendance at the conferences varied. At the impromptu conferences 
twenty to forty reporters were present. At the televised conferences, 
over i*00 sometimes appeared.
Johnson sometimes used planted questions in his press conferences, 
as had other presidents, to Insure that certain topics received atten­
tion.^
Johnson occasionally spoke off the record at his official confer­
ences, but not often.
After the end of each news conference, usually within an hour, 
transcripts were provided by the White House Press Office. Editing 
was almost always limited to changes in grammar or syntax, when there 
was editing of the transcripts. On a few occasions vocabulary was 
edited. Substantive changes were extremely rare and were limited to 
such matters as mistaken statistics.
l05Phillips, pp. 38-39.
*®^Moyers, letter.
10?Ibld.; and Christian, interview, Aug. 19, 1971.
CHAPTER III
THE CONTENT OF JOHNSON'S PRESIDENTIAL PRESS CONFERENCES
This chapter reports the findings of an analysis of the content 
of Johnson's press conferences. The guiding factors of the press con­
ferences' content were, first. Johnson's opening statements. or 
"voluntaries." and. second, the questions which reporters put to John­
son. Other characteristics of the content of the conferences such 
as timing, frequency, and length, are described In the next chapter. 
This chapter, then. Is made up of two major sections beginning with a 
treatment of Johnson's use of the voluntary.
Johnson's Opening Statements
Since the President made extensive use of opening statements In 
his news conferences, the voluntaries have been studied In detail 
in terms of the topics and themes developed. Primary attention is 
given to the subject matter of the opening statements and the frequency 
with which the various topics occurred.
Johnson began almost all of his conferences with various announce­
ments and statements. Each conference has been studied to determine 
the themes and topics, explicit and Implicit, In the voluntaries. In 
analysing the conference, five main categories of subject matter emerge: 
(1) executive matters, (2) domestic issues, (3) foreign affairs,
(U) personal concerns, and (5) miscellaneous items. Under the first 
three areas, subtopics have been analysed. While the system of catego­
rising the themes and topics is arbitrary. It provides useful insights
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for the purposes of this study. A similar Method is used to examine 
the questions reporters asked of the President.
Executive Matters
President Johnson used opening statements at his press conferences 
to report and promote the activities of the Presidency more than for any 
other purpose. Voluntaries on executive affairs were of three types. 
First were announcements regarding presidential appointments and other 
staff changes directly related to the executive branch of government. 
Seoondv Johnson often gave details of his executive plans, activities, 
and decisions. Third, Johnson made statements regarding the nature of 
briefings and meetings which had recently been conoluded.
More than half of Johnson's voluntaries on executive affairs dealt 
with presidential appointments and changes in personnel. To some extent, 
the press conference was Johnson's favorite format for announcing those 
new appointments and resignations whloh are under direct presidential 
control. Included were the White House, the Cabinet, the Supreme Court, 
the military, and others. Over two hundred, or almost a third of all of
1
Johnson's opening statements, were of this nature. Some examples follow.
In his conference of March 28, 196**, Johnson announced a number of 
appointments, including an ambassadorship, an appointment to the Atomic 
Energy Comnisslon, an appointment to the Export-Import Bank, three ap­
pointments to a study commission on Puerto Rico, a new Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of State, and others.
1
All references to Johnson's press conferences are from the trans­
cripts published in the Public Papers of the Presidents of the United 
States: Iyndon B. Johnson, Iff vole. (Washington, ri.U.: GPff, 196jj>^197bj.
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In hi* first oonfsrsnos of 1965, Johnson announced fonrtoon changes 
in ths Whits House staff, including a new press secretary and other 
important presidential asslstantships.
During one of his longer official press conferences, on June 18, 
1966, the voluntaries took up almost half of the conference's tine. 
Johnson announced eleven resignations, appointments, and nominations. 
Among the persons discussed were Ellsworth Bunker, Nicholas Johnson, 
Richard Helms, and John Connelly,
Press conference voluntaries also Involved announcements such as 
the appointment of Sargent Shriver as Ambassador to Prance, Wilbur 
Cohen as H.E.W. Secretary, General William Westmoreland as Chief of 
Staff of the Angr, Arthur Goldberg's resignation as Ambassador to the 
United Nations, Chief Justice Earl Warren's resignation, and others.
A second type of opening statement related to executive affairs 
embraced presidential plans, activities, and deoislons. Voluntaries of 
this type were used more frequently in Johnson's first year of office 
than in any other.
Prom time to time Johnson used his introductory remarks to give 
details of his activities prior to the press conference. Among these 
were meetings and briefings, receptions for dignitaries, telephone con­
versations, and other daily business such as the preparation of major 
addresses to congress.
Johnson also announced immediate and long range plans. Occasionally 
the president used the news conference to announce his travel plans. Por 
example, in the October 13, 1966, conference he gave details of his itin­
erary for a trip to several Aslan countries as well as his intent to 
attend the Manila Conference. During the fall, 196**-, election campaign
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he advised reporters of his travel plans a week or two in advance, at 
times. Johnson also used tha oonfaranea format to annonnea Whit#
House schedules of meetings with Individuals and vith groups suoh as 
dalagations of congressmen.
Asida from plans and activities, tha President sonatinas announoad 
other important decisions, although he usually preferred going directly 
to tha publio. Anong such executive decisions was his Raw Tear's Day, 
1968, voluntary describing an Executive Order to aneliorate the balance 
of payments problem. In a televised oonferenoe on March 20, 1965,
Johnson read a telegram whloh he had sent to Governor George Wallace 
of Alabama, thereby announcing the president's deoision to provide 
federal military assistance to protect civil rights marchers between 
Selma and Montgomery* Alabama. On a few occasions Johnson used his 
opening remarks to present awards, suoh as military citations.
The third subcategory of opening statements related to the executive 
affairs included remarks made by Johnson and other press oonferenoe guests 
after meetings with the President. This type of voluntary gained in 
frequency of use during the last three years of Johnson's administration.
Now and then Johnson met with reporters for a briefing after cabi­
net meetings, Por example, in his conference of September 22, 1966, 
Johnson took over half of the news oonferenoe time with a lengthy review 
of items discussed in that morning's oablnet meeting. On that and other 
occasions, Johnson sometimes deferred detailed questions regarding the 
cabinet meeting to his assistants or to others present at the cabinet 
session. Usually Johnson's remarks to the press after suoh meetings were 
in the nature of a summary.
Johnson also met vith reporters after meetings with individual 
cabinet members and other advisors. The President utilised that
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technique in hi* fifth offioial pr*s* oonferenoe, January 25, 1964.
On that occasion, two-thirds of tha oonfaranoa was spont by Johnson1* 
opening statements, M i y  of which dosoribod his Mating* with tha 
Secretary of Dafansa and with othar administrative offlolals.
Other voluntaries wara used froa tiM to tine after naatings with 
economic and Military advisors, ambassadors, special counsels, individual 
nembers of oongress, and Whit* Rouse aides.
A more commonly usad voluntary of tha post Meting variety con­
sisted of Johnson1* having an Individual or two hold a joint press 
oonfaranoa with hi* in order to allow participants in tha Mating to 
give their views and to answer queries of reporters. An interesting 
illustration of this followed a presidential briefing by Ambassador 
Averell Harrlman, who had just returned frost a tour of Asian and 
European countries following the Manila Oonferenoe (October, 1966).
In Johnson's November 11, 1966, news oonferenoe Harrlman reviewed his 
trip for reporters and replied to five of the twelve questions asked 
during the official press oonferenoe.
Following the Guam Oonferenoe in Maroh, 196?, Johnson used volun­
taries to suMarlse the Meting in hi* press oonferenoe of Maroh 21.
After a few questions, the President's press oonferenoe ended, and 
Ambassadors Lodge and Bunker met with reporters. Later in that year, 
on July 13, Johnson, McNamara, Westmoreland, and Wheeler held a joint 
press oonferenoe to discuss their meetings with eaoh other. All four 
participants made stateMnts and answered questions. A final exaaq>le 
is the May 30, 1966, televised new* oonferenoe, in which opening state­
Mnts by Johnson, Prime Minister Gorton (Australia), and Westmoreland 
took half of the press conference's allotted tiM.
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The last type of post nesting voluntary disoussed here was that 
which followed Johnson's nestings with various governors and conferences 
of governors. On March 12. 1966. L.B.J. held three impromptu, official 
press conferences in less than five hours, following sessions at the 
Rational Governors' Conference in Washington. D.C. Johnson and various 
governors nade aimounoenents of the results of the sessions and answered 
questions, The President exeroised this kind of voluntary, or Joint 
voluntaries, on other occasions.
Topias for opening statements regarding executive concerns were 
generated by three general factors. First were appointments, resigna­
tions and other staff changes under Presidential control. Second, the 
activities, plans, and executive decisions of the President led to 
various announcements and statements. Third, Johnson's meetings with 
leaders In governments provided toplos for many of Johnson's news con­
ference voluntaries.
Domestic Issues
The second most common type of opening statement In Johnson's press 
conferences dealt with the domestic affairs of the United States. State­
ments on the economy, on legislation, and congressional activity, and on 
related Issues appeared.
Almost a third of Johnson's opening statements pertained to domestic 
affairs. As might be expected, voluntaries of this kind were most fre­
quent during the first year of his presidency. After 19^4, Johnson 
displayed a tendency to use statements on Internal matters of the 
United States less frequently. That tendency also corresponded with 
Johnson's decreasing use of voluntaries as a whole after his first year 
as president.
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Opening statements related to the econosQr occurred. Announcements 
on matters such as the budget and employment were analysed as well.
About a tenth of all of Johnson's voluntaries brought up domestic 
economic natters.
During his first two years in office, it was conaon for the Presi­
dent to begin a news conference with a discussion of the state of the 
economy. During this period, the theae was alaost always that of 
frugality in government and a healthy situation in general. The develop- 
nent was reassuring and positive. Johnson's second, third, and fourth 
televised press conferences contained topics of an economic nature. In 
the oonferenoe of March 7, 196^. for example, the President discussed 
public favor towards a tax cut. new figures on uneaployaent. increasing 
business activity, and various prloe indices. On April 16 of that year 
he reported on the gross national product, increases in personal income 
figures, labor statistics, and prices. Then, on May 6 . Johnson addressed 
the nation and an immediate audience of reporters, and wives and children 
of reporters, gathered on the South Lawn of the White House. In that 
news oonferenoe Johnson presented information on the gross national 
product again, on "higher productivity," on "taxes," on "prioe stability," 
on "business oorporate profits," and on other eoonomlo factors.
The pep talks on the domestic eoonoiy were not limited to the tele­
vised press conferences. For instance, in an impromptu news conference, 
July 10, 196h, following passage of "all" of the 1965 appropriations bills 
by the House, Johnson discussed the budget and "glowing reports on our 
recent eoonomlo advances in employment, sales, profits, and income," to 
use his words. That oonferenoe was one of the best exaaqiles of Johnson's 
use of the voluntary on the economy theme. However, after the first part
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of 19^6, the transcripts lndloete that L.B. J . rarely introduced the 
theee In an opening statement at his official s e e  tings with corres­
pondents, whether broadeast or not.
As Mentioned above, topics related to the theme of the domestic 
economy Included employment and unemployment, the national budget, 
taxes, wages, prices, the Gross National Product, corporate profits 
and spending, general business activity, and frugality In the monetary 
affairs of the federal government. In sum, over a third of Johnson's 
voluntaries on domestic affairs, and roughly ten pereent of all of his 
official press oonferenoe voluntaries, treated domestio economic matters.
A second area of Interest among domestic affairs touched upon con­
gressional activities and legislation. About one In ten of L.B.J.'s 
voluntaries were of this kind. Johnson used this theme more in 196^ and 
In 1967 than In other years. He used the theme in about a fourth of his 
official press conferences, all told. Among the topics along these 
lines were the President's messages to congress, vetoes, speolflo pieces 
of legislation and treaties.
On January 7, 19&*-, the second session of the Eighty-eighth Congress 
was convened. The State of the Onion address oame the next day. Prior 
to that, Johnson held at least two unofficial press briefings. Later, on 
January 25, he had an impromptu press oonferenoe in which about two- 
thirds of the time allocated was devoted to opening statements and announce­
ments. Among those were statements on various bills in progress, bills 
passed and signed since he had taken office, and praise for congressional 
action on legislation of Interest to the White House. At the time, a 
major tax bill was pending, as were bills on education, civil rights, and 
others.
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Johnson oontlnuod to promote legislation In his prsss oonfersnoss 
that year. For example, at the Juno 2, nows conference, hold In his 
White House office, Johnson talked to reporters about the morning's 
aeetlng with legislative whips. He discussed the recent 1 no crate tax 
reduction and pending fiscal bills.
On his fifty-fourth birthday, August 27, 1966, L.B.J. reviewed 
various acts in his "Great Society Program." He also commented upon 
congressional efforts in behalf of his legislation, mentioning specific 
bills and specific congressional leaders responsible for the "bipartisan 
support" behind his legislative achievements. Later that year, in a 
televised news oonferenoe on October 13, Johnson used a voluntary to 
praise and blame Republicans of the Eighty-ninth Congress for various 
bills, including social security and medicare. He ended the voluntary 
session of the news conference by saying, "The 89th Congress, my pre­
diction is, historians will record as the great Congress."
Domestic Issues other than the economy and legislation came up in 
voluntaries. The topics here were mostly related to specific, current 
events in the United States. Among voluntaries of this type were those 
related to the military, to the spaoe program, to strikes, to domestic 
violence and disasters, and to the draft. Fewer than ten per cent of 
all of Johnson's opening statements had to do with these ourrent affairs. 
Further, the President tended to talk less and less about such topios 
in press conference voluntaries as his term in office progressed.
A few examples of topics on current affairs were noteworthy. In 
February and March of 1965, for instance, the president employed volun­
taries in two televised news conferences to discuss the voter registra­
tion drive in Alabama and, particularly, the racial violence in Selma
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at tha time. In Johnson's tonth, and ona hand rod and tanth offloial 
news conferences, ha usad voluntaries to axprass himself on tha 1964 
Alaskan earthquake, in tha former, and tha affaets of "Hurricane 
Beulah" on Taxaa «nd Mexico, in tha lattar (September, 196?). Johnson 
usad his July 10, 1964, press oonfaranoa to urge settlement of disputes 
in tha auto industry which had lad to strikes. In June of 1968, Bethlehem 
Steal announced a five percent price increase. A few hours after the 
announcement, Johnson held an impromptu meeting with White House corres­
pondents and reacted to Bethlehem's decision, in his first opening state­
ment.
In sussiasy, Johnson used approximately two hundred announcements 
and opening statements in his news conferences to discuss various 
domestic affairs. He spoke on the eoono^y, employment, taxes, and the 
national budget. He spoke on congressional affairs with attention to 
the specific proposals and the general programs of his administration. 
Finally, from time to time he spoke on various eurrent topics of impor­
tance in the United States.
Foreign Affairs
President Johnson also employed opening statements and announce­
ments to oommsnt on foreign affairs. However, on the whole only about 
one in ten of his press conference voluntaries considered topics of this 
nature. In the conferences from the beginning of his office until the 
end of 1966, Johnson was more frequent in his use of the theme. In his 
last two years as president, he introduced the theme only in a half-dozen 
offloial meetings with reporters.
Indochina was one concern. Statements about Vietnam had topics on 
troop increases, military efforts, peace negotiations and other attempts
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to settle tho war, and oonforonoas on Southaaat Asia. Topics on 
Vietnam appeared In fewer than a third of Johnson's news conferences, 
although sone of the announoeMnts on the these were probably signifi­
cant. Sometimes voluntaries on Vietnam were dramatlo.
One of Johnson's first lengthy voluntaries on Vietnam oame in his 
June 2, 1964, press conference. On that ocoasion Johnson presented a 
suraaary of U.S. policies In Vietnam which he had just reviewed in a 
session with his legislative leaders. Included In the statement was a 
letter from President Eisenhower to president Diem, dated October 25.
1954, which supplied Ideas for Johnson's development. Johnson went on 
to Mntlon the purpose of United States' involvement In Vietnam (". . . 
to help build a stable peace."), to praise the military for its efforts, 
to note the need for eoonomlo assistance programs, and to describe the 
agenda for the Honolulu conference on Southeast Asia then in progress.
At the President's next press oonferenoe, June 23, Johnson announced 
Henry Cabot Lodge's resignation as Ambassador to Vietnam, and the 
nomination of General Maxwell Taylor and U. Alexis Johnson to succeed 
Lodge, L.B.J. went on to repeat points he had made in his June 2 con­
ference. In the June 23 meeting the President discussed Viet Cong 
activities in Laos.
In a televised oonferenoe, March 20, 1965, six months after his Johns 
Hopkins speech on Vietnam, Johnson devoted a portion of his opening state- 
Mnt to the topic of the government's position on Southeast Asia. On 
June 1 of that year the President used a televised press conference 
voluntary to announce a request to the Congress for an eighty-nine 
million dollar appropriation bill for eoonomlo aid to Southeast Asia,
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The June 18, 1966, broadcast oonfaranoa oontalnad a long volun­
tary on Vietnam. Johnson prasantad a six months' review of polloies, 
military efforts, and Internal affairs. Ha emphasised tha necessity 
of . . honor for all in naking peace," and said, "Let the killing 
stop," in reply to critics of his policies. The tone of the voluntary 
suggested hope and a possibility of a peaceful end to the war. Johnson 
continued those lines of thought in his next conference, also televised, 
on July 5, 1966. There he developed the topic of social and economic 
progress in Vietnam, based on a recent report to him by Robert Komsr, 
(Johnson's aide in charge of social and economic development in Vietnam).
On November 5. of that year, Johnson used the press conference format 
to permit Secretary McNamara to brief reporters at the L.B.J. Ranch on 
military affairs in Vietnam. McNamara expressed a belief that there 
would be less U.S. military activity and that spending would not be 
increased in the future. The statement was lengthy and continued the 
theme of optimism, or hope.
Johnson's final Important press conference announcement on Vietnam 
was May 3. 19^8. The conference was broadcast "live," over radio and 
television. The President announced that, "I was informed about 1 o'clock 
this morning that Hanoi was prepared to meet in Paris on May 10th, or 
several days thereafter." That announcement followed Johnson's March 31 
address to the nation in which he proposed plans to end the war, including 
some cessation of bombing. Johnson also announced his intention not to 
run for re-election in the March 31 address.
Aside from the topics on Vietnam numerous voluntaries on a variety 
of other foreign affairs, especially those of direct involvement by the 
United States appeared. From time to time Johnson used the press conference
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voluntary to desaribe suoh matters as American relations with Panama, 
intervention in the Dominloan Republics, relations with the U.S.S.R., 
developments in the Middle East, the test ban treaty's progress, 
foreign aid, and other matters of foreign diplomacy. These topics, 
as was the case with Vietnam, accounted for less than ten per cent of 
press conference voluntaries. Further, Johnson was found to be more 
infrequent in his initiation of topics on foreign affairs after his 
first year in office.
However, several of Johnson's announcements and statements of 
this nature were of Importance. A few examples have been selected for 
presentation here.
Difficulties in U.S. relations with the Canal Zone and with 
panama evolved early in Johnson's administration. Johnson first 
introduced the problem at a press conference on January 23, 19^* 
following Panama's January 10 break in diplomatic relations with the 
United States. In press conferences held March 23 and May 15, L.B.J. 
continued to review the situation for reporters and the nation.
Later in the year, peaceful negotiations were developed.
At a televised press conference on Tuesday, April 27, 19^5.
Johnson made a brief statement on civil strife in the Dominican 
Republic. He announced the evacuation of American citlcens from the 
danger in the area that day. On Wednesday, the President announced 
to the nation the intervention of United States troops in the Domini­
can Republic. Four days later. May 2, Johnson devoted a televised 
address to the nation justifying the military involvement and recounting 
the events which led to it. The topic came up in other speeches of 
the President in May. On June 1, Johnson held his first press oonferenoe
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sine® his announcement of intervention in the Dominican Republic. John­
son used tha June 1 televised oonfaranoa to announce, publioly, with­
drawal of U.S. troops. The topic of American Involvement in the affairs 
of tha Dominican Republic was found in press oonfaranoa voluntaries In 
broadcast conferences in June and July, 1966. On July 5# 19^6, Johnson 
reported to the press that the situation was improved and promising.
In 1967. other press conferences provided the President an oppor­
tunity to bring up international affairs. Por instance on March 2, 
the President told reporters of an exchange of letters with Chairman 
Aleksei Kosygin which indicated progress in anas limitations. On 
September 1 of that year Johnson announced his authorisation to provide 
increased wheat shipments as aid to India.
During his last year in offloe, the President eschewed voluntaries 
on foreign affairs, save three on matters related to Vietnam.
Personal Concerns
Only on occasion did the President employ the offloial press oon­
ferenoe to initiate matters related to his private life. Suoh voluntaries 
accounted for only a handful of all of his opening statements and were 
more frequent during his first year of office than in ary other. Topics 
related to the area of personal affairs embraced Johnson's health, per­
sonal finances, travel and recreation, politics, and family. A few 
specific instances are noted here.
On November 3, 1966, an entire news oonferenoe was devoted to the 
subject of an announcement by the President that he would have abdominal 
surgery. The President announced more speolfio details at a press 
conference later in the month, November 13. At his fourth offloial 
meeting with reporters, January 23. 19^. Johnson responded to recent
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new* stories on his personal and family financial holdings. He also 
discussed the fact that, "The ^ Bobbj^T Baker family gave us a stereo 
set," a number of years before Johnson became president. In the first 
official press conference after the 1964 Democratic Rational Convention, 
L.B.J. announced the forthcoming publication of his book, Ijjr Hope For 
America. In his August 26, 1965* conference Johnson briefed reporters 
on his birthday plans of the morrow. In the next to the last of his 
official press conferences Johnson outlined his Christmas plans as well 
as his personal projects following the end of his tenure as President.
Miscellaneous Topics
Opening statements with topics of a miscellaneous nature accounted 
for only about five per cent of all of the news conference voluntaries. 
These topics Included those derived from announcements regarding the 
press and press conference policies, partisan political matters, cere­
monial statements, and certain statements made by guests at some of 
Johnson*s conferences. Examples of such opening statements follcw.
On July 24, 1964, the President welcomed visiting correspondents 
from South America to his news conference. Johnson's last press con­
ference, January 17, 1969* contained a humorous opening statement for 
reporters assembled at the National Press Club in Washington. On 
occasions, especially during his first two years in office, Johnson 
would comment upon his press relations and policies. The outstanding 
example of this was his March 20, 1965, statement on his press rela­
tions, discussed in chapter two of this work. An unusual example of 
Johnson's use of the voluntary on a political topic was found in the 
August 15, 1964, news oonferenoe. At that time Johnson responded to 
statements made by Senator Goldwater, Republican candidate for the
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presidency, on the subject of the use of nuclear weapons fay the U.S. 
Finally, opening statenants by guests at Johnson's press conferences 
provided news conference topics. For example, on Deoember 6, 19^5, 
Joseph Swindler, Chatman of the Federal Power Commission; Secretary 
of the Treasury Fowler; Wllllan Martin, Jr., of the Federal Reserve 
Board; and Gardner Ackley, of the Council of Economic Advisers, made 
statements to the press and were queried.
The first half of this chapter may be summarised at this point. 
Johnson's opening statements and announcements in official press con­
ferences played a significant role as a determinant of the content of 
the conferences. The President often began a news conference with one 
or more voluntaries. The extent to whloh voluntaries were used in 
press conferences paralleled the number of press conferences Johnson 
held each year. However, after his first year In office, L.B.J. dis­
played less frequency in his use of that device.
The topics initiated by Johnson in the voluntaries were of five 
kinds. First were statements regarding executive matters. Including 
Presidential appointments, personnel changes within the President's 
control; Presidential plans, activities and decisions; and statements 
following briefings and other meetings with White House aides, cabinet 
members, congressional leaders, governors, and others. Seoond, many 
voluntaries concerned the domestic Issues in the United States. In­
cluded were topics related to the national economy, current legisla­
tion and the congressional affairs, and ourrent events in the country. 
Third, Johnson used voluntaries to dlsouss foreign affairs. Vietnam 
and the war in Southeast Asia provided topics on a number of occasions. 
American relations with other countries suoh as the U.S.S.R. and Latin
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America also figured In some of the opening statements end announcements. 
Fourth, only a few voluntaries which treated the President's personal 
(or private) and family concerns emerged in the analysis. Fifth, several 
opening statements of a miscellaneous nature emerged from time to time.
The Content Of The Questions 
The second chief determinant of the content of the press con­
ferences was the reporter's question. An average of sixteen or seven­
teen questions was asked at each Johnson conference.
This study analyses all of the questions in terms of content to 
discover major topic areas and to discern specific subtopic categories. 
The system of studying the questions has been similar to the classi­
fication system used to study the voluntaries. Findings of the analysis 
of the questions are reported here under the four main topic areas 
which emerged; (1) the presidency, (2) domestic issues, (3) foreign 
affairs, and (4) miscellaneous. The following discussion treats each 
of the four topic areas and reports on Important subtopics in eaoh.
In the next chapter, other characteristics and qualities of the ques­
tions receive attention.
The Presidency
More than a fourth of the questions put to Johnson by correspondents 
had to do with the President's public and private concerns. While deter­
mining the difference between a president's official affairs and his 
personal business may be arbltrezy, the distinction proves useful in 
analysing the questions.
First under the presidency were questions related to the official 
plans and actions of the president. Correspondents frequently asked
10 7
Johnson about his administration*® goals, loadsrs, and activities. Thoy 
also quorlod Johnson on his Presidential alas, actions, deeisions, travel, 
staff and other appointments, meetings, and reactions to various events. 
Questions on the Presidency, and especially those on Johnson's official 
activities were more numerous in the press conferences during his first 
(1963*196*0 # third (1966), and last (1968-1969) years in the White House 
than in the other two years.
Questions on presidential activities were generated on occasion 
by Johnson's speeches, public announcements, and other official state­
ments. Suoh questions occurred either in anticipation of, or soon 
after, those public statements. For exasple, on January 13, 1966, the 
day after the "State of the Union Address,” an unsoheduled news oon­
ferenoe provided questioners an opportunity to probe the President on 
various ideas in the Address. One of the reporters said, "Mr. President, 
can you characterise the reaotlon to your speech last night? Tou 
talked about some 'con* telegrams, which we understand you said to be 
in the minority. How do you feel the reaction was?” Later that year 
on March 31# Johnson addressed the National Legislative Conference of 
the National League of Cities. At a noon, impromptu press conference 
on that date, reporters asked about some of the speech's statements.
News conference queries also resulted frost suoh addresses such as 
Johnson's najor statements on Vietnam, Including the September 29, 1967* 
"San Antonio formula” speech, also presented to the National Legislation 
Conference. Finally, after Johnson's Maroh 31* 1968, address to the 
pub 11a on Vietnam, which included his announcing that he would not 
stand for re-election, reporters asked about fifty questions on the 
President'8 plans, official and private.
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Since Johnson was fond of using tho presidential press con­
ference to announce staff changes In his administration, it is not 
surprising that a number of questions had to do with appointments 
and resignations. For instance, in the conference of April 11, 196^, a 
reporter asked, "Mr. President, sir, at what point in Mr. Lodge's 
career will it become necessary for you to re-evaluate his role as 
your ambassador?'1 Lodge resigned that position on June 19. On other 
occasions the press asked about resignations. For example, in the 
June 18, 1966, conference L.B.J. announced the retirement of William 
Raborn as Director of the C.I.A. One correspondent wanted to know 
why Raborn had resigned, saying, ". . . Is it health or other affairs?" 
Reporters occasionally questioned Johnson's oholces. In the June 23, 
196h, conference, Johnson said that General Maxwell Taylor would be 
the new Ambassador to Vietnam. One question in the conference was,
• why did you pick a military man for this post?" A related 
area of inquiry had to do with unfilled positions, as reporters 
did ask from time to time about Johnson's intentions to fill vacancies. 
Among other official activities which led to questions were 
Presidential trips. Reporters asked for details in advance of, during, 
and after such trips as Johnson's 19&* tour of Appalachia. Reporters 
asked about the possibility of a Presidential visit to Detroit and 
Newark after rioting in those cities in 1967. In 1968 questions specu­
lated on plans for a summit meeting in Moscow.
The President's press polloles were questioned in more than one 
oonferenoe, especially early in Johnson's administration. The first 
question of this nature appeared in his first press conference. In 
Johnson's second official oonferenoe, December 18, 19^3, a reporter
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asked whether L.B.J* would continue to hold surprise neetings with 
reporters. A televised conference, March 13, 1965, yielded a question 
on the timing of press conferences, since L.B.J. had waited six days 
to hold one after civil rights protesters, according to Johnson, were 
"attacked and some were brutally beaten" in Selma, Alabama.
Various other White House decisions cane under scrutiny in meetings 
with reporters. Johnson's decision regarding who would attend Churchill's 
funeral in 1965 began in a press conference on January 16, more than a 
week before Churchill died. In Johnson's February ^ news conference, 
a question was raised about why Vice President Humphrey was not selected 
to attend, since the President himself could not attend. Other deci­
sions were questioned over the years. For instance, in the meeting 
of December 4, 1967, almost half of the questions related to official 
actions of the President. In that conference reporters asked about 
Johnson's plans for the budget, his handling of McNamara's resigna­
tion, a recent military appointment, a possible meeting with Prime 
Minister Harold Wilson of Britain, possible Cabinet changes, the next 
day's meeting with Cyrus Vance, what L.B.J* might do about a steel 
price hike, and Johnson's plans for "an all-Asian summit meeting."
Matters related to Johnson's personal life aocounted for about 
two questions in an average press conference, or more than one in 
ten questions overall. Questions related to Johnson's private life 
were about as numerous as those on his official activities. Interest 
in L.B.J.'s private affairs was more acute in his first and last years 
in office than in others, as might be expected.
Several subtopics emerged. Reporters were interested in Johnson's 
health, family, personal finances, polltios, and suoh items as his
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feelings about his own press relations, A few examples of questions 
related to Johnson's unofficial affairs are presented below,
Qjr far, politics was the key natter of inquiry when it cane to 
L,B.J.'s private life. In the seoond Johnson press oonferenoe was this 
question: "Assunlng that you are the Democratic nominee for president
in 196^# will you agree to debate your opponent?” In Johnson's last 
offloial press conference, at the National Press Club in Washington, a 
correspondent wanted the president to say why the Demoorats had not 
won the 1968 election.
The frequency of questions on Johnson's political alms and acti­
vities was cyolioal and predictable. Election years, of eourse, brought 
about most political inquiries. In 19^, such questions became more 
and more numerous as the Democratic Convention approached. A similar 
pattern emerged during 1966, relative to Congressional and other elec­
tions. In 1967 and 1968 speculation as to when Johnson would announce 
his desire for reelectlon led to a number of press conference queries 
from time to time through the oonferenoe of March 30, 19&8. In that 
oonferenoe, a reporter asked if Johnson planned to talk about L.B.J.'s 
"future role in this campaign, or oandldaoy” in a televised speeoh to 
be given the next day. (The response was "No.” The next day, March 31* 
Johnson announced he would not run for reelectlon.)
Other political topics generated by questions included primary 
elections, political polls, press predictions, politioal figureheads 
close to the administration, the choioe of a running mate, matters of 
campaign ethics, issues, politioal debating, opposing candidates, and 
opposition parties and their spokesmen. An interesting example of a 
press oonferenoe in which questions of a political nature predominated
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was ths televised meeting of July 2^, I96U. Johnson had met with Repub­
lican nominee Barry Goldwater earlier in the day. Reporters used state­
ments which had been made by Goldwater to get L.B.J.'s reactions. They 
asked about his choice for Vioe President, about campaign Issues, about 
Goldwater's ability to get votes, about George Wallace's withdrawal from 
the presidential race, about how much campaigning Johnson planned to do, 
and, again, whether Johnson would debate with Goldwater.
Other personal affairs also led to questions from time to time. 
Johnson's health was a matter of Interest to reporters, especially when 
he was ill, and before and after surgery. In the November 3, 1966, 
offloial press conference, for example, all of the 37 questions asked 
were about a forthcoming abdominal operation, and Johnson's physicians 
handled the replies. At other times, questions of the "Row do you 
feel?" -type occurred.
Johnson's personal finances were subjeots of queries in some of 
his early press conferences. Reporters asked about suoh things as 
L.B.J.'s business Interests in Texas in more than one press conference.
Family matters emerged in a few conferences. For Instance, on 
August 9, 1966, reporters queried the President about his daughter's 
seeking employment in New York City.
Another area of unofficial presidential concern of note in the 
conferences was Johnson's reactions to criticism, especially press 
criticism, and his attitudes toward and relationships with the press.
For example, in the July 13, 1965, televised conference, Johnson was 
asked, "Hr. President, quite a bit has been written recently about 
your relations with the press. Some of these stories have been openly 
oritloal, to say the least, sir. We seem to have heard from everybody 
but you. I wonder if you could give us your views on the subject?"
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Finally, conferences held on special ocoaslons, suoh as L.B.J.1s 
birthday, and just before Christmas, evoked several questions about 
the President's private life.
The Presidency, then, was a major area of Inquiry in Johnson's 
presidential press conferences. Reporters asked questions on a 
variety of topics related to both the President's offloial activities 
and his private life.
Domestic Issues
The seoond area of questioning In the news conferences cantered 
around events, ideas, and people of national Interest in the United 
States. Questions on domestic affairs acoounted for almost a third 
of all questions asked from 1963 through 1969* While the percentage 
of these questions was basloally static over the years, 1965 and 1966 
yielded higher percentages than did the other years of the Johnson 
administration.
Questions on domestic matters dealt with the economy, legislation 
and congress, and "other" Internal Issues.
In an average press conference one question on the U.S. economy 
might appear. Sometimes questions of this nature were stimulated by 
Johnson's voluntaries. On other oooaslons, current events related to 
Inflation, the national budget, taxation, the stock market, and employ­
ment figured in the questioning.
Cases In whloh the president's voluntaries or other official acts 
and statements elicited questions on the economy were of note from 
time to time. The administration's budget and other money requests 
of congress were common stimuli for inquiries. For instance, in the 
November 29, 1966, conference, L.B.J. opened with a lengthy statement
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on major "cat backs" in federal spending for fiscal years 1966 and 1967, 
as well as other administration attests to control inflation. The 
voluntary led to a number of questions Including the effeots of the 
budgetary cuts on federal employees' pay, on the spaoe program, on 
money for building schools, and on the possibility of a tax reduction.
Of the fourteen questions related to the econony in that oonferenoe, 
one reporter asked, "How are the cattle prices? Are they pretty good?" 
(The conference was held in Austin, Texas.) On August 3, 1967, Johnson 
held a press conference, using a blackboard, to prepare reporters on a 
"Special Message to Congress" on budgetary and economio natters. All 
of the questions related to his economio report.
The other situation, in which Johnson made no initial oomnents on 
the economy, led to an occasional inquiry on that subject. For example 
in a televised oonferenoe, on August 18, 196?, efforts by farmers to 
raise their prices were brought up by a reporter. Another reporter 
asked for specific information on a statement which had been made during 
the week by Charles Schultse, Director of the Budget. In the May 21,
1966, meeting a reporter asked the President about "publlo dissatis­
faction" with inflationary trends in the eoonony. Other questions in 
that conference treated the possibility of a tax increase, the national 
debt, and Johnson's answer to the question on Inflation.
Other topics, such as employment figures, wage and price figures.
Wall Street, and the Gross National Product appeared in press conference 
questions off and on during the Johnson administration.
A second area of questioning relative to domestic affairs dealt with 
legislation and congressional activities. In an average conference one 
question of this type might occur. Over the years, less than ten per cent
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of the questions broached the ares of legislation and oongress, except 
for the aalendar year, 1967. The appearance of questions on donestic 
legislation was not always predlotable. However, reporters tended to 
query the President more often on tax legislation than any other type. 
Reporters also seemed to ssk more questions about pending legislation 
than about anticipated or passed legislation, except for money bills. 
Further, questions on domestic legislation seemed to occur more fre­
quently when a particular administration measure was stalled or In some 
other difficulty than when Johnson*s proposals were doing well in 
congress. The last phenomenon seemed to be true of questions about 
hearings on treaties and presidential nominations to federal offices.
Among the subjects related to this area were the success or failure 
of the "Great Society's" programs, specific pieces of legislation, 
committee hearings, treaties, and congressional action on Johnson's 
nominees for executive and Supreme Court appointments.
An example of a question anticipating legislation was found early 
In the Johnson administration. Less than a month after Kennedy's death, 
in Johnson's second official news conference, a reporter asked If the 
new President planned "for any legislation In the area of Presidential 
succession or disability. . .
On February 1, 1964, a reporter asked for Johnson's reaction to a 
"dispute" between Robert McNamara and the Joint Atomio Committee "over 
the atomic power plant for the carrier. . . In the same conference, 
another question dealt with Johnson's legislative priorities and what 
he thought his chances of success were with planned civil rights and 
tax legislation. A later question In that conference had to do with 
the development of the "war on poverty" and how Johnson thought it would
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be promulgated for congressional consideration. (On March 16 of that 
year Johnson presented his proposals on poverty in a "Special Message to 
the Congress.")
Good examples of questions on economic legislation were asked in 
press conferences vhioh followed important budget proposals and related 
requests of the congress. For example, in the oonferenoe of January 17. 
1967. reporters based most of the queries on Johnson's "Budget" and 
"Eoonomlo Messages" which included eighty-five specific proposals for 
consideration by the House Ways and Means Committee,
In September of 1966, one of L.B.J.'s major financial proposals 
and other legislation generated quite a few questions. For example, 
in the oonferenoe of September 21, one query had to do with whether 
the financial proposals were to achieve "a balanoed budget." Also, two 
questions treated the administration's unsuccessful Civil Rights act 
of 1966 (which had to do with housing). On March 28, 1968, a reporter 
asked for Johnson's feelings about the fact that "the Foreign Relations 
Committee voted down funds for the Aslan Bank and deferred funds for 
I.D.A. . . ."
An interesting illustration of questions on Senate hearings was 
afforded by Johnson's nominations of Homer Thomberry as Associate 
Justice and of Abe Fortas as Chief Justloe to the Supreme Court. John­
son announced the nominations in his June 26, 1968, press conference.
In the next official conference, July 31. the last question asked was 
for a statement on the Senate Judiolary Committee's handling of the 
nominations. The next news conference of the year was on L.B.J.'s 
birthday. The Fortas nomination was in trouble and the Democratic 
Convention was in progress. No questions were asked about Fortas in
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that brief oonfaranoa. In tha following Mating, September 6, one 
of Johnson's voluntaries discussed tha situation in tha Senate, where 
a filibuster on Fortas* nomination was in the making. Again, no ques­
tions were asked on that subject. The Senate filibuster began September 17. 
On October 2, Johnson announced his withdrawal of the Fortas nomination, 
thereby ending the filibuster. The matter did not appear in a press con­
ference again until the last one, January 17, 1969* when a reporter 
asked, "Did you seriously consider naming Arthur Goldberg as Chief Jus­
tice after the Fortas nomination was withdrawn?"
A final area of questioning on domestic affairs is miscellaneous 
in nature and has many questions related to current happenings at 
home. An average press conference would have two questions on ourrent 
events in the United States. Overall, about one in fifteen of all the 
questions asked was of this nature. Interest in ourrent affairs as 
revealed by the questions peaked In 1965, a year of civil rights efforts, 
riots, and other acts of civil violence In America. After 1966, repor­
ters asked fewer questions each year, proportionately speaking, on related 
matters.
Among the topics considered here were urban affairs, civil disobe­
dience and violence, civil rights, labor-management relations, the draft, 
and disasters in the country. Also included were consumer affairs, environ­
mental problems, the "space race," elections and voting, protest move­
ments, and business and industrial matters.
From 196^ through 1966 reporters often questioned Johnson about civil 
rights and related protest movements and violence. The first question in 
the April 16, 196h, televised oonferenoe, for example, was "Mr. President, 
how do you feel about civil disobedience as a tactic in the olvll rights
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struggle?" Events In and around Selma, Alabama, led to questions In 
conferences during the spring of 1965. That smser, rioting In Watts 
nade the news. On May 21, 1966, a press oonferenoe question was, "Mr. 
President, have you any thoughts on what seems to be Indications of 
noun ting racial tension in this country, suoh as In Watts and In sons 
other areasT"
In a slnllar vein, protest marches and demonstrations related to 
the war in Vietnam, poverty, and oanpus violence drew questions from 
reporters later In the Johnson administration. Por Instance, in March 
of 1968, rioting In Memphis, Tennessee, led a reporter to ask in the 
March 30 conference, " . . .  how do you feel about the proposed Poor 
People's Maroh on Washington next month . . .?"
The military draft was another matter of concern in press con­
ferences. For Instance on July 5. 1966, after a recent study of the 
Selective Service System had been commissioned by L.B.J., the president 
was asked for his own attitudes toward the system. On other occasions 
reporters queried the White House on prospects for inoreased draft calls. 
In the July 13, 1967, meeting, a reporter asked Secretary MoNamara, a 
participant in the oonferenoe, about the possibility of inoreased "draft 
calls" for Vietnam.
To conclude this section on questions relating to "other" domestic 
affairs, here are examples from selected press conferences. The Septem­
ber 9 , 196^, press conference elicited several questions on civil disor­
ders and government plans to solve the problems. Questions emerged on 
an F.B.I. Investigation of vlolenoe in Mississippi, on Johnson's request 
for an F.B.I. study of rioting in such oltles as Philadelphia and in 
Harlem, and about the possibility of "known Communists. . . among the
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agitators. . ." In the riots. In the June 17. 1965* conference, was a 
question on Pranklin D. Roosevelt Jr.. who apparently was considering 
running for mayor. Another question was ". . . i s  there anything you
oan tell us on the supersonic transport?" One reporter asked about the
"Denver flood disaster." A televised press conference on July 20. 1966. 
revealed other examples. In that conference reporters asked about an 
airline strike, the "black power" movement in the U.S., "professional 
agitators" in the cities, the Virginia primary election, and the Presi­
dent's attitudes toward freedom of the press. The President's televised 
conference of Maroh 9 , 1967, also revealed a variety of questions on 
ourrent domestic Interests. Reporters asked about C.I. A. expenditures 
for student organisations, the report of the study commission on the 
Selective Service, the shipyards strike on the west ooast, and the possi­
bility of a manned lunar landing in 1970.
On Maroh 30, 1968, questions dealt with the "Poor People's march on 
Washington," national defense, racial trouble in Mathis, and a strike 
in the copper industry.
Domestic affairs, then, proved to be an important area of inquiry 
in Johnson's news oonferences. Reporters raised questions about matters 
of interest in the U.S., on issues related to the eoommy, on congress 
and legislation, and on various other toplos. More often than not, current 
events in the country elioited queries. The next section describes the 
most frequented area of questioning in the oonferences, foreign affairs.
Foreign Affairs
In general, questions on foreign affairs occurred more often than 
those in the other three categories, given the number of questions asked 
and the member of press conferences which took place in the Johnson
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sdmlnlstrstion. Specifically, ever a third of the questions were of 
this nature. The percentage of Inquiries on foreign affairs aaoelerated 
after Johnson's first year in office. In 1965 and 1967, for example, 
about half of the news conference questions related to non-domestic 
Issues. Reasons for this and other trends ere suggested In the next 
chapter. At this point, a report on the content of the questions on 
foreign affairs is necessary.
The nost comon question area In Johnson's conferences was on the 
subject of Vietnam. About two-thirds of all the questions on foreign 
affairs related to U.S. involvement In Southeast Asia, to wit, war and 
peaoe In Vietnam. Comparatively speaking, little interest In Vietnam 
was expressed during L.B.J.'s first year in office. After 196^, however, 
reporters lnoreased the proportion of questions on Vietnam. Again, the 
years 1965 and 19^7 were peak years for the topic.
Specific Items of inquiry on Vietnam included American military 
support and activities, such as day to day operations, bombing, long 
range alms and efforts, battle conditions, troop strength, and expan­
sion of the war. Reporters also asked about social and political develop­
ments In Vietnam, as well as American eoonomia and other aid for the 
region. Other participants in the war, such as the Rational Liberation 
Front, neighboring countries, and allies of the United States received 
attention. Prospects of and attempts st peaoe were also topics. Critics 
of the war, at home and elsewhere, provided the basis for many press 
conference questions on Vietnam.
The first public statement by President Johnson on Vietnam was proba­
bly made in his first news conference. At the time, Johnson had requested 
that McNamara go to Vietnam to "look over the situation out there" for him.
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In that December 7, 1963* Mating, on* question was asked about John­
son's purpose In sending the Seoretazy. The toplo did not appear again 
in a press oonferenoe until Johnson's sixth Meting with reporters, 
February 1, 1964. During that oonferenoe Johnson was asked questions 
about the future of AMrloan involvement In Vietnam, about de Gaulle's 
ideas on neutralisation of the country, and about Johnson's own atti­
tudes regarding the best possible solution. The next two oonferences 
were televised and drew a dosen questions on Vietnan. For example, on 
February 29* a reporter asked whether the war would esoalate and,
". . . are we losing there?" A question on the possibility of inter­
vention by "Communist China" and the Soviet Union also appeared, as did 
a question on Laos. Another reporter asked about Johnson's previous 
statements regarding a searoh for peaoe in Southeast Asia. A week 
later, on Maroh 7« questions pertained to the safety of non-military 
personnel of the United States in Vietnam, to Republioan orltlclsm of 
Johnson's handling of the problem, to secret oammunioatlons with de Gaulle 
on Vietnam, and to the feasibility of withdrawing U.S. forces to allow 
the Army of the Republic of Vietnam to take over military activity on a 
gradual basis. These questions, taken from the first eight of Johnson's 
one hundred and thirty-five offioial news conferences, set the tone for 
most of the questions to be asked throughout his administration.
However, after the March 7 oonferenoe, reporters seldom asked more 
than one question in a oonferenoe on Vietnam until conferences in late 
July and early August. On August 4, 1964, L.B.J. addressed the nation 
on the Gulf of Tonkin hostilities. August 5 brought a "Speolal Message 
to Congress" whloh resulted in the August 7 resolution. Half of the 
press oonferenoe questions the day following that resolution were on
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•▼ants related to the Tonkin battles and the congressional resolution. 
After the August 7 oonferenoe. Interest In the matter waned In press 
conference questions. Moreover, as the presidential campaign increased 
in public attention reporters only occasionally queried the President 
on Vietnam.
Early in 1965 renewed Interest in American involvement in Southeast 
Asia led to more frequent questioning on various, related topics. A 
televised meeting with reporters on February U evoked a number of such 
queries. The first of these was for a general review of the situation. 
Another reporter probed the chances of a settlement resulting from 
secret talks in Paris. One correspondent posed a question about the 
views of Albert Gore and Prank Church on solving the conflict. Other 
questions were on Johnson's attitudes toward the reasons for U.S. 
Involvement in Vietnam, hinting at what was to be called the "domino 
theory" as a justification for oontlnued American activity. A final 
question on the topic had to do with United States attitudes tcward 
the current political and governmental structure In South Vietnam.
An eighty-minute conference on June 17, 19&5. brought up Senator Joseph 
Clark's statement on negotiating with the Viet Cong, about secret 
negotiations with Hanoi, about a proposal for negotiation made by Bri­
tish Commonwealth Prime Ministers, about the general "chances for 
improving International relations" because of American involvement in 
Vietnam (and in the Dominican Republie), and about the need for Johnson 
to request another Congressional resolution of support for his policies. 
Later in the year, several press conferences were dominated by questions 
on Vietnam. Among those questions were topics related to increased 
troops and overall "escalation," various peace proposals, the effects
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of the war on tho economy of the United States, bombing of "missile 
sites" In North Vietnam, efforts of allies of the United States, presi­
dential war powers. United Nations attempts to deal with the problem, 
Soviet support for the "enemy," and continuing negotiations.
Throughout the next two years reporters maintained constant ques­
tioning on Vietnam. During these years questions Increasingly reflected 
criticisms of Johnson's goals, policies, and actions In Southeast Asia, 
Also, the specific subject matter of many of the questions asked in pre­
vious years came up again and again. For example, on December 6, 1966, 
Johnson held a joint press conference with Secretary MoNamara. In that 
meeting, reporters asked twelve questions on Vietnam. In 1967, on 
July 13, in a conference attended by Johnson, MoNamara, and General 
Westmoreland, reporters asked all of their questions on Vietnam. Other 
press conferences In 1966 and 1967 reflected great Interest In the topic. 
For example. In a televised meeting on November 17. 1967. correspondents 
wanted to know about troop levels, public critics of the war, bonfclng 
In North Vietnam, the Vletcong's attitudes toward negotiation, Johnson's 
"present assessment of our progress and prospects," attitudes of North 
Vietnamese leaders on American public opinion on the war, "confusion, 
frustration, and difference of opinion" in the United States, and draft 
evaders.
Most of the same questions oame up again during L.B.J.'s last year 
as president. During this year much of the questioning was sparked by 
Johnson's final efforts to arrange formal negotiations with the leader­
ship of North Vietnam. Questions on the Paris peaoe discussions and 
the handling of the efforts during the transition to the Nixon adminis­
tration led to several questions in press conferences that year. For
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•xaiplc, In the November 15, 1968, conference, rtportsrs asked about 
the role of the coning executive leadership In foreign policy decisions 
related to Vletnan. They also asked about progress In getting South 
Vietnamese participation in the Paris peace talks. One question In 
Johnson's last presidential press conference was “Mr. President, are 
you sorry that more countries did not take a nore active part in the 
effort to help South Vietnam?1*
It Is clear that Johnson's news conferences afforded many and varied 
queries on the Issues surrounding this country's continued engagement in 
the affairs of Southeast Asia. The problem stimulated questions on 
general goals; the causes of the war; military activity; social, economic, 
and political problems faced by the participants in the conflict; effeots 
of the war In the United States and elsewhere; and various proposals and 
attempts to settle what may be the longest major war in American history. 
It Is essential to note again that no other press oonferenoe topic 
brought about such frequent and persistent questioning as did the subject 
of Vietnam.
Other matters of International concern evolved. Whereas an 
average press conference would have four questions on Vietnam, It would 
also have two questions on other foreign relations. Over the years 
these questions tended to anticipate and follow International develop­
ments, as was the oase with other domestio affairs. Further, no signifi­
cant yearly trends appeared In the proportionate amount of questioning 
on other foreign affairs, except for Johnson's first year in office in 
which sueh items as the Panamanian crisis were Important. It may be 
Interesting to note that 1966, the year In whioh Johnson held the most 
press conferences (forty-one), and in whioh more questions were asked
12**
than In any othar year, was tha jaar In whioh tha percentage of ques- 
tlons on "other" foreign affair* waa lowaat.
Among tha topica of queatlona on othar foreign affair* ware Ameri­
can relations with the U.S.S.R., Panama and tha Canal Zona, the Dominican 
Republic, Cuba, and Germany. Reporters also asked about India, problems 
in the Middle East, other Latin American affairs and the Organisation of 
American States, various European countries, Greece and Cyprus, Afrioa 
and problems in the Congo, China, and the "Pueblo affair." Examples of 
press conference questions from various years are presented below.
In L.B.J.'s first year, one of tha most common subject matters 
among questions on other foreign relations was the Soviet Union. On 
December 18, 1963. for example, a reporter asked the President about 
the best way for the United States and the U.S.S.R. to improve their 
relationships. Other Issues emerged during tha 1963-6** period. For 
example, in Johnson*s January 25, 196**, meeting with the press corps, 
a question on Soviet Union criticism of American violations of a "pledge 
for nondissemination of Nuclear weapons" came up. Another question in 
that oonferenoe was, "What do you think about tha French Intention to 
recognise Rad China?" Reporters also asked about attempts to solve the 
oonfliot in Panama, about British bus sales to Cuba, and about a recent 
trip to Malaysia by the Attorney General, Later in 196**, the Cuban situa­
tion, the Panamanian crisis, trade with the U.S.S.R., Sino-Soviet relations, 
Russian-German relations, American intervention in the Congo, and John­
son* s oonmnioations with de Gaulle ware toplos of questions.
In 1965 White Rouse correspondents inquired about such natters as 
the plan for a "multilateral force" in Europe, arrangements for a visit 
to the United States by Russian officials, Amsrioan involvement in the
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Donlnioan Republio, efforts of the Organisation of Amerloan States, the 
United Nations and difficulties between Indonesia and Malaysia.
Although 1966 had fewer questions, proportionately speaking, the 
variety of questions asked Is useful to note. 1966 brought up press 
oonferenoe questions on toplos carried over from previous years and on 
sone new problems In foreign dlploaacy. Included In the queries that 
year were American aid to India, renewed hostilities In the Dominican 
Republic, United States foreign policy In general, and admission of 
China to the United Nations. Problems among North Atlantic Treaty Organi­
sation participants. Including France's withdrawal of support, stimulated 
several questions. Difficulties between India and Pakistan were men­
tioned, as well as the possibility of trade with China, American coopera­
tion with the U.S.S.R., United States troops In Europe and the situation 
in West Germany, plans for a Latin American "summit oonferenoe," and 
"prospects for a treaty on outer space." In November of 1966, North 
Korean attaoks on an American patrol emerged In questioning for the first 
time. The president's trip to the Far East, and a forthcoming trip to 
Europe, and tension in the Middle East also came up. China's testing of 
nuclear explosions was a topic In the December 31 press oonferenoe in­
quiries.
In 1967 the two major topics of press conference questions were the 
U.S.S.R. and the war in the Middle East. In the spring of that year 
correspondents Inquired about developments on attests by the U.S. and 
the U.S.S.R. toward a nonproliferation treaty. No offiolal press con­
ferences were held during the June, 1967. meetings between Soviet Premier 
Kosygin and Johnson. However, progress In other "Disarmament Conference" 
meetings was a frequent issue. In the summer and fall of 1967, war In
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the Middle East and suoh erenta ae the dosing of the Sues Canal, Egypt's 
severing diplomatic relations with the United States, and American aid 
to Israel sparked a number of questions. Among other toplos were United 
States' relations with Czechoslovakia, new ideas on "world Communism" 
by the Senate foreign Relations Committee, the possibility of another 
"world war," American relations with China, and German Chancellor Kissin­
ger's visit to this country.
Johnson's final year in the White House revealed few questions on 
other foreign affairs. The "Pueblo incident" and aotivlties of the Soviet 
Union predominated in the questioning during 1968-69*
In January of 1968 the U.S.S. "Pueblo" was taken by North Korean 
vessels and the Pueblo's crew was held captive through most of the year. 
These events stimulated several press oonferenoe questions, for exaaqjle, 
on September 6, a reporter asked, "Mr. president, do we have ary informa­
tion that would lead us to believe that the Pueblo will be released this 
Sunday, or shortlyt" Similar questions had been asked sinoe February, 
and oontinued to be asked in the fall of 1968.
A second area of Interest during the year had to do with various 
affairs of the Soviet Union relating to Berlin, to Czechoslovakia, and 
to other Eastern European nations. For example, in the June 26 oonferenoe, 
one question was, "Mr. President, what do you think are the reasons for 
the intensified Communist pressure on West Berlin at this time?" In the 
September 6, oonferenoe, a reporter asked if Johnson was thinking about 
providing "asylum for Czechoslovakian refugees." Also in that and other 
oonferences were questions on the "Disarmament talks" and Senate action 
on the "nonproliferation treaty."
The Middle East situation came up in press conferences in March 
and October of 1968, For exaqple, on October 2kt a reporter asked, "Mr.
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President, are we having any diplomatlo oonaultatlona with tha Soviet 
Union with roapoot to rising tensions In the Middle East?”
A view of the questions asked in Johnson's presidential press con­
ferences showed that more questions on foreign affairs were asked than 
on any other area related to the presidency. Further, issues surrounding 
the war in Vietnam emerged in questioning more so than any other single 
aspect. Questions on Vietnam covered a gamut of ideas and events, as was 
noted. Finally, other matters of United States Involvement In other 
countries led to inquiry In the oonferenoes. Questions on other foreign 
affairs tended to cluster around current affairs and, occasionally, dealt 
with foreign policy in general.
Miscellaneous Topics
Topics of a miscellaneous kind accounted for less than ten per cent 
of the questions. In other words, about one question in an average oon­
ferenoe would be of this nature. No significant trend was noted over the 
years regarding the proportionate amount of inquiry classified as "mis­
cellaneous” in nature.
The most Important topic area here included political matters which, 
seemingly, were not essentially related to Johnson's personal interests. 
Other miscellaneous questions pertained to suoh natters as immediate press 
oonferenoe procedures and arrangements and the whereabouts and activities 
of various persons formerly associated with the White House. Statements 
which reporters sometimes made to the president, although not questions, 
fell here.
Correspondents sought L.B.J.'s reactions to current political events 
In a number of news conferences. Usually, these matters had an indirect 
bearing upon the Presidency or on Johnson's political career, ostensibly.
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but ware, hcwever, of sone In tore at nationally or locally. For example,
In a press oonferonoo on July 10. 19#*, a roportor askod for L.B.J.'s 
comments on a statement made by Robert Kennedy concerning R.F.K. »s ohanoes 
of being nominated for the Vice Presidency. In the save year Johnson was 
asked to consent on other political matters related to various campaigns 
and elections. Another election year, 1966, brought up some politically 
oriented questions. For example, on August 2**, Johnson was asked about 
the prospects of the re-election of "those five freshmen Democrats you 
got from Iowa." On November 4 of that year Johnson was asked to speak 
to the fact that, "Last week. Senator Barry Goldwater predicted that 
Ronald Reagan would win the Governor's seat in California by either a 
minor or a major landslide." Two days later, another question put to 
Johnson before the election was, "Could you give us your judgment on how 
big a factor the backlash Is in the ca^paignT”
The 1968 elections provided other examples, but one instance should 
suffioe here. On October 24, L.B.J. was queried about the congressional 
races, about the "law and order” Issue, and about Humphrey's desire to 
debate Nixon and Wallace.
Other "miscellaneous" questions were procedural. From time to 
time reporters would ask whether Johnson's comments were "on the record,” 
especially during his first year In the White House when he tended to go 
"off the record" in official conferences. Other questions might ask if 
a particular statement was available in a White House release (or printed 
In sosie form) at the time. Questions for technical clarification were 
sosMtimes asked, as well. For example, reporters would sometimes ask the 
spelling or pronunciation of names, especially when Johnson had announced 
a new appointment of some kind. Reporters sometimes asked L.B.J. to re­
peat a statistic, also.
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Once in a while, reporters made requests and othar statements to 
the President in press conferences. These were rare and usually brief 
points made to clarify a question Just asked, for example when Johnson 
seemed not to understand the meaning of a question. It was not at all 
common for a correspondent to use the press oonferenoe directly to con­
front the president on a matter. But Johnson's televised conference of 
July 20, 1966, revealed an example of that, when Richard Wightaan, of 
the Fairchild publications chain, complained to the President and the 
nation that "The White Rouse has withdrawn our press credentials to cover 
the wedding" of Johnson's daughter. The reporter went on to ask, "Don't 
you think in light of this that it rather goes against your own philoso­
phy of press freedom?"
Thus, the fourth and last question category, on miscellaneous 
matters, contained Inquiries on current political events, and on tech­
nical and procedural details of special Interest to reporters.
In sunaaiy of this section on the content of Johnson's press con­
ferences, as generated by reporters questions, the following statements 
may be made.
The first major topic area was the presidency, including official 
activities and Johnson's private affairs. The presidency accounted for 
over a fourth of the questions asked. Reporters questioned the Presi­
dent on a variety of administrative alas, plans, and activities. Repor­
ters also asked about unofficial matters, especially Johnson's political 
fortunes.
Domestic affairs accounted for many questions. The national eoonosQr, 
including employment, taxation, and governmental finance came up in cor­
respondent's queries. Congressional activities and domestic legislation
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provided many questions. Among other lnterael matters were olvll rights, 
public violence end riots, lebor relations, and natural disasters.
The third, and most popular area of questioning was foreign affairs. 
Questions on Vietnam emerged more and more often as the war progressed 
and as hopes for peace increased. Questions on other international mat­
ters treated specific events, chiefly. United States activities In panama, 
the Dominican Republic, the Congo, and Europe were discussed. Reporters 
also questioned the affairs of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, 
the United Nations, and activities of world powers suoh as the U.S.S.R., 
China, and Prance. Situations like the Pueblo incident and continued 
hostilities In the Middle East brought about many questions.
Fourth, soon miscellaneous Issues evoked questions from time to time. 
Included here were questions on partisan political matters and teohnloal 
and procedural items of Interest mainly to the press.
Finally, a profile of an average Johnson news oonferenoe would 
reveal at least four questions on the presidency, five questions on domes­
tic affairs, six questions on foreign affairs (including four on Vietnam), 
and at least one question of a miscellaneous nature.
The next chapter explores some of the rhetorical aspeots of the 
two determinants of the press conferences' content, the voluntaries and 
the questions.
CHAPTER IV
EVALUATION OF JOHNSON'S PRESS CONFERENCES:
VOLUNTARIES AND QUESTIONS
The aim of this chapter Is to present an evaluation of President 
Johnson's use of opening statements and announcements and the ques­
tions asked in the press conferences.
Briefly, the plan of this chapter is as follows. First, the 
voluntaries are described in terms of Johnson's purposes in using 
them, his methods of development, and his effectiveness with the 
device. Second, the questions are treated according to the corres­
pondents' purposes, the characteristics of their questions, and the 
effectiveness of the questions.
Johnson's Opening Statements 
What Johnson wanted to achieve with his press conference 
voluntaries, the techniques he used in developing the voluntaries, 
and his effectiveness in employing voluntaries provide bases for 
the evaluation presented in the first section of this chapter.
Purposes of the Voluntaries
Johnson's apparent aims in using the voluntary in a press con­
ference were not unlike the general goals of the press conference 
Itself, described in Chapter I, and Johnson's own press conference 
goals, mentioned in Chapter II. Historically speaking, the general 
goals of any president using this particular method of communication
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have been to Inform, to persuade, and to receive feedback. Moreover, 
Johnson's goals were pragmatic, purposive. Johnson wanted to Influence 
public opinion with Information and persuasion In his news conferences.
The general press conference goals, of disseminating Information 
and persuading, fall to explain adequately why Johnson used volun­
taries so extensively in his conferences. More specifically, Johnson's 
purposes were (1) to inform, (2) to publicise, (3) to promote, (4) to 
defend, (5) to enhance his ethos, and (6) to control the press confer­
ence Itself. While Johnson may have used a particular announcement 
or statement for more than one purpose In a given press conference.
It Is worth considering those purposes separately at this point.
To Inform. President Johnson not only used his announcement time 
to present new information, but to clarify other and previous communi­
cations with the press or the public. Examples of Johnson's presenta­
tion of new Information appear In quite a few conferences. In such 
conferences Johnson might announce a new presidential action, as he 
did when he told of certain appointments and nominations. Johnson 
also used a few press conferences to explain other communications 
which were given with other formats. For example, before or at the 
same time as the White House released a "Special Message to Congress," 
Johnson might use a voluntary to explain aspects of the "Message."
He did this on the day that an economic proposal was sent to Congress,
In his August 3, 1967, news conference.* In that situation the
*A11 references to Johnson's press conferences are to the tran­
scripts published in the Public Papers of the Presidents of the United 
States; Lyndon B.Johnson. 10 vols. (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1965-1970)7 
Citations to other materials, such as speeches and press releases, 
refer to the same source. Direct quotations from the transcripts, un­
less elllptlcally quoted, are verbatim with the following exceptions. 
Footnote numbers and footnotes in the texts are deleted. Also omitted 
are headings and bracketed numbers, e.g. J, which appear in order to 
show changes In topics within a given conference.
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President wanted reporters to understand various phases of his pro­
grams and he used half the press conference to talk about the proposals. 
A similar aim of a few voluntaries was to clarify infonnatlon presented 
at some time before a particular conference. For Instance, the Panama 
and Canal Zone hostilities led to official statements from the White 
House on January 10, lh, and 16, 19#*. On January 23, Johnson met with 
reporters and summarized events and statements on the subject. In the 
main, Johnson's press conference voluntaries revealed that attempts 
to explain were more common before or at the time of any Presidential 
communication than afterwards. Nevertheless, an important goal of many 
of the voluntaries was to Inform reporters of Johnson's actions and 
decisions.
To Publicise. President Johnson used the voluntary to get imme­
diate attention and interest for specific Items related to his adminis­
tration. Johnson sought publicity for new developments. He also used 
voluntaries to maintain interest in and bring attention to previously 
announced matters. As was seen In the analysis of the content of 
the voluntaries, the President was more likely to announce his deci­
sions and other executive affairs than any other topics. Further, the 
announcement of staff changes was by far the most frequently used kind 
of opening statement. These announcements gained publicity for the 
President as well as for the particular persons being nominated, ap­
pointed, or relieved of service.
Johnson also used the press conference situation to build publi­
city over a period of time. "The Voting Rights Act of 1965" provides 
an Interesting illustration. First, here Is some background Informa­
tion. In Johnson's first "State of the Union Address," he argued
the need to provide legislation for "Increased opportunities" In, 
among other areas, housing, employment, and voting. The topic was 
revived In campaign speaking during the summer of 196*1. For example, 
on June 17 Johnson told the Communication Workers of America, "We 
have a program to give every American dtlsen an equal chance to hold 
a Job, to vote . . . whatever his color or race." Two days later 
Johnson got Senate passage of his 196*4 "Civil Rights Bill." On accept­
ing the Democratic nomination In August, Johnson again mentioned the 
voting Issue, but in a minor way, as he had In his "State of the Union. 
In December of 196*4-, Johnson told the National Urban League that he 
was anxious to deal with the problem.
The hints of 196*4 were asserted more overtly in 1965 *s Johnson 
accelerated his efforts toward action on voting rights. The "equal 
opportunity" idea came up in the January *4, 1965, "State of the Union 
Address," with brief mention of voting rights as a specific Issue.
The voter registration drive in Alabama, and Its consequences, spurred 
Johnson to announce In his February *4 news conference that the 196*4 
"Civil Rights Bill" would be used to find a legal solution. On 
March 9, Johnson released a statement that a special act was In prepa­
ration. Four days later, in his televised news conference, Johnson 
spent close to half of the conference discussing the difficulties In 
Alabama and his Intention to submit a bill to Congress. On Monday, 
March 15. Johnson addressed the Congress, Introducing the "Voting 
Rights Bill." In the next few days further aggravation In Alabama 
brought about a confrontation between Governor George Wallace and 
the President. On March 18, Johnson read to White House correspon­
dents a telegram from Wallace to the President. Johnson followed the
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reading with a statement of his own. On March 20. the President met 
reporters at the L.B.J. Ranch for a news conference and once again 
publicised a stimulus for requesting the voting rights measure.
Johnson did not Initiate press conference discussion on the bill 
Itself as It proceeded through congress, although reporters did ask 
the President for his reaction to the progress of the bill during 
those four months. On August 6, Johnson signed the act. In his tele­
vised press conference of August 25, he made a lengthy opening state­
ment to publicise the successful application and enforcement of the 
act In Georgia, Mississippi, and Louisiana.
To Promote. President Johnson wanted more than mere public 
attention and interest or publicity; he wanted favorable public opinion. 
In his quest for support from the press and from the people, Johnson 
frequently made statements in press conferences to promote the goals, 
plans, and successes of his administration. While It was more usual 
for him to speak on attainments of his efforts, L.B.J. sometimes used 
voluntaries to elicit favorable attitudes toward his goals and his 
plans to accomplish those goals. Although Johnson preferred not to 
go directly to the public or the press to discuss legislation of im­
portance to his programs, he sometimes used the press conference to 
pave the way for the introduction of specific bills. To cite an exam­
ple, on February 4, 1965, he began a broadcast news conference by 
explaining a new "Message to Congress," which became law as the "Food 
and Agriculture Act of 1965." The February h statement included remarks 
on the Importance of the American farmer, on the value of food, and 
on the need to aid farmers and to protect "our unparalleled harvest of 
plenty." Johnson continued by outlining the basic proposals of the
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special message and by saying that speolfle proposals would be an- 
nounced In "the weeks and months ahead." Johnson tried to get favora­
ble attention for his goals as well as his plans.
Perhaps the most significant promotional voluntary was that 
which detailed the successes of the "Great Society." The President 
often, apparently, was pleased to begin a press conference with good 
news. Sometimes the good news was a specific accomplishment; on other 
occasions, a general review of progress was presented. A rather odd 
Instance of demonstrating success was found in two press conferences 
in 1964. On February 29 Johnson told reporters that the "A-ll" Jet 
airplane was being tested. He described the development of the craft 
as well as related, "important technical achievements." On April 11 
Johnson announced that, "The world record for aircraft speed, cur­
rently held by the Soviets, has been repeatedly broken in secrecy by 
the United States aircraft A-ll." L.B.J. then gave further details 
of the accomplishment.
Among the most frequent of Johnson's success stories were volun­
taries on the economy. Most of these messages appeared In the first 
two years of L.B.J.'s tenure. But as late as March 9, 1967, in con­
junction with the announcement of a request to Congress "to restore 
the Investment credit and the use of accelerated depreciation for 
buildings," the President sought to show the nation, In a televised 
news conference, that his actions of the previous year had worked.
In that conference Johnson presented a number of details and statis­
tics to prove the efficacy of his economic programs.
Preempting prime time television was a favorite means of telling 
the American people of particularly dramatic accomplishments In the 
early years of the Johnson administration. But press conferences.
13?
especially broadcast ones, also provided appropriate means from time 
to time. Perhaps one of Johnson's most Important public statements 
was made at the May 3, 1968, conference, on Hanoi's agreement to 
meet for peace negotiations In Paris.
To Defend. The fourth specific goal of some of Johnson's volun­
taries was related to the promotional aim. At times Johnson used the 
press conference to defend his administration, especially when Johnson 
felt the heat of criticism for various policies and actions. Some 
examples follow.
Not long after his first few months in the White House, criti­
cism of Johnson's press policies and relations appeared in the news 
media. Johnson responded in more than one of his press voluntaries. 
For instance, in the televised conference of March 20, 1965* he gave 
a lengthy review of his policies. (A quotation from that statement 
appears in Chapter Two.) On June 17 of that year Johnson began his 
conference with a brief statement on his long voluntaries, which also 
had come under attack, and promised to allow "20 minutes for question­
ing." That conference lasted eighty minutes and at least half of the 
conference was taken up by Johnson's opening remarks.
Another, and quite possibly more essential, area of sensitivity 
was Johnson's handling of the war in Southeast Asia. As the U.S. 
showed Increased military and economic commitment to Vietnam, more and 
more critics spoke and acted against L.B.J.'s policies. The criticism 
did not escape Johnson's attention since he used a variety of forums, 
including the press conference, to defend his goals, policies, and 
actions. Instances of Johnson's presentation of his reactions to 
critics of the Vietnam war were more common In his first two years
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in office. For example, In L.B.J.'s Maroh 20. 1965. conference he 
stated that he had explained U.S. policy in Vietnam "U? times.”
Johnson repeated the policy statement once more in that voluntary.
Critical assertions by politicians, such as Barry Goldwater in 
196**, also brought an occasional press conference voluntary in defense 
of Johnson's leadership.
To Enhance His Ethos. President Johnson sought to use some of 
his press conference remarks to demonstrate his own leadership abili­
ties, Including such personal qualities as integrity, decisiveness, 
forcefulness, sincerity, and sagacity. Johnson also sought to help 
the public image of various menfoers of his staff. Johnson's general 
promotion of his administration, described above as his third aim, can 
also be seen as evidence of his desire to win positive public opinion 
for the Presidency.
Johnson tried to establish rapport with reporters In his con­
ferences. At first, his eagerness to win over the White House press 
included serving coffee to correspondents in an Informal setting in 
Johnson's office. Perhaps even the habit of surprising reporters by 
holding impromptu conferences was designed to win their favor. But 
Johnson also used his voluntaries to show his concern for their needs. 
It can be argued that Johnson was attempting this by providing useful 
and sometimes dramatic Information in his conferences, especially In 
the conferences which were not broadcast "live,” that he was trying to 
demonstrate his awareness of and willingness to cooperate with media 
representatives.
Johnson also tried to enhance the ethos of various individuals 
associated with his administration. When nominating or appointing
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someone for a particular post, It vas not unlike the President to 
present the person In a favorable light, especially, but not only,
If the person was relatively unknown to the press and the public.
For example, on July 13. 1965, Johnson announced five nominations in 
his news conference. He talked In some detail about his nominee to 
the post of Solicitor General, Thurgood Marshall, and about Mrs.
Penelope Thunberg, The two were there and Johnson presented them to 
reporters and to the nation.
Further, Johnson often prepared opening statements to heighten 
the image of some of his current staff, including military leaders 
and cabinet members. This sort of aim was apparent in joint press 
conferences with men like Robert McNamara and General William West* 
moreland. The same type of voluntary aim appeared in conferences 
held after meetings with presidential advisers or with Important lea­
ders.
In the case of some of his voluntaries on persons associated 
with his presidential leadership, Johnson may have been attempting 
to support his own image at the same time as he praised other persons.
The content of Johnson's voluntaries seems to reveal that the 
President was indeed Interested In establishing, maintaining, and at 
times regaining a favorable image, not only of the Presidency, but 
of Johnson himself. Because the president must serve in various capa­
cities and because the person who is president sometimes looks beyond 
his immediate term in office, it is not difficult to understand that 
one aim of Johnson's voluntaries was to enhance his ethos.
To Control the Press Conference Itself. Presidents can regulate 
their conferences by the frequency, timing, and length given to meetings
with reporters. Presidents oen slso Influence the oonferenoe with 
such factors as location, degree of formality, the president's mood 
or tone, as well as other conditions. Johnson probably used all of 
those forces. He also, probably more than any other president, tried 
to shape his conferences by what he said at the beginning of the 
meetings. His Intent apparently was to control the content, length, 
and direction, as well as the effects, of most of his conferences.
Several factors were considered In evaluating Johnson's alms In 
the use of opening statements and remarks In his conferences. Such 
factor's included the "national interest," presidential authority and 
roles, the Immediate and long range needs of the press conference 
participants, the availability of other ways of meeting the partici­
pant* needs, and, perhaps, the extent to which the participants shared 
or conflicted In their expectations of the conference.
To fault Johnson for using the voluntary to Inform, publicize, 
promote, defend, and enhance the ethos of his administration would 
probably run counter to many accepted theories of democratic govern­
ment In the United States. Such criticism probably would also violate 
most recognized philosophies of communication.
Moreover, in terms of Johnson's particular presidential leader­
ship goals, the powers of his office, and related factors, Johnson's 
alms, alone, seem worthy.
Another question related to evaluating a president's voluntaries 
(and other aspects of his conferences) has to do with the use of volun­
taries during election campaigns. If the president were campaigning 
for himself or for his party's candidates, or both, the critic could 
assert the existence of a political or selfish motivation behind the
use of press conference voluntaries. Various factors run counter to 
this viewpoint. First, when does a political "campaign" begln7 Barry 
Goldwater was seeking his party's nomination probably even before John­
son took office. Goldwater entered primaries early In 19^ and cam­
paigned until nominated. Knowing that a president Is a candidate does 
not necessarily begin with a formal announcement of candidacy. Nor 
does the president become a candidate only after accepting his party's 
nomination. Johnson avoided formal announcement of his own candidacy 
as long as possible In 19&*.
Furthermore, when Johnson spoke during election years, it was not 
always clear whether he was wearing his official hat or a campaign hat 
with "Vote Democratic" on It. For example, Johnson refuted criticisms 
of his administration made by Republican presidential candidate, Barry 
Goldwater, on the day of Goldwater's nomination. If it was chiefly for 
political gain that Johnson rebuffed Goldwater, then the critic might 
question Johnson's .motives. However, the Issue was a matter of na­
tional security, at least In the mind of the President, and one could 
Just as easily argue that Johnson was merely explaining presidential 
policy in his rebuttal. Other aspects of Johnson's press conference 
voluntaries during political campaigns raised similar problems. For 
example, why did L.B.J. hold a news conference the day before his 
nomination? His only voluntary concerned an explanation for his 
being late to the conference and a statement that In two hours' time 
he planned to announce the nomination of his running mate. In his 
next conference, September 9. 196^ , Johnson announced that a book on 
his "philosophy of government and . . . views on the Issues" was to 
be published. (The profits were to "be turned over to charity.")
Pour days later, Johnson lntroduood a press conference with one of his 
reviews of the successes of the domestic economy. In that conference, 
Johnson began, "Confidence In our eoonomlc prosperity has been growing 
as indicators continue to point up. . .
One of the most widely repeated criticisms of Johnson* s press 
conference aims resulted from a conflict of the desires of the two 
Immediate participants, the President and the press. Johnson's primary 
alms conflicted, to some degree, with the main objective of reporters, 
as was noted In Chapter TWo. Again, however, the leadership roles of 
the presidency, as Johnson saw them, probably justified pursuing his 
own alms, even over those of the press, on some occasions. Analysis 
does show that Johnson's sixth aim, control of the press conference, 
was Important in his use of voluntaries. This aim may have denied 
reporters the opportunity to fulfill their own desires at times. There­
fore, Johnson's sixth aim may have merited the criticisms it elicited. 
The Institution of the press conference is "extra-legal," or "extra­
constitutional," and therefore Is automatically under presidential 
control. However, it was not always necessary, nor was it always fair 
to reporters, that Johnson had the control of his conferences as one 
of his chief aims in using the voluntary. This criticism will be 
seen as more justified In the discussion of Johnson's methods of devel­
opment.
A final evaluative question regarding Johnson's alms In the volun­
tary Involves the question of a third and Indirect participant In the 
press conference. Surely, Johnson saw his alms as meeting the needs 
of the "national interest." The question Is, were the aims of promo­
tion, defense, and ethos enhancement, as well as press conference con­
trol, really so important to the needs of the country (let alone the
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world) as they Apparently were to the President? While there Is no 
way of knowing, the answer would not be an unequivocal "yes." The 
public at large probably would not have applauded all of Johnson's 
alns. A stronger basis for this speculation, once more, may be seen 
In the discussion regarding Johnson's pursuit of his press conference 
alms.
Summary. Six specific aims appear in Johnson's use of voluntaries 
in his press conferences. His prepared statements were given in order 
to inform, to publicize, to promote, and to defend the administration. 
Johnson attempted to enhance the ethos of the Presidency and of per­
sons associated with his leadership. Johnson also aimed at controlling 
the press conference situation by using voluntaries. Further, a given 
voluntary might have more than one specific aim. Johnson sometimes 
would, for example, try to provide Information, get publicity, and 
enhance his ethos with one specific announcement or statement.
Generally, then, the six alms of Johnson’s press conference 
voluntaries warrant approval to the extent that they were generated 
by the national interest. More specifically, those aims which best 
served all the participants were probably the most valuable. When the 
needs and desires of the conference participants conflicted, the press 
complained, and some of those complaints may have been justifiable.
Methods of Development in the Voluntaries
How Johnson went about developing the Ideas presented in his 
prepared remarks, to accomplish the responses he sought with the six 
specific alms just described, receive attention here, Johnson used 
materials traditionally associated with exposition, amplification, 
and persuasion. Other significant techniques were employed. They are
mdiscussed In the next section, on Johnson's audience adaptation and 
effectiveness. Given the faot that some voluntaries were designed to 
achieve one aim and other voluntaries more than one aim, supporting 
materials have been analysed from the standpoint of the purposes.
For Informing. Some of the President's voluntaries appeared to 
be primarily for passing along lnfomatlon, although almost anything 
a president says In a press conference is likely to be publicized 
and Interpreted by journalists and others. Johnson’s attempts to 
present and explain Information ranged from short announcements to 
commentaries and documentaries.
Brief announcements occurred from time to time. These statements 
usually regarded minor activities and plans of the president and 
passing contents on such matters as press conference procedures. For 
the most part, Johnson developed those announcements with statements 
of fact, specific details, and little else. For example, on Septem­
ber 20, 196^ , L.B.J. announced "three appointments for the Comsat 
Board— Communications Satellite." He volunteered the names and cur­
rent jobs held by the three, but not much more. Johnson continued 
in that conference by outlining an itinerary for the next two weeks.
The list of stops on the trips was specific for the most part, but 
general at times. For Instance, compare, "On Friday morning I will be 
In £1 Paso to meet with President Ldpez Mateos," with his plans for 
the following Monday: "I would like to go to Hartford, Conn., at noon,
and make stops in Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont before returning 
to Washington." For most of the stops, however, he Included a brief 
explanation of purpose, like this one: "On Thursday, the 8th, I will
be in Cleveland, Ohio, for a Democratic dinner, and there make a 
Democratic campaign speech." The day after his "Johns Hopkins
1^5
Address" on Vietnam, L.B.J. Mentioned (1) receipt of s letter from U 
Thant, (2) an assignment to an adviser, Eugene Black, (3) a meeting 
with the Secretary of Commerce, (k) a visit by United Nations Ambassa­
dor Adlai Stevenson, and (5) the presence and immediate plans of Black. 
The only important details were of Black’s assignment, and these were 
brief, although Black was questioned for a few minutes.
Short statements of fact, or brief details, proved to be the 
exception rather than the rule when Johnson made Informational announce­
ments. Brief remarks occurred, usually, only when the President saw 
no need for expanding the points or, on occasion, when further Informa­
tion was (or was to be) provided In some other manner.
Longer opening statements for the purpose of explaining appeared. 
Included were remarks Johnson sometimes offered In conjunction with 
the Introduction of legislative proposals to Congress. Budgetary 
requests occasionally went hand In hand with didactic remarks to 
reporters. An illustration, from the January 17, 1967, conference, 
demonstrates the type of materials frequently used with this type of 
voluntary. Although the meeting was shared with the Budget Director, 
Charles Schultse, Johnson did much of the briefing himself. The 
President prefaced his description of the "Budget Message" by saying 
that it was scheduled for submission to Congress the next week and 
that another briefing would be arranged at that time. Next, Johnson 
gave some "background" Information related to changes from "last 
year's authorisations and appropriations." Included in the review 
were a number of details, especially statistics. Various aspects of 
the "Message" were developed topically. Johnson talked about general 
figures, "obligations for roads," and mortgage purchases by Congress.
Ih6
He also compared end contrasted several figures with statistics from 
previous years. As Mr. Sohultse explained other Items of the requests, 
Johnson put In an explanatory remark here and there. The Interjected 
remarks were to amplify and clarify what Schultse said. Johnson 
treated some Items briefly and others at length.
Late that year, on August 3# Johnson sent his "Tax Messagedto 
congress. At about noon that day L.B.J. met with correspondents in 
the Fish Room of the White House and devoted over half of his con­
ference to explain the request which Included the "surcharge" for 
"the Vietnam problem." The explanation was technical. L.B.J. pre­
sented, in economic terms, the reasons for the tax increase, the 
projected results of the request, an explanation of how the tax would 
be effected, and a review of the general budgetary situation at the 
time. In that conference, Johnson used a number of supporting 
materials. The press had been given copies of the tax request.
Johnson attempted to review and explain the request with specific 
details, many statistics, comparisons and contrasts, specific exam­
ples, and the use of a chalkboard. Upon closing the lecture, the 
President said, "... That is all I know about It. I will answer 
any questions I can. Then, you will get better answers from Mr. 
Fowler." (Henry Fowler was Secretary of the Treasury.)
The two illustrations show that when Johnson wanted to Inform 
reporters on technical matters In his press conferences, he was able 
to elaborate in detail with materials he thought appropriate for 
comprehension.
For Publicising and Promoting. Most of Johnson's voluntaries 
went beyond the mere transfer of information. More commonly his
prepared remarks were to get publicity, or attention and Interest,
In the news media. Announcements for publicity differed slightly 
from those for promotion in methods of development. Statements 
designed to get immediate attention for new aspects of Johnson's 
administrative actions and voluntaries to reinforce, increase, or 
maintain attention for known programs played a major role in the press 
conferences. The fact that Johnson made the announcement himself, 
rather than issuing a written release or having an aide give out the 
data, often meant Johnson was pursuing these alms. Frequently the 
President announced specific plans, decisions, and activities. As 
has been seen, he especially favored announcing staff changes.
Examples of promotional statements on the economy are noteworthy. 
Johnson's joint press conferences often contained similarly designed 
preliminary remarks. He liked to publicise and promote other aspects 
of presidential action, also.
Johnson's comments on the goals, successes, and programs of 
his administration were not limited to one type of press conference 
nor to one topic area. Some of the best examples of Johnson's at­
tempts appeared in voluntaries which in content resemble remarks 
Johnson was prone to make in campaign speaking, in major addresses 
on domestic affairs, and in the preemptive televised announcements 
of the early part of his administration.
The general area of presidential decision making provides 
examples. Johnson often liked to talk about what he was doing and 
thinking and this was reflected in several of his announcements. For 
instance, on June 1, 1965, In a televised question and answer ses­
sion, he reviewed some of the activities of the United States in the
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Dominican Republic. This was his first official press conference 
since April 27. In the April conference Johnson had mentioned the 
evacuation of American citizens, saying, " . . .  1,000 Americans 
have already been taken aboard ships. ..." On April 28 the Presi­
dent announced to the nation that "400 Marines" had just entered the 
Dominican Republic. He also gave some brief data about the reasons 
for the intervention. Other "preempts" cane two days later, April 28, 
and again on May 2. The next major public statement of his actions 
appeared In Johnson's first voluntary, June 1. After a short explana­
tion of events, he said: "I am therefore, accordingly, ordering the
immediate withdrawal of one battalion landing team of United States 
Marines, plus headquarters and supporting personnel. This will total 
approximately 2,000 people."
In the June 1 conference, L.B.J. declared that he was sending a 
request to Congress. He was asking for money for the "economic and 
social development of Southeast Asia." (During April and May Johnson 
had pushed a resolution through Congress for increased military spend­
ing In Vietnam; the request then was for 700 million dollars.)
The development of Johnson's two major announcements in that 
conference was typical of other announcements. In the first, on the 
Dominican Republic, Johnson began by reviewing, briefly, the situation: 
a "serious" problem existed. Next, Johnson praised the Organization 
of American States for its actions. Then he related that his advisors 
had suggested the possibility of "further withdrawal," and that the 
Secretary General of the O.A.S. as well as the American ambassador to 
the Dominican Republic approved. Finally, L.B.J. announced his action, 
as quoted above.
1^ 9
The second major voluntaiy that day was on allocations of money 
for Vietnam. While the pattern was somewhat different, the develop­
ment was similar. Johnson started by stating what he wanted. The 
statement was general, and read, "This afternoon I am sending to the 
Congress a very special message requesting an additional appropria­
tion to help in the peaceful economic and social development of 
Southeast Asia, This is another forward step toward carrying out 
my proposal for a massive effort to improve the life of man in that 
conflict-torn corner of the world." Then followed a few more general 
statements of justification. Next, the President talked about the 
efforts of his advisor, Eugene Black, still in general terms. L.B.J. 
recounted various aspects of his goals in the country. There followed 
specific details, mostly statistics, regarding the social and economic 
conditions of the country's people. He said, for example, "The 16 
million people of South Vlet-Nam survive on an average income of $100 
per year. ..." He gave figures on literacy, medical conditions, and 
"life expectancy." He compared those conditions in Vietnam, statistical­
ly, with life in the United States. Johnson then compared the social 
and economic "enemies" in Vietnam with "the aggressor" in the war (pre­
sumably, the Viet Cong and North Vietnam). "These enemies, too, we are 
committed to help defeat," Johnson said, about the internal problems.
He did not specifically talk much more about other "economic and social" 
conditions. Having presented the problem, Johnson led into some de­
tails about the spending of the funds he requested. The money was to 
go for "water and power resources," for "clinics and doctors," and for 
"materials for their homes and their factories." He commented that 
support from the American Medical Association to "recruit surgeons and 
specialists, approximately 50 of them," had been achieved already.
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Johnson concluded the voluntary, saying, "Now this Is just a part of 
the beginning. This appropriation today calls for only $89 million, 
but In the future I will call upon our people to make further sacri­
fices because this Is a good program, and the starts that we are making 
are good starts. This Is the only way that I know In which we can 
really win not only the military battle against aggression, but the 
wider war for the freedom and for progress of all men."
These and other voluntaries show that Johnson used a variety of 
supporting materials to develop his publicity and promotional announce­
ments. He used specific details and statistics. He cited factual 
statements and statements of opinion. He included the opinions of 
advisors to the President and his own assertions. He also made refer­
ence to other authorities, comparisons, or analogies, and contrasts. 
Johnson reviewed situations with brief narrations of events leading 
to decisions and actions. Explanations sometimes used description, 
also.
The devices for development varied to suit the topics and the 
amount of time allowed for any one voluntaxy. The chief determinant 
of development, of course, was probably the President's attitude at 
the time a voluntary was prepared.
For Defending. Johnson's fourth kind of voluntary, In terms of 
his alms, was that which he used to defend his goals, plans, and 
actions. Statements of this nature were similar to the promotional 
ones, but were more akin to refutation In tone and development. That 
Is, on occasion, Johnson responded to criticisms of his efforts, again 
with a variety of materials.
For the most part, the President defended his policies when the 
critical stimulus was directed toward Johnson in particular. The
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development of his defensive voluntaries was usually indirect in 
approach. That is, he did not often attack specific sources of 
criticism or irritation. Johnson was frequently criticised by poli­
ticians, reporters, and others. Criticism of his press relations, 
for example, on such matters as "overexposure" of the President, led 
to the long defense of his press policies in the March 20, 19&5 
meeting with reporters. L.B.J. responded directly to some of Gold- 
water's assertions in a press conference voluntary on August 15, 196**.
Examples follow to demonstrate Johnson's development of the 
defensive statements he initiated.
On June 18 of 1966 Johnson addressed the press, in front of film 
cameras. He articulated a rather long statement defending U.S. acti­
vities in Vietnam. A brief narrative covering "the past few weeks" 
of fighting and of Johnson's observations of the situation led to 
the assertion that "the national Interest requires that we persist 
in our present policy . . .  to bring to bear the ground, naval, and 
air strength required to achieve our objective." Next, he justified 
not giving further details on possible future American involvement.
He said that "national interest" meant not revealing such information 
"to those conducting aggression." He continued with a restatement of 
this country's goals. This negation appeared: "We are not fighting
to remain in South Vietnam, not to hold bases there, not to control 
the affairs of that people." Again, he summarised the objectives in 
a positive way. Johnson said, "What are our prospects?" He answered 
his question with statements directed toward the nation, and the world, 
mentioning "political differences" of opinion. Johnson reaffirmed 
his general policy saying, "our course is resolute . . . our conviction
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is firm" in "doing what is necessary in the Nation's Interest and the 
cause of freedom." He asserted that the South Vietnamese were also 
Just as "determined to fight" and to succeed with domestic improve­
ments. Then Johnson cited and compared mortality figures which showed 
heavier casualties for the "aggressor." Johnson claimed success for 
the bombing program and briefly justified increased "air strength."
More comments on political and economic achievements in South Vietnam 
were given, with a reference to Johnson’s special assistants for those 
affairs, William Porter and Robert Komer. Johnson advised that "steps 
. . .  to control inflation" in Vietnam would be announced later in the 
day. Johnson then turned to the theme of national support in the United 
States, saying that the majority of the people were beh?nd his policies. 
He supported the assertion of public backing by referring to recent 
primary elections in the United States. He implied that congressional 
candidates would probably not be successful if they took a stand 
against his war policies. Johnson concluded with an appeal for "an 
honorable peace at the earliest possible moment." The appeal was 
developed with a number of statements to demonstrate South Vietnam's 
desire for peace, quoting parts of "The Declaration of Honolulu" (of 
February 8, 1966). Johnson appealed for a revised analysis of the 
problem and expressed his belief that "the wave of the future" was 
away from "aggression."
The voluntary on Vietnam shows a development similar to other 
statements of the President's defense of his Vietnam programs. The 
supporting materials were not organised or worded in the style of 
direct refutation common to academic debate. Although the purpose 
of the voluntary was to defend a policy position which had been argued
153
publicly In the United States, Johnson referred only obliquely to his 
critics and to their counter proposals in this particular instance.
The basic themes were reaffirmation of (1) the value of present policy, 
(2) progress toward success, and (3) hope.
The specific supporting materials were those often found in state­
ments to amplify. Johnson constantly repeated "our objectives," as 
he had in other talks and official statements on Vietnam. He frequently 
restated and summarised his beliefs. He also argued from authority 
by quoting himself, quoting a passage from the Honolulu statement, and 
referring to the opinions of "those who have not shared our views" as 
against the reports of his advisors. In the conclusion he used epi­
grammatic statements ("There is honor for all in making peace. Let 
the killing stop."), allusive references to success in other countries 
("Look at the new resolve in Indonesia. . . ."), and rhetorical 
questions (on the future: "is it aggression?"). Other supporting 
materials Included comparison and contrast, statistics, factual 
details, and examples. But in the main Johnson employed general 
assertions of belief, most of which were merely restatements.
Later in 1966, as the Eighty-ninth Congress was coming to a close, 
Johnson's activities included a televised press conference on the 
afternoon of October 13. The President began the meeting with Justi­
fication for a trip to Southeast Asia and to the "Manila Conference." 
This first voluntary was long. Johnson alluded to the possible help­
fulness of his trek to Australia and New Zealand, saying that he had 
been there before as a representative of President Franklin Roosevelt. 
Johnson then defended the need for going on to Asia. He gave a general 
description of the needs of Aslan countries. He mentioned progress In
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the aree. Referring to various facets of that progress, he said, "I 
want to see for myself as much of their achievement as Is possible 
for me to see in the limited time that we have allotted." Next, he 
afforded that it was "a good time for the Manila Conference," because, 
after the Honolulu meeting, agreement was reached for a later one.
Then Johnson praised efforts of "The Government of Vietnam" in improv­
ing economic and political conditions. He casually referred to pre­
vious doubts of his critics that "a free election" could be held. He 
did this to demonstrate the fulfillment of one of his aims which had 
run counter to the predictions of some. Johnson went into a compari­
son of voter turnout in off-year elections in the United States and 
the South Vietnamese election to show, again, the election's success. 
Further, Johnson described efforts and achievements In "education, 
health, agriculture, and . . . security. ..." Johnson mentioned 
"defections from the enemy forces" and proceeded to discuss peace 
efforts on his part. Johnson blamed the "enemy" for refusing to 
negotiate and said he wished "those who make very special pleas for 
peace would" take their pleas to "those two governments" (not speci­
fied) instead of to him, because he already wanted peace. Another 
defense of Johnson's trip were the "pleas" of the leadership of South 
Korea, of the Philippines, and of Thailand" to come and meet with 
them." Furthermore, Johnson asserted that he did not want to leave 
while the current Congress was In session but that his going to New 
Zealand and Australia later in the month might interfere with elections 
in those two countries. He concluded the Justification for the timing 
of his trip by saying, "I have been criticised some for accepting. I 
only wonder what would have been said about me if I had said no, 1
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refuse to come and talk to our allies about our problems or our 
program."
As might be seen, this Illustration refloots supporting materials 
similar to those used in the June 18, 1966. voluntary. Although the 
arguments varied somewhat, the same devices for defense appeared. 
Further, criticism seems to have motivated the voluntary. But speci­
fic critics were not mentioned by name nor were specific counter pro­
posals to Johnson's policies specifically considered.
Thus, indirect rebuttal prevailed in both illustrations of volun­
taries for defense. This subtle approach appears to be characteristic 
of many of Johnson's press conference voluntaries designed to reply 
to criticism of his leadership.
For Enhancing an Image. The ways in which L.B.J. developed 
announcements and opening statements for ethos enhancement are nota­
ble. The objects of his persuasion included the press, public opinion 
at home, and world opinion. "Target groups" depended upon the speci­
fic occasion and other factors such as the topic of the voluntary.
As noted before, Johnson wanted to develop and demonstrate many aspects 
of his image, including his general leadership capabilities.
Early in his administration the President sought to win rapport 
with reporters. While his press relations waned during various periods 
of his presidency, many of Johnson's opening statements appeared to be 
basically for the purpose of winning over reporters' attitudes toward 
his person, as well as toward his administration of the Office. Fur­
ther, the use of the voluntary to gain rapport with this audience was 
attempted with many devices. Including the news value of his remarks 
and factors of timing, length, and frequency. How the content of his
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opening remarks, In terms of exposition, amplification, and persua­
sion, was effected, merits observation.
Johnson almost always made some verbalised reference to the report­
ers and other media representatives as he opened the conference. Some­
times he would go beyond a greeting. He used humor, references to 
reporters' facilities or accommodations, procedural announcements to 
aid in their work, references to their needs and interest, compliments, 
and invitations to go for a walk with him. Even in his press confer­
ence statements on his press relations, the President was usually 
careful to word his remarks so as not to offend his immediate audi­
ence, especially the "regulars" of the White House press corps. John­
son occasionally referred to particular news stories or news agencies. 
Once in a while he would illustrate a point by using a hypothetical 
example involving a specific correspondent. Johnson wanted to make it 
known to reporters that he was interested in their work, that he could 
speak their language, and that he followed their activities.
Johnson opened a conference in his White House office on April IS, 
196^ , with a statement to correct "a very inaccurate account" of his 
foreign policy address for April 20. Johnson showed his awareness of 
press activities and stated the correction as if to protect reporters 
from "second-or-third-hand1information, as well as to protect his own 
interests.
In the May 6, 19<&, South Lawn press conference the President's 
last voluntary went as follows: ". . .1 have today accepted lifetime
membership in the Vanderburgh Humane Society of Evansville, Ind." 
Newspapers and magazines had published pictures and articles on John­
son's treatment of his pet dogs. The voluntary may have been added 
for humor.
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On August IS of the sens year Johnson offered a detailed list of
his plans for the day and for the next few days. He told reporters
that he was doing this for their benefit. He said he had thought 
of it earlier in the day and that Press Secretary George Reedy had 
agreed that "The suggestion that I made to him earlier might be help­
ful, if I carried it out." Once more, Johnson wanted to show his 
good will toward reporters by providing "information, guidance, and 
background."
Johnson's final voluntary on April 27, 19^ 5* was a tribute to 
Edward R. Murrow, who had died. Johnson praised Murrow before re­
porters, subscribing to the letter's ideals as a "newsman and as a 
public official." Johnson told reporters and the viewing public,
"We have all lost a friend."
Johnson also sought to build his ethos with the public at
large in the U.S. and elsewhere. An analysis of his public state­
ments as a whole would probably reveal this aim in much the same way 
that the present study shows attempts to achieve image enhancement 
in the voluntaries. Moreover, just as Johnson attempted to demon­
strate his leadership in the televised preempts, he made forceful 
and dramatic statements in many of his press conferences' opening 
remarks. Some selected examples show a few of the types of materials 
L.B.J. used.
President Johnson seemed to show his decisiveness with announce­
ments of appointees to executive positions in government. When John­
son gave specific details of a particular person's credentials and 
other background information, he seemed to be saying to the public that 
he had made the decision on the basis of careful thought and that by
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having such a person in government his administration would be more 
effective. He wanted to show, further, that those he selected were 
among the best possible to choose from. Two relatively minor appoint­
ments announced in the April 1ft, 1964, conference illustrate his 
development. Johnson appointed Eugene Patterson to membership in 
the U.S. Civil Rights Commission. Johnson said that the member being 
replaced was a past president of the American Bar Association "and 
Dean of Southern Methodist University Law School in Dallas," to show 
the Importance of the position. Johnson then talked of Patterson's 
background, giving details such as his present position ("editor of 
the Atlanta Constitution"). where and when Patterson was born, and 
the man's academic work. L.B.J. described Patterson's "extensive 
newspaper career," his military achievements. Including "the Silver 
Star and the Bronze Star with Oak Leaf Cluster," and his family.
Next was Harold Russell's appointment as "chairman of the President's 
Committee on Employment of the Handicapped." Johnson mentioned that 
Russell replaced L.B.J.'s "old friend Mel Maas." Johnson promised 
to provide more data on Russell for reporters but gave a few details 
then. Those specifics Included a description of the appointee's 
military accomplishments, the fact that the man had lost his hands 
in military service, and that he had been honored by the national 
Jaycees in 1950.
Johnson also probably wanted to demonstrate his skills with the 
statements on the effects of his economic programs. Those self- 
promotlonal success stories seemed to show Johnson to be a man to be 
trusted with the national purse, a man who was aware of and concerned 
for the taxpayer's problems, a man of frugality, moderation, and of
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caution, a man who was an economist In his own right as wall as 
one who listened to the advice of others on money matters. Johnson 
developed the impression of those skills with a variety of materials. 
Specific details were manifested mainly through statistics. Johnson 
often "barraged" his listeners with figures. Further, he compared 
and contrasted present and past economic conditions. Impressive 
examples of economic progress In government, business, and Industry 
appear. Johnson related facts on employment, descriptions of the 
effects of his administration's ability to prevent strikes, and warn­
ings to labor and industry about the potential dangers of strikes 
and price hikes. He sometimes used a narration of the events which 
led to a particular decision. He occasionally referred to and quoted 
his economic advisors to add weight to his own decisions. He ex­
plained the purpose of such monetary requests as tax Increases and 
additional spending, to demonstrate that his view of "the national 
interest* had guided his thinking.
Johnson displayed his leadership in other ways with the volun­
taries. He used the press conference to pit his own ethos as Presi­
dent against those who confronted him, such as Barry Goldwater,
Governor George Wallace, Bethlehem Steel, critics of the war. Repub­
lican and other opponents of his legislation, demonstrators, "the 
aggressor" in Vietnam, and various members of the news media who 
questioned his leadership. Sometimes, as with the defensive volun­
taries, Johnson's display of his own power and skill over his oppon­
ents was direct. On other occasions he referred to them more Indirect­
ly, probably assuming that his audiences knew the object of his attacks. 
Various developmental materials to cany out his aim appear and are
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similar to thoso used in the defensive voluntaries. On occasion 
Johnson compared and contrasted his views with those of his antago­
nists. He described the actions and statements of the opposition 
briefly. He then used longer statements to support and amplify 
his own position.
Another type of voluntary for the development of ethos enhance­
ment utilised the presence and remarks of others in the joint news 
conferences. For Instance, Johnson showed that he shared authority 
in decision-making by having key figures in his administration appear 
and talk to reporters along with him. The statements made by such 
figures as General Westmoreland, Secretary of Defense McNamara,
Budget Director Schultse, various governors, foreign dignitaries, 
and others seem to have been designed to show important support 
for the President's programs. These testimonials backed up previous 
and current goals, decisions, and successes of Johnson's administra­
tion.
For Controlling the Press Conference. The last aim of Johnson's 
voluntaries was to control or direct the press conference situation. 
How Johnson exerted this control is not revealed by many overt state­
ments and supporting materials. The President was subtle in his 
manipulation. A few statements, however, do appear in some of the 
conferences, although Johnson rarely expanded upon such remarks.
Johnson's directives to reporters had to do with such matters 
as how long he would be available for questions, when and how Johnson 
wanted information released, how he would like his statement to be 
treated by the correspondents (for example, "off-the-record"), and 
even what he wanted reporters to write.
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At his ranch, two daya after Christina In 19&3* Johnson Instruc­
ted reporters, after a series of announcements, as follows:
You will have these releases and you do not need to 
copy all of this material. I want to review them with you 
briefly In case you have some question. I will try to refer 
it or answer it.
. . .  I do want to point out there is a mistake by 
Pierre Salinger's girls that he brought down here from 
the East Coast. They say "Office of the White House Secre­
tary, LBJ Ranch, H-u-e, Texas." He didn't misspell Texas, 
but he did misspell Rye. I don't want any of you to follow 
the announcement literally. Correct all mistakes before 
using, please.
Another observation I want to make is that I gave 
Pierre that jacket he has on today because It Is too large 
for me to wear— or too small.
With a touch of humor, Johnson tried to Instruct reporters on a minor 
matter. He also wanted to say how he felt the writers should handle 
the voluntaries he read to them and how he wanted the conference 
questioning to proceed.
Johnson clearly indicated to reporters how much time he wanted 
for questions In the August 18, 19&t, session. The conference started 
at 11:^5 a.m., according to the "note" In the transcript. L.B.J. 
began by saying that he just had a few minutes before "a 12 o'clock 
meeting." He then spent two-thirds of the conference time giving 
data orally. Concluding his remarks, L.B.J. said he had not the time 
for "detailed questions," but that he would take a walk with them and 
with Iceland’s Prime Minister Bjarni Benediktsson. The Prime Minister 
was arriving for the meeting Johnson had mentioned.
On New Year's Day, 1968, Johnson explained the ideas of an "Execu­
tive Order" he was having released. Johnson wanted to center the con­
ference around those Ideas. He told reporters why he had asked them 
out to the ranch that day: to brief them on the "Executive Order."
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Ha concluded his review of the Ideas with procedural renarks such as, 
"I will be glad to take some United questions from you on this or 
other matters.11 He then told reporters that three of his assistants 
were present for a nore "detailed backgrounding." Johnson continued, 
"While I don't want to cut off questioning, I am very anxious for this 
very important story to go out, and I am very anxious for you to have 
all the information you need In connection with it. I'll be glad to 
take a limited number of questions." Johnson then Invited his three 
assistants, Walt Rostov, Joseph Califano, and Ernest Goldstein to 
Join him. L.B.J. said, " . . .  I will take questions on this or any 
other subject matter for a period of a very few minutes, and then I'll 
yield to them." He stayed during the briefing and Interjected more 
comments not only in response to questions put to his advisers but 
to speed up getting the session finished. For example, at one point 
he said, "I wonder If you can wait until we talk to the Congress about 
that. ..."
When President Johnson announced that Hanoi was agreeing to meet 
in Paris, he told the participants in a broadcast news conference that 
he did not want a lot of questioning on the announcement. He said,
"I have never felt it was useful for public officials to confuse deli­
cate negotiations by detailing personal views or suggestions or elabo­
rating positions in advance. I know that all of you, therefore, will 
understand that I shall not discuss this question further at this con­
ference." Furthermore, he changed the subject and Introduced Josd 
Vlvanco and Ambassador Raymond Telles, "Chairman of the Mexican-United 
States Border Commission between our two countries."
The illustrations of the President's statements to guide the flow 
of questioning show that supporting material was rather restricted.
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Johnson sometimes amplified the announcements with repetition and 
restatement. He used statements of his own personal opinion and de­
sire to develop the directive remarks. Johnson also used explanation, 
to some extent, to justify his guiding the conference.
Summary. Looked at generally, Johnson's news conference volun­
taries were not exiguous in development. Moreover, Johnson used a 
variety of developmental materials to carry out the specific aims he 
had for the meetings. He employed the traditional forms of support 
normally associated with informing, amplifying, and persuading. He 
read releases and extemporised on his own thoughts. He provided news 
items which were frequently developed with background Information.
It Is clear that Johnson often wanted his press corps to have de­
tailed data, especially when the goal was to publicise and promote. 
When Johnson seemed to be talking not only to get comprehension but 
to win support for his administration, he was often expansive in his 
use of diverse materials. Some of those materials seem selected for 
the particular topic, occasion, and audience. Other times, especial­
ly when the goal was to amplify, the support is reminiscent of pre­
vious speeches and public statements on a particular theme. That is, 
many of the favorite arguments and proofs of previous communications 
came up in particular press conference voluntaries. How effective 
President Johnson was in developing his ideas is the subject of the 
next section of this chapter.
Situational Adjustment Techniques
Johnson's success is probably best measured in terms of his own 
strategy and goals in the press conference as well as with a view of 
the goals of the other participants. Johnson's apparent strategy was
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to employ tho voluntary to got to public opinion. Tho strategy genera, 
ted six specific alms and subsequent development. But what seems more 
Important, to some extent, than Johnson's typical and traditional sup­
porting materials, are some specific techniques the man took to the 
situation In conjunction with the announcements. An explanation and 
assessment of these devices precede some general conclusions about the 
voluntaries.
The devices Johnson used In conjunction with the Ideas and develop- 
ment are related to frequency, timing, length. Issue avoidance, antici­
pation, Interjection, and guest participation In the news conference 
voluntaries. All of these factors were under the President's control, 
as were most aspects of his press conferences. Johnson's manipulation 
of the seven factors seems calculated enough In many of the conferences 
to warrant a discussion of each.
Timing and Frequency. The timing of and frequency with which L.B.J. 
employed voluntaries paralleled, to a degree, the timing and frequency 
of the press conferences. He seemed to like the unscheduled, "sur­
prise" conferences. The same element of spontaneity Is noticeable In 
the scheduling of announcements.
Some regularity did exist. During the first two years, Johnson 
was predictable in the sense that fifty of the fifty-one conferences 
had at least one announcement of some kind. During the last three 
years, however, Johnson did not open approximately one In four of his 
conferences with voluntaries. What was not so predictable was the 
extent to which voluntaries would appear. Johnson's reply to a ques­
tion In his second news conference, on the nature of his news confer­
ence plans, turned out to be a keynote. He said, "We don't want to
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be too rigid. We always want to be flexible.” The "we" probably 
Meant that Johnson did not want a regular schedule. Further, he 
apparently wanted his questioners to agree that flexibility would 
serve their Interests as well as his own alms.
President Johnson demonstrated variety In his timing and schedul­
ing, not only with some diversity In the topics he brought up In a 
given conference but also with the length and nature of the develop­
ment of those topics. In some conferences, all of the opening remarks 
related to one area of concern. In many, however, a variety of Items 
showed up. The length of a given announcement as well as the length 
of the time devoted to announcements also varied. The general pat­
tern was for Johnson to devote between a fourth and a third of his 
press conferences to his own statements. But the number of deviations 
from this norm Is Interesting. During his first three years in office 
Johnson often spent close to half of the allotted time to voluntaries. 
During the last two years that trend was reversed for the most part, 
as Johnson learned to abbreviate his opening remarks. So, for the 
specific amount of time the President might spend on a given announce­
ment or in a particular topic area, the same sort of variance is seen 
as with the frequency with which specific topics, such as the economy 
or the war, appear over the years. That is, similar to the way that 
the topics of the domestic economic situation were frequently intro­
duced In the early years of the Johnson administration, so, too, was 
the amount of time spent on that Issue in a given voluntary more in 
those two years. Again, however, this was not always predictable.
The governing factor, of course, was the President's will or mood.
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Another aspect of Johnson's scheduling of events has to do with 
how he coordinated various other activities. The extent to which L.B.J. 
coordinated all of the communications of the executive branch is not 
known. It is evident, however, that Johnson exerted a good measure 
of control over official White House output. Johnson's voluntaries 
show that he wanted to be a direct participant In many of the activi­
ties of the press office. For example, Johnson often held his official 
conferences at times when the White House Press Secretary normally met 
reporters In the letter's twice-a-day conferences. Other activities 
seemed to lead to unscheduled voluntaries. For Instance, Johnson 
called In reporters Just before trips. Just after cabinet meetings, 
before and after ceremonial functions such as receptions of dignitaries, 
and even In between his dally schedule of appearances at governors' 
conferences. Usually Johnson met reporters on an Impromptu basis 
when he had something he wanted to tell them. Knowing that his dally 
activities were being "covered," L.B.J. guaranteed himself an audience, 
occasionally rewarding the White House press group, and others, with 
some sort of press conference.
While Johnson seems to have been guided by an expressed desire 
for "flexibility," by Involvement with the work of the White House 
Press Office, and by his own daily and weekly activities in the schedul­
ing and coordination of his voluntaries, another determining factor 
appears. Other external events also seem to have been a guiding force 
in Johnson's decisions on timing, scheduling, and length. National 
and International "crises," apparently relevant to the Presidency, 
generated a variety of decisions and communications. For the most 
part, Johnson vent to the public or the press, or both, only after a
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major decision had boon made. How he communicated the decision varied. 
Johnson's having almost sixty separate television appearances in his 
first twenty-four months In office reveals one method. Although among 
Johnson's television appearances, major speeches, such as a "State of 
the Union," can be found, the dramatic preempts and broadcast news 
conference voluntaries also account for this type of communication.
That is, If Johnson had something he deemed Important to say to the 
public, he was not often hesitant In taking the matter to the press 
or the public, especially once the decision or action was done. Illus­
trations appear in Johnson's announcements of strike settlements, of 
his decisions to act in civil disturbances, and of his expressions of 
presidential will In difficult situations like that surrounding the 
death of Martin Luther King. Whether or not Johnson would preempt 
broadcast time or raise the Issue In a news conference voluntary 
seemed to hinge on more than one factor.
Length. The logistic of length, as well as timing and frequency, 
may be a manifestation of Johnson's determination to approach some 
issues and avoid others. The topic might be an old one, as involve­
ment in Vietnam came to be, or a current one such as rioting In Watts, 
California.
Issue Avoidance. Overall, Johnson avoided introductory state­
ments on his personal life and on foreign affairs more than on other 
areas of discussion. Most voluntaries were, then, on presidential 
activities and domestic Issues. Further, patterns of avoidance in 
topic areas evolved. The fact that Johnson held fewer conferences 
each year, except for 1966, and that he had fewer voluntaries each 
year, explain trends of Increased avoidance on some topics, but not
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•11. Although L.B.J. was fairly consistent over the years in offering 
announcements of his nominations and appointments, he tended to shy 
away from Introducing material on his own activities except for plans, 
decisions, and actions related to various meetings and conferences.
An Increased reluctance to discuss foreign affairs was another trend.
In this connection, although Johnson Introduced the topic of Vietnam 
more in 1965 than in any other year, the pattern was generally to 
•void the topic; in 1967 he did not bring it up at all in press con­
ferences. On domestic matters, the President gradually came to avoid 
most issues, save, perhaps, the area of legislation and the Congress, 
but especially the country's econony.
Aside from the general patterns of avoidance, specific, current 
Issues were eschewed In voluntaries. Such Issues were avoided In 
several ways. First, at times, as during the Dominican Republic up­
heaval, the President simply did not hold press conferences until he 
was ready to discuss the matter. Of course, Johnson avoided a few 
events and specific current Issues completely In public statements 
on occasion. This was especially true during some periods of communi­
cation between the United States and Russia, and between the United 
States and foreign dignitaries who were attempting to bring about 
peace in Vietnam. Second, with some topics the President went directly 
to the public or used other forums to Introduce such problems as the 
bombing of Vietnam. Third, when Johnson wanted to avoid bringing up 
a current event, he was prone either to have no introductory state­
ments at all or to Introduce unrelated Issues, as he did at times 
when some of his major pieces of legislation were in trouble with 
congress.
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The factor of Issue avoidance Is understood to sone extent by 
a fifth determinant of Johnson's voluntaries, anticipation. As 
L.B.J.'s press secretaries have said, the President was well aware 
of what was on the minds of national news media representatives. He 
read, listened to, and watched, on a dally basis, what they were 
saying to the public. Moreover, the President and his staff ap­
parently felt confident that they could guess which questions would 
come up In almost any conference. The extent to which and how the 
device of anticipation probably was used is worth consideration.
Anticipation. First, many of Johnson's opening statements did 
relate to quite specific events and Issues of Interest to the press.
In some of these voluntaries Johnson told reporters, both directly 
and indirectly, that he knew what they wanted to find out. For 
Instance, on January 23, 196^ , L.B.J. met briefly with reporters 
in the Fish Room of the White House to talk about "our position on 
Panama and the Canal Zone." The only executive comments prior to 
that voluntary had been three White House news releases (January 10,
I4*, and 16), following Panama's severance of diplomatic relations.
In the same conference, Johnson advised reporters that he knew 
that they also had asked about "an insurance policy" and about Bobby 
Baker's "gift of a stereo set." Johnson responded to those antici­
pated questions.
Another type of anticipation seen in the voluntaries was generated 
by questions which, going beyond specific events, had to do with 
trends. Reporters frequently asked the President for his opinions 
or "reactions" to a series of related events or issues. Some of the 
voluntaries reflect Johnson's awareness that this type of question
might cone up. For example, the defensive voluntaries on L.B.J.’s 
press policies and on Vietnam manifested, to a degree, that the 
President not only was aware of growing or continued criticism, but 
also that correspondents were likely to bring up inquiry on such 
subjects. It may be that by answering questions before they were 
asked, Johnson felt the matter would be taken care of in a given 
press conference, or, perhaps, Johnson may have wanted to handle 
certain topics from the offensive, rather than from the defensive 
posture in which a given question might have seemed to place him. 
Interjection. Johnson was somewhat unusual In that he occa­
sionally presented his voluntaries In the middle or at the end of 
his conferences. Some conferences, in fact, have voluntaries at 
first. Interspersed with questions, and at the close. Other combi­
nations exist, also, although most of the time the voluntaries were 
placed in the traditional position. One reason for interjecting a 
voluntary may be that at times the President simply forgot to pre­
sent the material early in the conference. It Is also plausible that 
In some conferences L.B.J. added voluntaries because reporters failed 
to ask a particular question for which he had prepared and which he 
wanted to discuss. Perhaps, for example, a few of the "planted" 
questions did not get asked In some of his conferences. Interjecting 
announcements in the middle of a conference also night have been done 
to change the tone or subject of the questions which had been asked. 
Adding voluntaries at the end of the conference may have been useful 
In the same way. Final voluntaries might, if Important enough, shift 
the emphasis reporters placed on the questions and answers to Informa­
tion which might be even more useful In preparing news stories on the
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content of the proas oonferonoo. Another factor which led to Inter­
jected remarks were the answers given by others in the joint, confer­
ences. At times such answers seamed to stimulate the President to 
defend or explain an administrative position. On such occasions 
the President seemed dissatisfied with the answers given by his guests. 
Other times, Johnson just seemed to want to talk a bit more and what 
he said does not seem to have been prepared at all. For example, 
Johnson reminisced for a minute or two in a conference at his ranch 
on his fifty-fourth birthday.
Guest Participation. A final Important factor related to the 
voluntaries was the result of Johnson's having news conferences with 
guests. In these Joint conferences, the guests were selected to 
serve the President's aims as well as the needs of newsmen, on occa­
sion. Johnson held these conferences to inform, to show unity among 
Democrats, to show support for his programs and policies, to display 
shared responsibility and decision making, and to establish a situa­
tion in which the guests and the President might enhance each other's 
ethos. Because guests appeared in more than one in five of the con­
ferences, how the guest figured, especially in the voluntaries, bears 
attention.
Sometimes the guests were simply present and did not speak during 
the President’s conference. This was the case when Johnson announced 
his nomination of Thurgood Marshall to the Supreme Court, June 13, 1967. 
In this situation, and in others when the guests answered a few ques­
tions, the appearance of guests seems to have been more ceremonial 
than functional, as when Mrs, Johnson answered a few questions at a 
news conference on one of L.B.J.'s birthdays. On the other hand.
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the presence of particular persons nay have been useful in establishing 
a mood or tone In a given meeting.
Guest appearances seem more important In those conferences when 
the visitors spoke. Some conference guests seem to have been asked 
merely to Inform. For example, the Budget Director helped Johnson brief 
reporters on detailed matters. With Johnson taking the lead In the 
conference, the Budget Director was able to support and expand upon 
what L.B.J. said. More than the transfer of Information may have been 
sought. Added credence for the President as the nation's economic 
leader may have been an aim.
Another dramatic and unusual example of shared conference appears 
on November 3» 1966. Johnson walked Into the Cabinet Room of the 
White House and announced that he was to have an operation. He Intro­
duced a team of his doctors to the reporters. Johnson then left the 
meeting, allowing Press Secretary Bill Moyers and three physicians 
to provide details In a voluntary by George Burkley, M.D. (and with 
over thirty-five questions and answers). Moyers gave Information on 
the medical team's members. Burkley, Johnson's personal physician, 
followed with an opening statement. The doctor said. In closing his 
remarks, "There is no Indication of any serious problem . . . and his 
general health continues to be excellent." It seems obvious here that 
Johnson wanted the press and the public to have more than his own word 
on the subject. Again, not only was specific Information available, 
but the presence and remarks of others may have been calculated to make 
the general message appear highly Important and credible.
Some of the shared conferences seemed designed to display national 
unity and support for Johnson's administration. Once more, it appears
that Johnson wanted to enhance the ethos of his leadership. Johnson 
held six official news conferences with governors. Three of these 
took place on March 12, 1966, the last day of the National Governor's 
Conference that year. The first of the three occurred at about noon, 
and Governor John Reed was asked by Johnson to make a few remarks.
Reed was extremely complimentary and gracious. He said, for example, 
" . . .  I know I speak for my fellow Governors when I say that we are 
relieved, we are encouraged for the prospects of closer liaison be­
tween Federal and State governments." An exchange of thanks between 
Johnson and Reed followed. About an hour later, following another 
meeting, nine other governors were called on by Johnson to tell the 
press of their reactions to the meeting. Again, an impressive "bi­
partisan" display of support for an aspect of Johnson's "Great Society" 
was effected through those statements. In the last news conference, 
about 5 p.m. that day, Johnson assembled another group of governors to 
meet the press. Governor Reed, the Chairman, talked at some length 
about the President's "generous" involvement in the affairs of the 
Conference and L.B.J.'s actions in behalf of the states. Not only 
that, the Governor then read a statement which quoted "a resolution 
that was adopted unanimously at the session this afternoon." The 
resolution had endorsed Johnson's Vietnam policies. Reed concluded 
with an expression of national support for Johnson's aims and programs 
in Southeast Asia. Reed asserted that the peace "demonstrations" in 
the United States did not represent the majority will. He said, "The 
American people are wholeheartedly behind the President," in the 
governors' view. Later in 1966 and again in 196? Johnson held press 
conferences with other governors. For exaig>le, on December 21, 1966,
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after a meeting of Democratic governors, Harold Hughes and the Presi­
dent each talked to news correspondents.
On April 8, 1965, Johnson Initiated the practice of having 
various presidential advisors Join him for news conferences on the 
Vietnam problem. April 8 was the day after L.B.J.'s speech at Johns 
Hopkins University, "Peace Without Conquest." The President had ap­
pointed Eugene Black to meet with U Thant to discuss ideas for ending 
the war. Black was present and stood for questions in the conference. 
Later, in 1966, Johnson shared two conferences with Robert McNamara, 
one with Averell Harriman, and another with the Prime Minister of 
Laos. In 196? Henry Cabot Lodge talked to reporters with the Presi­
dent as the Guam meeting on Southeast Asia ended. On July 13, 1967, 
a press conference featured Robert McNamara, General Earle Wheeler, 
and General William Westmoreland. On May 30, 1963, General Westmore­
land and Australia's Prime Minister met the press with Johnson.
The statements by these guests upheld Johnson's goals and poli­
cies in Vietnam. In turn, Johnson praised his guests for their abili­
ties and for their efforts. But the main effect sought seems to have 
been to demonstrate unity among the advisors and reinforcement for 
the administration's position and practices. Along with the presence 
of such important persons as Harriman and Lodge were useful and per­
suasive messages made by those guests. Johnson's having others report 
directly to the press, rather than summarizing what he had been told, 
allowed the President to focus attention on those guests. Perhaps, 
further, L.B.J. thought that having someone else available to help 
explain such matters as troop Increases and prolonged military activity 
might prove that these decisions and actions were not Johnson's alone.
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By having these guests at press conferences, Johnson was also able to 
defer some of the questioning in the conference.
Audience Adaptations. The description of Johnson's specific aims, 
methods of development, and the special techniques employed in volun­
taries supplies bases for some evaluative remarks. This assessment 
takes into account the three basic conference participants, the Presi­
dent, the press, and the public.
It is not difficult to see why so many correspondents complained 
about Johnson's press policies. Johnson's voluntaries alone appear 
highly self-serving if one chiefly does not identify or equate "the 
national interest" with the interests of a particular president. Not­
withstanding national needs and the goals of reporters, an evaluation 
in terms of Johnson's alms is possible, especially to the degree that 
presidential power is seen to be important. What is more important 
for this study, however, is the general criterion of audience adapta­
tion. That is, how effective Johnson was in communicating with the 
press and the public provides, probably, a significant question for 
measuring the press conference voluntaries.
The public is an indirect participant in a presidential news 
conference. Public remoteness probably is increased when a confer­
ence is not broadcast. Therefore, the needs of the public's "repre­
sentatives," the correspondents, should be specified. Saying that 
reporters attend press conferences "to get news" indicates a major 
goal. let that generalization is not sufficient for careful analysis. 
The press participates in the meetings to get material for immediate 
news stories and to enable themselves to write Interpretative, specu­
lative, and feature articles. Further, the conpetitlve nature of
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American journalism probably causes reporters to feel the need to "sell" 
their writing to their editors and publishers. In turn, editors and 
publishers want to reach various segments of the public and to sell 
newspapers, magasines, and broadcast programs. In the case of broad­
cast journalism, networks and stations are also dependent upon another 
economic factor, advertising, possibly more than the print media, since 
most news programs have commercial "sponsors." Broadcast media com­
pete for public attention with news programs in order to sell adver­
tising time because advertising defrays the production costs. There­
fore, the broadcast media must meet public and private (business) 
Interests to be successful. In this way journalism may be seen as 
an industry or business in which news is a commodity. To a degree, 
then, correspondents must serve themselves and the media they repre­
sent* They must get salable materials.
A secondary goal also related to a need for self preservation.
The press not only preserves itself with what It gets in the press 
conference but with how it performs In maintaining the environment 
which provides for it. To some extent, correspondents must estab­
lish and maintain a relationship with the Chief Executive which will 
promote the fulfillment of their own needs. Also, they must protect 
the Institution of the press conference by their demeanor if they 
find that institution efficacious from their own point of view.
Another function of reporters, also of secondary importance, 
perhaps, stems from the "fourth estate" theory. The theory posits 
that reporters represent the public. These representatives meet 
with the President to get information, to communicate public atti­
tudes, and to exert a measure of control on the executive branch of
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government. In the press conference, reporters observe, question, and 
talk. The questions and statements of reporters may be Interpreted 
as public communication to the president, according to the theory.
Sufficient evidence is not available to demonstrate how corres­
pondents, either individually or collectively, subscribe to the goals 
of maintaining the press conference as an institution and serving as 
a "fourth branch" of government. Reporters at Johnson's conferences 
probably were most interested in getting materials for their stories, 
although they probably had other goals, too.
Applications of this understanding of the purposes of the press 
in the conferences appear in the following conclusions and in the 
treatments of the questions and answers.
President Johnson's voluntaries show that he was aware of corres­
pondents' desires, even if he did not always seem to appreciate them. 
In some ways the voluntaries met those needs quite well. On the other 
hand, the way Johnson handled the announcements in some conferences 
was not apparently for the benefit of his immediate audience.
To fulfill reporters' need for materials the President often 
provided new information. For example, correspondents seemed interes­
ted in presidential decisions and activities. Johnson responded to 
that interest by announcing a number of important nominations and 
appointments as well by presenting data which were not available else­
where.
Aside from occasional vital and dramatic announcements, Johnson 
often supplied useful background information for reporters. For 
example, giving biographical details of appointees may have saved 
time for those newsmen facing immediate deadlines. L.B.J. often was
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not reluctant to supply a suffiolent array of details for the kind of 
writing mai\y of his questioners did. And when he did not give out 
the details orally, he often had written "handouts" prepared, such 
as copies of messages to congress and other White House releases.
At times, the voluntaries seem planned to aid those journalists 
who were writing interpretative stories. For instance, the long ex­
planations of tax and other economic, legislative requests may have 
been given to help media representatives comprehend and interpret 
the specific measures entailed in such requests. Even some of the 
lengthy commentaries on foreign policy, when they were not simply 
restatements, may be seen as useful materials for the interpretative 
type of communication.
The voluntaries appear less designed to provide for the specu­
lative interests of correspondents. When a major decision was pending. 
If Johnson mentioned it at all, he was prone to say, "We will let you 
know as soon as we decide."
In many ways Johnson's announcements seem to have been more 
adapted to his own interests than to the needs of his press corps.
The pursuit of his own aims as revealed by the topics, supporting 
materials, and other devices demonstrates little concern for the 
press at times. Johnson quite often used voluntaries to publicize 
and promote more than to Inform. Many of the promotional statements 
seem Inappropriate for the Immediate audience. The voluntaries which 
seem mainly planned for ethos enhancement were probably wasted on 
reporters much of the time.
Johnson's supporting materials appear more useful for direct 
public addresses than for many of his press conference statements.
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This is especially true of the restatements of policy relative to 
Vietnam, in which persuasion and amplification led to the use of 
proofs more appropriate for the general public than for the press.
It is doubtful that Johnson's heavy use of repetition and restate­
ment was of great value to correspondents. The difficulty lies not 
so much in the quality of the materials L.B.J. used but In the exces­
sive attempts to achieve propaganda aims which prompted those materi­
als. Johnson probably used the press conference format to give argu­
mentative speeches too often, in terms of the goals of the press. In 
fact. In both broadcast and non-broadcast conferences, Johnson some­
times used reporters as a sort of captive audience to rehash policy, 
react to his critics, and convince the nation of the successes of 
his programs. The news conference gave the President a convenient 
speaking situation. But his occasional and time consuming talks on 
the national well-being may not have been of great interest to the 
press.
While it is natural that the president and the press do not 
always have common causes, Johnson's aims and the development of his 
ideas seem to leave much to be desired, at least from the standpoint 
of audience adjustment.
Even less adaptive were other techniques L.B.J. used in conjunc­
tion with his voluntaries. The frequency with which announcements 
appear probably presented no difficulties for most correspondents.
The occasional surprise statements probably yielded good news materials 
for reporters, although the surprises may have deterred some questioners 
from asking questions on other subjects. Further, reporters could not 
easily predict if Johnson would have an Important statement to make.
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if ha would have nothing to introduce, or if he would talk at length. 
Irregularities in the frequency and timing of voluntaries may have dis­
couraged some reporters from careful preparation before a given confer­
ence, whether the conference was impromptu or not. On mapy occasions 
reporters had little opportunity to offer many questions which were 
not generated by the voluntaries. Thus, incentive for adequate prepa­
ration was lost to an extent. In fact, many reporters, especially 
among the White House "regulars," may have come to depend upon the 
President to provide topics for questions at times.
A related factor, also unpredictable to a degree, was the amount 
of time Johnson might usurp with his remarks. The length of the volun­
tary period was often excessive. In the majority of the conferences 
the President spent from a fourth to over half of the conference time 
with his own prepared statements, frequently leaving little time for 
questioning. While Johnson may have felt he was simply providing use­
ful material for reporters to pass on to the nation, the correspon­
dents may have been frustrated frequently in not having time enough 
to ask questions on other topics or to ask "follow-up" questions.
Once more, Johnson's spending so much time on his own remarks may have 
led to a dependency for some correspondents. That is, a few reporters 
probably calculated that L.B.J, would often talk at some length, thus 
restricting the time available for inquiry. Therefore, some reporters 
may have been reluctant to do research and to make extensive prepara­
tion of questions. A press conference with a long period of announce­
ments followed by many questions related to the voluntaries was not 
unusual. But this type of conference may not have been in the best 
Interests of all of the media representatives present, especially those 
who had important questions on other topics.
1B1
Johnson's capabilities at anticipating questions cannot be criti­
cised except when that anticipation affected what happened in the 
press conference. Many of Johnson's voluntaries seem designed to 
answer questions before they could be asked. This not only gave the 
President the initiative with a particular topic but frequently led 
him to expect that his opening remarks would be the only discussion 
necessary. Indeed, on occasion Johnson indicated that he wanted no 
questions on certain topics. Further, he often talked so long on a 
particular subject that more questions on the topic would have denied 
inquiry into other matters. If Johnson did know what questions would 
be asked, he might have waited for the questions so as to provide more 
of a question and answer atmosphere in his press conferences. Allow­
ing reporters to ask even those questions which he anticipated might 
have stimulated better questioning simply because the questioners would 
have had the privilege of initiating inquiry as opposed to passively 
listening to the President.
A further measure of control Johnson exerted over the press confer­
ences with his voluntaries was the interjection of announcements during 
the question period. Interspersed statements may have thrown corres­
pondents off balance and may have unnecessarily postponed or eliminated 
a line of questioning, especially if the interjected remarks were stimu­
lating enough to generate a new direction of inquiry.
The "planned spontaneity" of some of those announcements may have 
interrupted a flow of follow-up questions on vital topics. If the 
interjected remarks were important enough to make in a news conference, 
Johnson probably would have served reporters better by placing them in 
the traditional position, especially in those conferences which allowed
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only a few minutes for questioning anyway. Further, it may have 
seemed unfair to reporters that L.B.J. made some of his announce­
ments after the question period was finished. It is possible that 
correspondents were denied the opportunity on some occasions to in­
quire about announcements made in Johnson’s closing remarks.
The device of the shared news conferences presents another diffi­
culty. Even if they occasionally were warned that a particular guest 
or guests would appear, correspondents probably did not know to what 
extent they might be able to question a guest. The questioning of 
guests also limited the time available for questioning the President. 
The time Johnson spent introducing his visitors and what he had to 
say about them was often superfluous. At times his own reactions to 
guests' voluntaries turned some conferences into ceremonies of mutual 
congratulation rather than opportunities to query important govern­
mental leaders. The voluntaries of guests, while often affording 
newsmen with useful materials, were also sometimes propagandists 
in nature. That is, persons speaking at Johnson's conferences fre­
quently presented brief talks to support Johnson's administration.
Of course, supporting remarks were appropriate in the presence of the 
Chief Executive. But statements which merely amplified known informa­
tion probably did little to meet the needs of many media men. Most of 
those who met reporters with the President probably held or could 
have held their own press conferences which might have been more advan­
tageous to the press as a whole on occasions.
One essential factor related to the press conference voluntaries 
has to do with the importance of the material presented. This cri­
terion involves adaptations to the press and to the public. Many of
1*3
Johnson's opening statements Just as easily could have been released 
by a White House press aide or some other public Information person 
In another part of the government. That Is, a number of Johnson's 
informational announcements were relatively minor in importance; there 
was no need for the President to make them. This seems true of some 
announcements about technological, military developments, about minor 
staff changes, and about routine activities of the President. In 
terms of public interest, the press conference was not necessarily 
the best possible channel of communicating much of the relatively 
unimportant matters which appear in the voluntaries. Even when it 
was in the "national interest" to provide certain information to the 
public, the press conference was only one of many available ways to 
reach the larger audience.
How Johnson's voluntaries met another need of newsmen merits 
some consideration. The extent to which the press felt they repre­
sented the public is not so important as the fact that the press 
conference situation does provide an opportunity for some such repre­
sentation. Assuming that correspondents could ask questions reflecting 
public needs, attitudes, and interests, it is difficult to see at 
times how Johnson's voluntaries encouraged such representational in­
quiry, First, the more the President spoke, the less reporters could 
ask. What Johnson said often determined what reporters queried. Drama­
tic announcements could easily forestall questions on other important 
matters of public concern. Further, attempted exhaustion of a parti­
cular issue in a voluntary seems to have been calculated to inhibit 
inquiry on rather vital matters. On occasion, Johnson seemed to say, 
"Here is all you need on this matter. Let's go on to other items."
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This appears true of policy statements, such as those on the war, in 
some of the conferences. hVen the lengthy reports showing achieve­
ments in numerous facets of the domestic econouy might make follow up 
questions seem unnecessary or unwarranted considering the Importance 
of other matters and the time available to ask about a variety of 
national concerns. Johnson apparently attempted to avoid certain 
areas of questioning either by not mentioning a particular issue or 
by attempting to dismiss an Issue with his introductory remarks. These 
tactics probably did little to stimulate reporters who wanted to 
channel public feedback to the White House.
An extension of the theory which holds that the press can serve 
as a "check" on the executive branch leads to another question. That 
is, to what extent did Johnson's use of voluntaries promote an environ­
ment in which the press could function as a control over the President? 
The question is worth brief consideration because some members of the 
press corps, or their editors and publishers, may have subscribed to 
the theory. Johnson probably did not. Johnson's introductory remarks 
Indicate a view of reporters not only as competitors for news but 
also as his own agents. Johnson certainly did not appear to invite 
questions on national policy. The avoidance of statements about impor­
tant decisions and negotiations which were in progress as well as the 
President's expressed wishes not to receive inquiry on such matters 
are probably manifestations of an attitude which ran counter to the 
"fourth estate" idea of some of the press. What Johnson did choose to 
say in his voluntaries and the amount of time apparently devoted to 
publicity and promotional aims gives the same impression. Beyond the 
content of the topics and the developmental materials as the devices
1*5
Johnson usod to control the conferences with his voluntaries. Had 
L.B.J. thought of the press as extra governmental force to influence 
decision making in the White House, he might have exhibited less con­
trol over the conferences. Although President Johnson may have under­
stood the desire of some of the press to influence government, his 
voluntaries do not reveal that he adapted to the need.
A final and even more difficult measure of the audience adapta­
tions in Johnson's voluntaries draws in the larger, ultimate audience, 
the public. While L.B.J. certainly aimed to influence or win over the 
press, he also wanted to maintain his leadership with the aid of public 
support. Moreover he had a duty to serve the "national interest" in 
what he said at press conferences. Various components of the public, 
even as Indirect participants, probably had some basic needs. The 
public goals were probably among these four. First, many citizens 
may have wanted recent information and opinions from the President on 
currently important affairs. That is, for many readers and listeners, 
the conference could provide information upon which to base intelli­
gent opinions. Informed citizens may be able to relate better to 
their representatives in government. If public opinion is to influence 
government, it should be based upon knowledge and the President is in 
a position to determine the extent to which certain data reach the 
public. Second, many persons in the country may have felt a desire 
to affect Presidential decisions through the confrontation situation 
of the news conference. In other words, feedback to the president 
may be afforded through the questions reporters ask, to the extent 
that reporters are willing and able to reflect public opinions. Third, 
the press conference may allow the public to observe and evaluate an
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aspect of presidential leadership. Some citizens may feel that 
seeing the president's Interaction with reporters can help gauge 
the general effectiveness of his service as well as his abilities to 
handle specific Issues. The fourth possible goal of citizens, not 
unrelated to the other goals, may have been to participate vicari­
ously in press conferences. By identifying with the direct partici­
pants In the meetings, some persons may feel more a part of the af­
fairs of state. The feeling of involvement may satisfy basic needs 
of people who are interested in the presidency or the press, or both.
What Johnson did to meet the needs of the public in his volun­
taries is a perplexing problem because the president is privileged 
to use his view of "national interest" to determine what and how he 
communicates. It is difficult to question a president's judgment 
when a president argues that what he does or does not do, including 
what he chooses to say, is based upon the best interests of society.
In retrospect, however, some comments can be made about Johnson's 
adaptations to his public audience in the press conference voluntaries.
In some ways, Johnson's aims appear to conflict with public 
needs. To some extent the public does need to be assured that its 
President is providing the leadership needed to accomplish the nation’s 
goals. On the other hand, the press conference voluntary is not the 
only way of demonstrating effectiveness. The degree to which Johnson 
tried to achieve his promotional and publicity aims may have inter­
fered with the public need for useful information. Naturally, Johnson 
rarely brought up matters which would reflect failure on the part of 
his leadership. But he also tended to present one-sided pictures of 
success. Johnson did not often initiate discussion on problems facing
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the nation unless he wanted to express his own will. Perhaps Johnson 
so strongly identified his own aims and programs with what he felt the 
public wanted that he saw no need to go much beyond announcing deci­
sions and achievements.
A more difficult complication is President Johnson's apparent 
avoidance of statements on the progress of decision making. He did 
not like to make public the alternatives he was weighing. Perhaps 
he did not want public discussion on his decisions until they were 
made. But his secrecy may be seen as a denial of the needs of many 
persons to know what was happening in a very powerful branch of gov­
ernment. Moreover, the reluctance to announce progress on decisions 
may have inhibited the feedback function of public opinion. It is 
difficult for a president to maintain strong leadership if he appears 
indecisive, but it may be even more difficult to lead if surprise 
decisions do not satisfy the public. Perhaps one area in which Presi­
dent Johnson may have communicated with more candor was the Vietnam 
problem, which came to dominate reporters' minds if not the atten­
tions of most of the public. As noted, Johnson's statements on Viet­
nam, as well as on other foreign policy matters, tended to repeat 
arguments and proofs presented previously by the President. The 
press conference voluntaries show that L.B.J. did not often relate 
important, new, factual data to the public. He was more likely to 
argue and defend policy rather than explain details of American 
involvement in Southeast Asia. Making the news conference a forum 
to express his hopes for peace seems to have prohibited the presenta­
tion of a balanced report on the prospects of attaining that peace. 
Johnson sometimes gave the impression that the possibilities for peace
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ware good. And although he warned that the United States' commitment
might be costly, his warnings were so general, and his expressions of
hope and his pleas for continued support so earnest, that the public 
did not get much in the way of specific information on that particular 
subject. The press conference voluntary was not, probably, the place 
for detailed reports on Vietnam and other important and complicated 
matters, such as the econony. By the same measure neither was the 
voluntary the best place for passionate pleas for public support. 
Johnson met frequently enough with the press to provide useful and 
frank progress reports to the populace and such voluntaries might 
not have conflicted with the public need or "right to know" what was 
happening with regard to a major difficulty.
The possible lack of adaptation to the public need for informa­
tion during the formation of policies and decisions and on matters 
affecting national welfare relates to another area of alms which
may have been in disaccord. The need for citizens to talk back to
the White House may have been discouraged by the voluntaries In the 
same way that the President's initial statements seem to have Inhibi­
ted reporters' asking questions which reflected national interests.
The voluntaries were adaptive, to a degree, to those citizens 
who wanted to observe and evaluate presidential leadership. The 
voluntaries were frequent and lengthy enough, but they did more to 
exhibit what the President wanted to say than his abilities to tackle 
unresolved difficulties. For those who already agreed with Johnson's 
policies, the voluntaries provided ample display of forcefulness and 
decisiveness. For those who questioned various policies, the propagan­
dists nature of mary of L.B.J.'s announcements and his avoidance of
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particular Issues may have been unrewarding. Johnson's alms and 
efforts to defend his policies and actions probably left much to be 
desired for some. Johnson rarely attacked the specific proposals 
of his critics. He usually dismissed his detractors with reaffirma­
tions of his own position. Failure to deal with specific points may 
have diminished the apparent importance of counter proposals to his 
programs but this tactic probably did not provide an adequate basis 
for understanding the President's defensive replies or for evaluating 
his abilities to give fair consideration to the Ideas of his opposi­
tion.
Two aspects of L.B.J.'s opening statements contrasted with 
Kennedy's style. First, Johnson differed in the way he attempted to 
build his own image. Second, Johnson probably showed the public a 
stronger, more direct measure of attempted control over the press 
than had J.F.K. The contrasts may have kept some citizens from 
Identifying with L.B.J. as a participant in the conferences. Al­
though Johnson did not have to attempt emulation of any previous 
president's style, his own efforts may have been too abrupt a change 
to satisfy this particular public need. Johnson might have done more, 
however, to curtail the length and the somewhat obvious self-congratu­
latory nature of many of his announcements, especially in the televised 
conferences. In fact, some indirect participants in the conferences 
may have come to feel an identity with the press because of the frus­
trations felt and expressed by many correspondents in getting oppor­
tunities to question as well as in eliciting responsive replies. The 
public need to feel a part of the press conference situation is rela­
tively minor, but not totally inconsequential considering the fact
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that public identification with its national leadership nay provide 
the president with the kind of support that is sometimes advantageous 
to effective action in dealing with oongress, critics, and foreign 
powers.
Summary. Studying President Johnson's press conference volun­
taries reveals some definite attempts at audience adaptations. John­
son apparently adjusted to his immediate audience, the press, by 
giving them important "news" on several occasions. He also appears 
to have tried to adapt to his ultimate audience, the public, with 
both information and persuasion.
President Johnson's own purposes and the manifestation of his aims 
in the content and related governing factors seems to run contrary to 
the needs of the press and the public in many ways. L.B.J.'s promo­
tional seal appears to have overtaken the chances of his satisfying 
some important wants of the other participants in his conference. This 
is not to say that he was unaware of those needs or that his goals 
were calculated to circumvent satisying the press and the public. 
Johnson's use of opening statements does show, however, that he proba­
bly was not effective in audience adjustment as often as might have 
been desirable.
Aside from audience adjustment, external evidence of Johnson's 
overall effectiveness in achieving his own purposes in the voluntaries 
exists to a degree. Because L.B.J.'s alms in answering questions were 
essentially the same as those of his voluntaries, a general assessment 
of his effectiveness is better understood after considering other com­
ponents of the press conference, the questions and answers.
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The Quest!one
In most of President Johnson's news conferenoes press inquiry 
provided stimuli for much of what was said. Reporters' questions 
bear consideration not only as antecedents to answers but also from 
the standpoint of the press' goals and the characteristics of the 
queries. An evaluation of the questions is also presented, briefly, 
to enlarge an understanding of the context of Johnson's replies.
Understanding the purposes of the press is essential. To recapitu­
late what was said in preceding parts of this study, newsmen who attend­
ed the presidential press conference appear to have had one major aim: 
to get materials for publishing or broadcasting. While most corres­
pondents may have been interested in writing reports of what the Presi­
dent said, others attended the conferences to write interpretative, 
speculative, feature, and editorial commentaries. To write their 
stories reporters had to get various kinds of replies from the Presi­
dent. Some writers desired specific pieces of information or factual 
data which evidently was not immediately available elsewhere. Other 
correspondents wanted opinions, reactions, and projections from the 
Chief Executive.
The press had two minor goals beyond getting news. One was de­
rived from some correspondents' interests in playing a role in govern­
mental affairs, including those who felt able to represent the public 
as well as those who wanted to influence the White House in other 
ways. Another aim of the press was to maintain a direct line with the 
President. This meant maintaining the institution of the news con­
ference, too, because the press cannot always determine whether or 
when a president will meet with them, let alone under what conditions.
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The questions in the news conferences were chiefly expressions 
of the needs of the press. Some queries did reflect consideration 
for public Interests. Others seemed responsive to some of the Presi­
dent's purposes. The alms of all of the participants provide a stand­
point from which to evaluate the effectiveness of the content and 
style of the press conference queries.
Among the qualities of the questions' content are timeliness. 
Importance, situational appropriateness, and responsiveness. The 
meaning and application of each of these characteristics is found In 
the discussion which evaluates the content of the questions.
The style of the questions Is assessed with regard to question 
types and In terms of the qualities of clarity, tone, conciseness, 
and appropriateness. This evaluation follows the treatment of aspects 
of question's content.
Content
A major measure of press conference Inquiry is timeliness. A 
timely question might anticipate events, might come up during events, 
or might follow some occurrence. Of course, the sooner a question Is 
asked (and answered), the more valuable It Is to reporters who com­
pete for news and have publishing or broadcast deadlines. Questions 
may be well timed, also, when they relate to less Immediate, con­
tinuing phenomena.
Johnson's press corps apparently excelled in asking questions 
related to current events. Even though the President did not seem to 
like questions which anticipated his decisions or actions, reporters 
continued, over the years, to ask such questions.
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President Johnson held his first official news conference at 
noon on his first day as occupant of the White House, December 7, 
1963. The opening question was, "Will you be here today?" Other 
inquiries in that conference treated the possibility of L.B.J.'s 
planning to meet with Charles De Gaulle, future plans for holding 
press conferences, prospects for programs to reduce unemployment, 
and Johnson's plans for weekends and Christmas. Another reporter 
sought to find out what would be done with an F.B.I. report on John 
Kennedy's assassination. From the first conference through the last. 
Interest in future events rarely waned.
Interrogatories during the progress of particular affairs 
were common, although the President, again, often showed a predilec­
tion to wait until an affair was ending before he responded in a 
press conference. For instance, a series of happenings in the 
Middle East during the summer of 196? elicited a number of queries, 
especially during periods of involvement in the conflict, and during 
rumored or real presidential activity related to the problem.
Questions put to the President after events account for some 
of the news conference inquiries. After the fact questioning usual­
ly resulted from a hiatus in public statements or presidential press 
conferences during crucial times. For example, during the American 
military intervention in the Dominican Republic, and during the 
196^ Gulf of Tonkin affair, reporters had to wait until after presi­
dential action to ask. Such questions were opportune because they 
were raised as soon as possible.
The typical timeliness of correspondents' queries to the Presi­
dent probably shows that the reporters served themselves and the
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public in seeking immediate responses on current Issues. The ques­
tions which anticipated events may have been useful in demonstrating 
press and public interest in the future to the person who had much 
responsibility for those events. An example of such a question ap­
pears in Johnson’s sixth press conference, February 1, 1964. A news­
man asked, "Mr. President, you spoke of viewing these foreign prob­
lems in the perspective of history rather than today's headlines. 
Looking at the problem of \flet-Nam that way, how do you look, what do 
you see down the road? Is this a situation that can be settled in a 
military way? Do you rule out any neutralisation such as General 
deGaulle suggests, or what is your general perspective on Viet-Nam?"
In some ways, perhaps, too much of the questioning was generated 
by the proximity of specific matters. Reporters did not regularly 
reflect or request retrospection or reflection while querying the 
President. Such questions might have raised discussion to more of a 
philosophical plane than is traditional for the conferences. On the 
other hand, continued requests for Johnson's analyses of critical 
matters may have promoted more effective, thoughtful, and important 
answers. A number of factors vitiated against the achievement of 
such an ideal. Reporters were not often rewarded for asking analytic 
questions. Johnson's rapport with the press in general was not 
great and he apparently did not see the potential value of those 
writers who can provide insightful interpretations of contemporary 
issues. The competitive striving for "hard" news to get quick publi­
cation and broadcast, the apparently intense interest in what the 
President was doing at the time, and the probable lack of emphasis 
on contemplative stories found in most American news publications and
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broadcasts also may havs suppressed the appearance of questions which 
do not, on the surface, appear to be timely. Other factors, such as 
the number of questioners present, the amount of time available, the 
apparent need for follow-up questions, the impromptu nature of so 
many of the press conferences, Johnson's predilection for propaganda, 
and even the abilities of many newsmen may have forestalled frequent 
appearance of less timely queries.
A quality of the questions related to timeliness Is importance. 
By Importance is meant the value of knowing what the questions appa­
rently sought. From the standpoint of the chief aim of correspon­
dents, enough of the questions do appear to seek responses from John­
son which would help. In many cases the same holds for public neces­
sity and desire. Because Johnson was aggressive in many of his 
leadership roles, and because he wielded influence and power which 
affected the public daily, it was important for the press and the 
public to keep up with his policies and activities.
Highly significant questions on the war and on domestic diffi­
culties appear in the question and answer sessions. During periods 
of civil violence, reporters asked about presidential plans to solve 
the problems. When Johnson talked about the economy, newsmen asked 
about the effects of specific programs on the "taxpayer" and on the 
inflation issue. As the military and economic involvement in South­
east Asia increased, so did the quality of questioning on that 
matter.
Overall, much of the questioning appears not to have been of 
more than immediate Importance, however. Reporters usually asked 
about what was happening at the time and about the imminent effects
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of events. Whet may be seld about the short-sighted nature of sane 
of the inquiry has already been treated with regard to the possible 
problems of having questions which were "timely" in an immediate 
sense. Newsmen rarely asked about the long range consequences of 
many Issues such as ecology, population, and international coopera­
tion. And for many of the same reasons that apply to the diminution 
of questions seeking reflective or analytic responses, justification 
may be seen for the temporal quality of a lot of the inquiries.
Beyond the questions which seem Important in various ways are 
those which seem rather limited in value. Many press conferences 
contain inquiry which appears to be almost inconsequential, especi­
ally in terms of the public's needs. Personal and political questions 
were often of short lived, if any, value. The continued probing on 
Johnson's political plans for 196^ , for example, appears to be more 
useful to writers than to the national interest. TWo conferences in 
July, 196^ , Illustrate this point. On July 2*4-, in a televised 
conferences, over half of the questions were on politics, mostly 
on Johnson's campaign plans. Six days later, seventeen of the nine­
teen questions pressed Johnson on the same issue. This trend con­
tinued in the questioning at press conferences through August and 
September. A number of questions on miscellaneous matters, such as 
those of chief concern to the press, took away some time from more 
vital concerns. For example, on August 9» 1966, three successive 
questions were asked on Lynda Bird Johnson's "job hunting."
Another quality pertaining to questions may be called "situa­
tional appropriateness." This criterion asks if questions were best 
asked to the President and if they were best asked in presidential
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news conferences. The bulk of the inquiry appears to have been quite 
appropriate. A factor which confounds general assessment, however, 
is knowing the availability and adequacy of other sources like the 
White House press office, cabinet members, and military leaders. Fur­
ther, Johnson met the press unofficially, almost daily, and the results 
of those meetings are not generally known.
Most of the questions do seem designed just for Johnson, whether 
to get Information or a "reaction." A few questions do not seem 
suited to a press conference, at least In terms of Importance to 
the citizenry. Again inquiries on personal affairs of the President, 
on immediate needs of correspondents, and on politics might have been 
channeled elsewhere or later. Consider the following exchange in the 
June 13, 1967 meeting:
Q. Mr. President, yesterday Mrs. Johnson said 
you have been a protestor all of your life.
The President. She has reminded me of that a 
good many times before yesterday.
Q. You agree with the statement, then?
The President. Yes.
Finally, a general quality of the content, responsiveness, calls 
into question correspondent's tendencies and abilities in meeting 
the needs of the conference participants. How reporters responded to 
their own needs and those of the public has been discussed to some 
extent in the preceding treatment. The press also responded to presi­
dential needs in some ways. For example, in many of the hastily called 
conferences reporters tended to follow Johnson's leads by asking a 
number of questions about his voluntaries. Such questions not only 
fulfilled correspondents' urges to get details but gave the President 
an opportunity to reinforce his messages. In other ways, however, 
the content of the questions appears less responsive to L.B.J.'s
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favorite topics, especially as his most frequent areas of approach 
and avoidance contrast with what the press apparently wanted to 
know about. In some cases, what Johnson usually avoided bringing 
up himself, reporters were prone to ask. The reverse was true, too. 
Johnson's avoidance of announcements on personal matters was compen­
sated for by newsmen's queries. His reluctance to introduce informa­
tion was balanced in the question period. One of Johnson's favorite 
topics in his first year, the domestic economy, was one of little 
interest to reporters that year. This apparent state was maintained 
by a fairly equal amount of emphasis between voluntaries and questions 
on two topics, the presidency in general and domestic Issues other 
than the economy. The fact that the press tended to pursue those 
issues which the President did not seem so Interested in initiating 
was probably useful for all the participants. Keeping the President 
aware of the desires of the press by pressing Issues which L.B.J. 
tended to eschew may also have helped the nation and reporters to 
find out vital information at times.
As a rule, the press acquitted Itself well in Johnson's news 
conferences by responding to events and issues of potential Importance 
and interest to American citizens. Newsmen were at their best, often, 
when they asked about specific current happenings. Moreover, they 
occasionally responded to trends of events and to significant, general 
issues. The press served the public by apparently being sensitive to 
a need for more information on certain topics. For example, after 
important statements by Johnson, such as a "State of the Union" address, 
writers were not hesitant to ask for a better understanding of parti­
cular statements.
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In terms of content, then, the questions probably reflected 
the Immediate needs of newsmen to report and Interpret specific 
events. Next, newsmen were quick to respond to some of the Presi­
dent's manifest alms by following most of his announcements with 
Inquiry. Further, the public was served by most of the news con­
ference inquiry which probably reflected many aspects of public 
Interest in and attitudes toward the country's leadership. The 
content of the questions, then, seems quite appropriate in terms 
of varying specific stimuli and pressures affecting the press during 
Johnson's administration.
XZP6.8.
The style of the press conference questions Is worth noting 
since various aspects of style may have had as much effect in the 
conferences as the content of the inquiry. The type of questions 
asked and the clarity, tone, conciseness, and appropriateness with 
which correspondents worded their interrogatives are scrutinized 
briefly.
Question types are possibly best looked at from the standpoint 
of the objectives of the questioner. The chief types of questions 
were four: data seeking, opinion seeking, reaction seeking and
follow-up.
Questions for data Included those which sought specific bits of 
information or general expositions of factual detail. Such questions 
probably represent the most common kind of questioning in the confer­
ences. Concrete information, especially if it is as yet unheard of, 
can become valuable to writers. Since Johnson was a major news source 
so often during his administration, it is no wonder that more often 
than not questions wanting specific data appear in the conferences.
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A second type of inquiry sought Johnson's opinions. More 
specifically, statements on policy, on prophecy, and on Johnson's 
analysis of situations were requested frequently by the press. Be­
yond knowing exactly what the President was doing, reporters wanted 
to know such things as Johnson's rationale for action, his philosophi­
cal viewpoint, the structure of his attitudes on issues, his vision 
of the future, and how he interpreted the course of various events.
Such questions were less directive and more probative in nature. They 
tended to appear seasonally, especially at the first of the year, on 
Johnson's birthday, and at the end of the year. For instance on 
January 16, 19&5. » writer asked, "Mr. President, on the eve of your 
inauguration could you sum up or characterise for us your view of the 
general world condition, or the leadership job that you see ahead 
for us?" Although that reporter may have sought the content of L.B.J.'s 
"Inaugural Address," it was not an uncommon request,
Johnson's fifty-fourth birthday (August 27, 1966) was the occa­
sion for a conference at the "L.B.J. Ranch." In that meeting, al­
though one question was, "Mrs. Johnson, what are you going to have 
for dinner tonight?" Other queries, to the President, were broader.
One reporter asked Johnson to "lay down a basic philosophy for what 
might be called the next chapter ahead In world affairs." Another 
correspondent asked about the "prospect" for improved relations 
between the United States and Russia.
Questions to elicit the President's reactions were not uncommon. 
With such questions reporters wanted to gauge Johnson's feelings on 
various issues rather than to get specific data or statements of 
policy. Inquiry for expressive behavior dealt with criticisms and
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topics which wsra ssnsltlvs to Johnson. In those queries newsmen 
expressed or alluded to critical evaluations of Johnson's perform­
ance and programs. Sometimes they gave arguments confronting the 
White House from other souroes. Writers occasionally simply seemed 
to be talking to the President, expressing their own feelings, per­
haps hoping to Influence Johnson more than Just to get a passing 
observation or reaction.
Reaction seeking questions were sometimes general, or open ended 
in nature. For example, the transcript of the July 28, 19^ 5* broad­
cast conference shows Nancy Dickerson asking, "Mr. President, after 
the week of deliberations on Vlet-Nam, how do you feel— in the context 
of your Office? We always hear It Is the loneliest in the world."
An example of a more specific question appears In the same conference:
Mr. President, . . . last night one of the leading 
Governors of the Republicans said some rather strong 
things. Governor Hatfield of Oregon said that recent 
escalation of action In Vlet-Nam is moving all the 
people of the world close to world war III, and we 
have no moral right to commit the world and especially 
our own people to world war III unilaterally or by 
the decision of a few experts.
This seems to Imply rather strong criticism of 
present policies. Do you care to express any reaction?
A frequent bent of some correspondents seems to have been to eli­
cit L.B.J.'s response to political Issues. As the elections of 1966 
came near a close, Johnson held a televised meeting with reporters, 
October 6. Several questions in that conf erence seemed to want the 
President's reactions to political Issues. One reporter asked about 
Johnson's feelings about Democrats running for southern governor­
ships "who are avowed segregationists." Another writer asked what 
Johnson thought about campaign Issues from his point of view and in 
terms of the opposition party's positions. The next question wondered
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about "the rather steady decline of the £~stoc\TJ market in recent 
months." Another questioner pointed up Republican criticism of 
Johnson's "preoccupation with and spending for Vietnam." These and 
several other questions In the conference seemed obviously designed 
to get quick reactions from Johnson especially In his role as head 
of the Democratic Party.
Some reporters, especially in Johnson's first year of office, 
apparently wanted to spar with the President. Such bickering and 
baiting usually related to press and political matters. On February 1, 
1964, Johnson assembled newsmen in the White House Theatre. One of 
the first questions asked was, "Mr. President, many of us are won­
dering why you would hold a news conference in a cramped little room 
such as this, limited to about 90 newsmen, when you have facilities 
available to accommodate all newsmen, such as the State Department?"
The embarrassment caused by the activities of two of Johnson's 
advisors, Bobby Baker and Walter Jenkins, produced some press con­
ference Inquiry. Correspondents asked about Bobby Baker In at least 
three conferences in 1964. February 1, 1964, a week after a question 
on Bobby Baker had appeared, another question was, "Mr. President, do 
you feel that Mr. Walter Jenkins should go up to the Capitol and 
testify under oath to clear up the conflicts that are appearing in 
the testimony?"
On April 11, 1964, a reporter wanted Johnson's reaction to the 
"Light Bulb Johnson" appellation. That question Immediately led to 
some apparently useless banter concerning who Invented the term.
Another newsman In that conference requested Johnson's opinion on 
negotiations for a cable television arrangement in Austin, Texas,
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where L.B.J.'s family had financial interests in a broadcasting 
corporation.
A last type of question is the "follow-up." Over half of all 
the inquiry put to Johnson in an average official conference seems 
immediately derived from either his voluntaries or other questions 
asked, or both. That amounts to eight or nine of the sixteen to 
seventeen questions normally asked. Among the follow-ups, those 
related to previously asked questions were slightly more frequent 
that those stemming from announcements. On an annual basis, this 
kind of questioning is, in frequency, proportionately the same as all 
questioning. In quite a few individual press conferences, however, 
most if not all of the questions were generated by the President's 
opening remarks. In most question and answer sessions are at least 
a few follow-ups to voluntaries. Questions which may have been 
brought about by related, prior inquiry in a given conference are 
perhaps even more common. Furthermore, correspondents occasionally 
used the press conference to follow up on statements made by Johnson 
in other speaking situations.
Reporters asked follow-up questions for the same reasons that 
they asked the other types of questions, basically. Newsmen asked 
more follow-ups in order to get more material than evidently was pro­
vided in the voluntaries and the answers. On the whole, the follow- 
up inquiries appear quite appropriate by any measure. In some con­
ferences, however, it appears that follow-up questions were asked for 
lack of Impetus to bring up other and perhaps fresher Issues.
President Johnson announced to reporters on March 2, 1967, that 
an exchange of letters with the Soviet Premier, Aleksei Kosygin,
2(*
might result In talks for "limiting the arms race In offensive and 
defensive nuclear missiles." All but three of the conference's 
seventeen questions were on that brief announcement. This was the 
first public announcement of the correspondence, and the news seems 
dramatic in light of the attempt to curb production of "defensive" 
or "antimissile" weaponry. Writers searched for the meaning of the 
forthcoming discussions, specific details leading up to the talks, 
and data on arrangements for the meetings. They also asked about 
immediate and potential effects of the proposed conference.
Later in 1967, on July 13» Johnson and several military advi­
sors met the press. Appropriately, all of the questions, which were 
directed to Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, General William West­
moreland, and the President, were on Vietnam.
In September of 1967 Johnson presented his "San Antonio formula" 
for ending the war. The day after that policy statement, September 30, 
newsmen asked only question related to Johnson's voluntaries on staff 
changes In the Department of Justice. They did ask questions about 
Vietnam with specific references to the speech of the night before.
At times, questioners seemed completely uninterested in Johnson's 
announcements. For instance, on September 6, 1965, L.B.J. took a third 
of the conference time to announce a number of items such as a meeting 
with Senate leaders that morning. The transcript of the conference 
reveals no questions generated by the voluntaries and only three ques­
tions following up on answers to previously asked queries.
In sum, a variety of factors seems to have determined the nature 
and frequency of follow-ups. Included are Johnson's voluntaries, the 
presence of guests at the conferences, the apparent Importance of
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external events at tha time of a conference, and even the kind of 
conference held (impromptu, advance notice, televised) and where It 
was held. In any event, the follow-up questions generally appear 
responsive to the needs of the Immediate participants In the news 
conferences.
Stylistic Qualities
An Important quality of questioning Is clarity. While the 
Inquirer probably need not reveal or emphasize his own purposes In 
asking, he should word the question so that the respondent knows 
exactly what sort of response Is sought. That Is, the asker does 
not have to say what he Is going to do with an answer, but he must 
make sure that the responder knows what kind of answer Is requested. 
Johnson's apparently high interest and direct involvement with media 
representatives probably made it fairly easy for him to understand 
most Inquiry. On the other hand, Johnson's habit of anticipating 
questions, his sensitivity to particular areas of questioning like 
the war and his personal life, his apparent dislike of questions on 
policy and pending decisions, his habits of secrecy and surprise, 
and his general attitudes toward the media and the press conference 
format probably did not Insure that he would comprehend every question.
In the judgment of this critic, L.B.J.'s inquisitors performed 
well in asking clearly worded questions, generally speaking. This is 
not surprising since many of the correspondents assigned to the White 
House were probably experienced and knowledgeable. Competition for an 
opportunity to query the President may have added incentive for good 
inquiry. Lapses In any aspect of the quality of questioning was proba­
bly a function of general and specific preparation. Although it might
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be expected that impromptu news conferences would yield less thought­
ful asking* this was not always the case* nor is there evidence at 
present to show that general relationship. Some factors of the ques­
tions* however* did affect clarity. Reporters sometimes failed to 
Indicate when they were changing topics when they addressed the Presi­
dent. They sometimes asked multiple questions which may have led to 
confusion. Further* some of the general queries were perhaps unneces­
sarily general* although framing such open ended questions as "How do 
you feel?" or "What are the prospects of a tax increase?" may have been 
deliberately general and not at all vague in terms of Johnson's percep­
tion.
If Johnson's responses to questions are an Indicator of clarity, 
the questions appear to be very clear. L.B.J. rarely asked for inter­
pretation of a query. Hie only time he asked about one, usually, 
was to discover a specific source quoted or alluded to in the state­
ment of the question. Whether, in such a case* the particular newsman 
wanted to reveal his source cannot be determined easily. Of course, 
Johnson could not well have afforded appearing not to understand many 
questions, especially those on Important matters. By the same token, 
as noted before, newsmen could ill afford abstruseness.
Finally, reporters did not seem unmindful of the needs of other 
participants. The questions were probably clear to other correspon­
dents in most cases. In the broadcast conferences, most newsmen seemed 
to take time to put their queries into a context which would be under­
standable for the public.
Perhaps a more important quality of the news conferences is the 
tone of the inquiries. The demeanor of reporters, as reflected in their
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questions, probably affected the quality of the answers to a degree. 
This applies to individual questions and to the general tone of 
inquiry in a given conference, if not to the whole trend of inquiry 
facing the President over the years. Of course, L.B.J.'s voluntaries, 
his answers, environmental conditions, timing, and other factors influ­
enced the mood of the questions, also. Of chief importance, perhaps, 
was the general feeling of friendliness, expressed by reporters, be­
cause imparting that feeling may improve rapport and therefore may 
enhance the quality and responsiveness of the answers.
On paper, much of the inquiry in Johnson*s news conferences seems 
rather neutral, or not expressing any particular feelings toward the 
speaker other than a common formality of address, "Mr. President . . ." 
Some questions appeared quite friendly, even complimentary. Amicable 
questions seem more common In conferences held on short notice, on 
holidays and on special occasions such as Johnson's birthday, and In 
conferences at the L.B.J. Ranch or in Austin. Hostile, unfriendly, 
and sarcastically worded questions are more frequent In broadcast 
conferences, but are not limited to that format. Further, a trend 
toward more blunt and less hospitable inquiry appears after Johnson's 
first few months in office. This trend continued, with a few excep­
tions, even after the President announced his intention to retire from 
political life.
In a sort of "non-conference," on January 23. 1 9 ^ *  Johnson's 
fourth official meeting with newsmen, the only question asked was,
" . . . how do you think things are going up on the Hill?" This was 
on one of Johnson's favorite topics and the reply imparted good news. 
Johnson had held the conference in answer to a request for a policy
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statement on Panama and to reply to some stories being circulated about 
L.B.J.'s financial affairs. The question which was articulated may have 
eased tension momentarily.
One of several questions on the possibilities of Johnson and Gold- 
water debating in 196k appears In a news conference of July 10. A 
correspondent said, "Mr. President, a couple of months ago your ora­
torical propensities were officially recognized by the National Foren­
sic Society /National Forensic League^. Will this in any way influ­
ence your decision to debate your opponent in the upcoming election?" 
Instead of asking, "Why won't you debate Goldwater?" or even a less 
tactfully worded question, this particular inquiry may be seen as com­
plimentary and encouraging In Its wording. Similar questions came up 
on other conferences. For Instance, on July 1, 1967, a writer told 
Johnson, "When we, the National Negro Publishers Association met with 
you In 19&+, you said you were going to be President for all the peo­
ple of the United States. That you have shown beyond a reasonable 
doubt, I wonder if your honesty, integrity, and humility will rub 
off on many of the Governors throughout the United States as the years 
go along." (Johnson had just concluded a meeting with a group of 
governors in St. Louis, Missouri.)
A rather helpful question appears in a conference at the Ranch, 
August 29, 1965. An announcement of an end to strikes by dock workers
had been made by the President. One writer, who may have been cogni­
zant of Johnson's desire to keep strikes at a minimum, asked, "Mr. 
President, what would the steel strike to do the national economy?"
This allowed Johnson the opportunity to speak against the strike, and
the argument of harm to the economy was supplied by the questioner.
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About a year later, In the sum location, anon* L.B.J.'s birthday 
gifts ware b o m  sociable questions like, "How do you feel on your 
birthday, Mr. President? How Is your health? Have you gained or 
lost weight since the first of the year, and that sort of thing?"
At tines, reporters were kind enough to ask leave to state a 
question, especially on particular topics. For example, two days 
before the November 8, 1966, elections, a newsman said, "Mr. President 
. . .  I hope you won't mind a question about the campaign," before 
asking Johnson's judgment on the "factor of the backlash." In the 
same question period other queries began, "Mr. President, sir ..." 
(Johnson cut in on one, saying, "That 'air' kind of disarms me. Go 
ahead. I hope It's a friendly question." The reporter replied, "It 
Is." And It was.)
Overtly hospitable questions were less common than those which 
seem less cordial in tone. Sons of the questions designed to get 
Johnson's reactions, especially his response to criticism, often 
reflected In content and mood a degree of unfriendliness.
On July 31* 1967, a number of press conference questions con­
fronted the President with Ideas contrary to or critical of his own. 
Among those were Governor George Romney's complaint concerning federal 
troops during riots in Detroit, Michigan; a Gallup poll showing pub­
lic dissatisfaction with Johnson's war policies; requests by several 
Democrats for Johnson to retire; a question on why no "advocates of 
black power" were appointed to the "Commission on Civil Disorders;" 
and references to the rioting In the United States as related to the 
costly attention being given to Vietnam at the same time.
Sometimes reporters were not subtle. The following exchange 
appears In the November 29, 1966, meeting:
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Q. Did you sand congratulations to Harold Holt 
^Australia's newly also tad Prime Minister^?
The President: We sand wires to the heads of 
govemsent and to Prime Ministers who have elections 
and are successful. We even send them to members of 
the opposition party, sometimes. In this country.
Q. Well, In this case, this opposition leader 
says It Is meddling In their elections.
The President. We Just send the wires.
On December 31 of that year some hard-hitting questions were asked. 
One question was, " . . .  do you think It was a mistake not to ask 
for a tax increase this year?" Another reporter brought up the 
bombing of "two light Industries" in North Vietnam, saying, "I 
don't believe that these Industries fall within the target objec­
tives previously announced by the Defense Department. ..." A 
newsman brought up the question of money spent on Vietnam by the 
United States. A further question was, "Mr. President, there has 
been a great deal of talk lately about your Image. Some writers 
discuss what they call a credibility gap. The Harris and Gallup 
polls have Indicated performance ratings at the lowest point since 
you became President. And there has been some unrest In the Demo­
cratic Party among the Governors."
One factor of the style of the questions worthy of note is con­
ciseness. This quality is mainly Important in so far as It affects 
the amount of time available for questioning and the clarity of the 
Individual questions. Since Johnson's voluntaries and answers did 
more to determine the time available, questions which might be con­
sidered verbose in any way probably had little effect on time. The 
average press conference question appears to have taken around fif­
teen or twenty seconds to present. Questions taking less time than 
that seem to appear somewhat more frequently than those going beyond 
a quarter of a minute.
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Taltrlaad question And uicmr ••aslons apparently had i o r« longer 
questions than many of the non-broadcast and laproeptu conferences.
Long questions seen to hare been a function of careful preparation, 
of caution, of a desire to be clear to all participants, and sometimes 
of a need to make statements to the President. The more carefully 
worded questions tended to be prepared with background Information, 
or with rationales for asking certain questions. Often, questions 
were long without being wordy. For example, some writers would phrase 
more than one Inquiry In one statement, perhaps because the President 
might not call upon most reporters more than once in a given con­
ference.
Further, most of the questions do not seem too conoise for com­
prehension, at least for Johnson's understanding. Nor did many of 
the Inquiries seem so protracted as to obfuscate meaning. Given the 
rapid give and take In the conferences, as well as other Influences 
such as the newsmen's probable awareness of the time limit, a possible 
desire of reporters to share the time available with each other, the 
urgency of some of the questioners to get a number of details or to 
explore a variety of topics, Johnson's proclivity to take up much 
time with his own materials, and the unpredictable timing and fre­
quency of the conferences probably led most correspondents to be fair­
ly succinct.
In general, then, Johnson's press corps, with some exceptions, 
seems to have been concise In the wording and length of their Inquiries.
A final measure of style applied to the questions Is appropriate­
ness. The language of the questions appears felicitous. What was said 
about the clarity and conciseness of the queries applies to this
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generalisation. Johnson seldom asked, "What do you nean?" He seemed 
quite familiar with the terminology and occasional jargon employed by 
the press. Reporters often used terns most easily comprehended by 
those In the national government. They frequently employed acronyms 
like "S.B.A.T.O." (Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation) and "D.M.Z." 
(the "demilitarised sone" separating North and South Vietnam). Such 
terms as "The Kennedy Round" (of negotiations for International tar­
iff considerations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) 
began before the Johnson administration. Again, reporters In the 
broadcast conferences appear to have been considerate of the public 
by asking questions with generally understandable language. In fact, 
the President was more apt to use technical terms at times than was 
the press.
A general evaluation of the style of the questions reveals good 
inquiry. Correspondents were usually clear, concise, and appropriate 
in their use of language. They used the kinds of questions best 
suited to their needs but did not appear to have violated the main 
needs of the public or the President with the types of questions they 
asked. Follow-up inquiry was especially good In many conferences. 
While possibly reflecting Johnson's own mood at times, the tone of the 
questions was generally polite, if not often very friendly. Not shy­
ing away from unpleasant subjects, the press appeared to be usually 
candid, frequently blunt, and sometimes even antagonistic in their 
queried. Reporters were probably respectful of the needs of all of 
the conferences' participants, for the most part.
How well President Johnson responded to the questions is the 
subject of the chapter which follows.
CHAPTER V
AN EVALUATION OF JOHNSON'S ANSWERS
This chapter explores President Johnson's abilities in answering 
the press conferences' questions. Investigation of President John­
son's responses to the 2,000 and more news conference inquiries 
reveals how Johnson Interacted with the press as well as how he per­
formed in meeting various demands of this speaking format. An outline 
of the President's goals, a study of his methods, and an assessment of 
the answers afford a fuller view of Johnson's presidential press con­
ferences.
Johnson's Alms
Johnson's general press conference purposes and the specific 
goals of his voluntaries, it will be recalled, were to provide 
Information, to publicize, to promote, and to defend his administra­
tion, to better his image, and to control the press conference.
Johnson's alms in answering the questions appear akin to the 
goals of the voluntaries. A few particular purposes, however, may 
be found in the answers.
To Control
The special purposes were, basically, matters of control. That 
is, the President wanted to regulate the flow of questioning, especi­
ally in terms of the content. On some occasions, often after an 
Important announcement to open the conference, he seemed to want
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questions on the particular voluntary snd he apparently wanted to 
avoid other areas of Inquiry. At tines, the President apparently 
did not really want any questioning. For example, on August 18, 196*4-, 
a few minutes before a reception for a visiting diplomat, L.B.J. 
held a brief conference to announce some aspects of his plans for 
the week, some of his recent activities, and some data on unemploy­
ment.^ Johnson ended his remarks with an invitation for questions 
on "this schedule, or these points." His replies to the queries were 
brief. At one point, after a question related to his voluntary on 
employment, Johnson said, "I don't want to get Into a general press 
conference. I Just said that. This man /"Iceland's Prime Minister/7 
is on his way here. . . ."In order to keep the Inquiry on the topics 
of his other announcements. The next question was on whether the 
topic of "politics" had come up In L.B.J.'s recent meeting with state 
and city leaders. Johnson said, "Yes." Pursuing the question, a 
reporter asked, "Can you tell us about that?" Johnson replied that 
it was not the right occasion to discuss the matter. The President 
did answer a few other questions pertaining to his plans for the 
coming days. Other methods to keep reporters on one track are ex­
plained later in this chapter.
*-All references to Johnson's press conferences are to the trans­
cripts published in the Public Papers of the Presidents of the United 
States: Lyndon B. Johnson. 10 vols. (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1965-1970).
Citations to other materials, such as speeches and press releases, 
refer to the same source. Direct quotations from the transcripts, 
unless elliptically quoted, are verbatim with the following excep­
tions. Footnote numbers and footnotes in the texts are_deleted.
Also omitted are headings and bracketed numbers, e.g. / 8/7 which 
appear in order to show changes in topics within a given conference.
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Another special purpose was to control what newsnen did with his 
replies. Just as L.B.J. often met with the press on an off-the-record 
basis, he sometimes Invoked that category of answering which previous 
presidents had employed. It Is notable that Instead of using the four 
categories of reply which Franklin Roosevelt, for example, employed in 
conferences, Johnson's habit was to answer for the "record" in his 
official press conferences and give other kinds of responses in other 
meetings with the media. The off-the-record reply, then was infre­
quent in the press conferences and was, further, more commonly used 
during his first two years in office.
On January 16, 1965. in a conference at the L.B.J. Ranch, John­
son spoke off the record three times. The first time was during a 
voluntary on White House personnel changes. Next, after some persis­
tent inquiry as to his travel plans, Johnson decided to handle the 
difficulty privately for a few minutes. Toward the end of the meet­
ing is the following give and take:
Q. Mr. President, on the eve of your inauguration could 
you sum up or characterise for us your view of the world 
condition, or the leadership job that you see ahead for us?
The President. I prefer to do that off the record 
for you. I don't want to create any more problems than 
we already have. If you want to do it on that basis I 
will be glad to.
Q. Could that be for our guidance?
The President. I assume it would guide you.
Q. I mean can we use it?
The President. No, you can say White House sources said 
or the President said or somebody close to the President 
said or anything. I will just give you my view off the 
record and if it has apy influence on your view, well, all 
right. You can entertain your own.
The transcript indicates that Johnson concluded the conference on an
off-the-record basis.
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In general the President was just as purposive in his answers as
he was in holding conferences and in his use of voluntaries. The 
specific aims of the answers were not unlike those of his announce­
ments. Specific instances of answers which seem directed toward the 
fulfillment of each of those are presented here.
To Inform
One specific aim was to provide the press and the public with 
concrete information. Johnson wanted his audience to understand, 
remember, and attend to certain data. Answers to provide informa­
tive materials were most common in those conferences called so the 
President could brief the press on matters such as a forthcoming 
budget request. Johnson also liked to respond to questions probing 
his voluntaries, especially those on the presidency, when a writer 
wanted more details, or even background Information.
The nomination of Clark Clifford for the post of Secretary of 
Defense generated a conference on January 19. 1968. After announc­
ing the nomination, Johnson stayed for questions. The first question 
was for background information: "What were the factors that pointed
to Mr. Clifford?" Johnson answered at length with biographical de­
tails, saying he had just that day made the decision, although Clark 
Clifford had been "under consideration" for months. Another writer 
wanted to know how long Clifford's "term" would be and if that had been 
arranged. L.B.J. replied that he and Clifford had not discussed the 
matter.
Later in 1968, on May 29. Johnson gave a commencement speech at 
Texas Christian University in Fort Worth. In the conclusion of his 
talk, the President advocated granting eighteen-year-olds suffrage.
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He laid out no plan nor did he imply apy program to achieve that end.
In his news conference the next day, a correspondent asked if Johnson 
did have a proposal in mind. Johnson replied, "Over the weekend, we 
will be working on a very special message to Congress. A constitu­
tional amendment will be required. The President will send the message 
to Congress, I hope, next week, making his recommendation."
To Promote
More frequently President Johnson's replies appear to have been 
designed to publicize and promote his administration. L.B.J. was so 
eager to accomplish this aim that he occasionally had questions planted. 
He probably prepared some answers. In a few conferences, he even read 
replies.
For Instance, on April 8, 1965# one query was, "Mr. President . . . 
what do you think of the House passing the medical bill?" Johnson be­
gan his reply, saying, "I just happen to have it here." He went on 
to praise the House and to urge the Senate to "convert this monumental 
bill to the final reality of an enacted law."
President Johnson frequently used his answers to promote pending 
or proposed legislation, whether the replies were prepared or impromptu.
A conference held on August 9» 1966, yielded a question on "riot­
ing in the streets" and what the central government might do about 
that and other urban affairs. L.B.J. took the opportunity to list "a 
good many" efforts on his part to solve such problems. He put in plugs 
for the Teacher Corps, for a "rent supplements" program, and a "Demon­
stration Cities bill." He also mentioned that he was working on the 
coming year's budget with special consideration for the three specific 
programs.
218
President Johnson was not Immune to promoting himself and his 
party. In a meeting with the press on April 4, 1964, a reporter asked 
if L.B.J. knew "of any instance where a President has failed of elec­
tion in a prosperous period.'' Johnson took the cue to praise his 
party, predict prosperity, and promote the implication of his election.
Questions on the congressional elections of 1966 often came up 
in L.B.J.'s news conference. On August 24, of that year, for example, 
Johnson was asked to guess the chances of Republican gains in the elec­
tions. He replied at some length, urging the press to be wary of 
polls. He warned against paying attention to "people who try to cre­
ate psychological situations and bandwagon approaches, and try to 
repeat a thing so many times that finally, folks begin to believe it." 
He concluded his answer with optimistic statements regarding the 
success of his own party.
Other instances of political propaganda appeared in press con­
ferences held during Johnson's participation in meetings of governors.
A question on cohesion among members of the Democratic Party came up 
following the close of the Democratic Governors Conference, July 1, 
1967. L.B.J. answered by saying that "divergent opinions" were not 
necessarily harmful to Democrats. He concluded, "I think, generally 
speaking, the worst Democrat is better for the country than the best 
Republican."
To Defend
Extensive criticisms of many of President Johnson's programs came 
up throughout his administration. These criticisms appeared in all 
kinds of publication, in public speaking, and the news media. Especi­
ally vocal were detractors on the war issue. The complaints and
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suggestions of critics often emerged In the questions put to the Presi­
dent in his news conferences. So, one of Johnson's goals frequently 
was to defend his leadership in responding to inquiry.
A two-part query on the war and on inflation came up in the 
May 21, 1966, question period. Johnson spent over five minutes in 
reply. He was apparently prepared for the query because he produced 
a chart comparing prices in the United States with prices in other 
countries. He went on to say that the White House was making efforts 
to curb inflation, and he predicted that economic conditions would 
improve. On the war issue, Johnson asserted that no one was more 
concerned about the need to find peace than was he. He reviewed in 
detail his administration's attempts to settle the war. The stimulus 
question had mentioned "recent polls that show considerable public 
dissatisfaction." L.B.J. ended his question by alluding to the 
question. He said that "those who approve of what we are doing are 
almost twice" the number of those who did not subscribe to his poli­
cies in Southeast Asia for one reason or another.
Aggressive inquisition on the war policies emerged in most of 
Johnson's news conferences in 1966 and 1967. In most cases L.B.J. 
had ready and lengthy defensive remarks apparently designed to refute 
the general nature of the criticism so often inherent in those ques­
tions. His replies usually tended to enumerate his own initiatives 
and blame the enemy for refusing to negotiate for an end to the hostili­
ties.
To Improve An Image
Another specific aim of the answers was to improve the image of 
the President and his leadership. While few newsmen probably would
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have asked questions Just to satisfy this presidential aim, Johnson 
was not reluctant to turn an answer into an image building attempt.
On almost any issue Johnson might present a happy picture of his suc­
cesses, give lengthy details of various work in progress, or express 
optimism and hope for the prospects of his resolving a current con­
flict. He often showed sympathy for the needs of his countrymen. He 
displayed vigor, forcefulness, and action. He liked to associate his 
decisions with the ideas of persons admired by the public, such as 
Kennedy, Truman, and Eisenhower.
One of the most damaging attacks on President Johnson's image 
came about through press rumblings on his believability. So sensi­
tive was Johnson to the "credibility gap" charge that he sometimes 
even referred to the term in answering questions. At times he seemed 
to want to disprove the charge directly. In the May 21, 1966, meeting, 
Johnson referred to two specific areas of sensitivity relating to his 
reputation. After a statement on the war, Johnson said, " . . .  I 
think I have said about all that I can on that general subject 
/Vietnam^ today." He then opened the question period for "any 
other matters." After three inquiries, a reporter asked if Johnson 
had said that only questions on topics other than those on Vietnam 
were in order. Johnson replied, "I don't want to be charged with 
barring you from asking anything you want. . . . "  Later in the meet­
ing, in response to a question on the cost of living, L.B.J. discussed 
probable government spending figures. Johnson warned that "It is 
difficult to predict." He continued, "I don't want to have our 
credibility questioned if we are off a half percent out of 100. . . . "  
He expressed hope that his projections would be accurate, explaining 
the difficulties he faced in making them.
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This view of President Johnson's specific purposes paves the 
way for an exploration of how Johnson answered the questions.
Methods of Development 
In order to discuss Johnson's way of answering questions the 
following distinction is made. An •'answer" is a direct and respon­
sive reply with some ideational content. That Is, those responses 
other than "answers" Include a simple "yes" or "no," a "no comment," 
or some device to pass over a particular point without actually 
saying anything about the topic. Indeed, replies and responses 
which reflect an intent completely to avoid development are fre­
quent and important in studying the conferences. At this point, 
however, only those responses which contain some sort of exposi­
tion, amplification, or proof receive attention.
The following generalizations may be made about the development 
of Johnson's answers. That Johnson's methods in developing his 
voluntaries seemed similar to the content of some of his speeches 
was noted in the preceding chapter. Many of his answers appeared, 
in content, like other kinds of utterances Johnson made.
Second, a variety of types or forms of development was found in 
the answers as a whole and in many specific replies.
Third, as with some of the voluntaries, specific types of 
development depended upon what the correspondent wanted, what John­
son's purpose was in replying, or the topic of the question. Once 
more, however, patterns of answers in terms of methods of development 
varied. An answer on a particular topic, stimulated by a particular 
kind of question, might show almost any type of development.
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Fourth, the extent to which L.B.J. developed an idee varied. Pre­
dictably, he usually answered questions on his favorite topics (the 
presidency, legislation— especially successful projects, politics, 
and the state of the econovy) with more than a general statement. In 
other words, when Johnson had good news, he liked to talk about it.
On the other hand, Johnson was unoredictable when it came to other 
topics, especially Southeast Asia. Sometimes he would develop a 
reply on that problem at length; on other occasions he would dismiss 
the issue altogether. The specific nature or tone of the question 
apparently was not a determinant of the content of such inquiry, 
either.
Fifth, the general quality of the answers was very irregular.
In some conferences it seemed that little was gained by the press, 
the public, and even the President. In others, plenty of the answers 
were useful enough to serve all participants adequately. In still 
other meetings a strange mixture of excellence and mediocrity 
existed.
Since President Johnson was often responsive in his answers 
and did show an interesting variety of methods of support, some 
illustrations of his answers which went beyond a few words merit 
consideration. Special attention is given to some of L.B.J.'s 
favorite methods of development.
Statistics
President Johnson's fondness for statistics has been noted in 
connection with his opening statements on the economy, including 
employment. The use of numbers appeared in replies on other topics 
as well. Johnson kept quantitative evidence on a number of his
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activities and statements* On January 17, 1967, L.B.J. and Budget 
Director Charles L. Schultze briefed reporters on upcoming monetary 
legislation. The introductory explanation of a "tax surcharge1* led 
to some inquiry. One reporter wanted more information on the mone­
tary need for the taxation proposal. L.B.J. used a number of figures 
to explain and promote the proposal. To show how the "surcharge" 
and other aspects of his bills would affect the public, he said,
We will ask married people with two children who earn 
over $5,000 to make some modest contribution. I believe 
the schedule showed yesterday, if you have two children 
and make $10,000, you would pay $67 a year. That is about 
$5 a month with a $10,000 income.
With a $15,000 Income, it is $10 or $20 a month. It 
is a very nominal amount.
As to a corporation, I had better not get into corpo­
ration figures, but I saw one schedule where I believe 
with $500,000 it is $1 ,^000. So we think it is a very 
small part of what has already been rebated.
We think it is fiscally desirable so we don't have 
to pay Interest on this amount of money, to try to raise 
at least a part of it, or $^ billion, or $5 billion, or 
$6 billion. We think we can do it.
We hope with social security we will pay out to the 
lower groups in the neighborhood of $4 billion plus. We 
would expect to take from those making above $10,000 and 
up a little over $*♦• billion. So it kind of balances 
off. . . .
The answer appears to have used helpful details in the form of sta­
tistics. The material may have been concrete enough to explain or 
amplify what Johnson had said in his announcement and previous 
answers on the subject.
The President could, also let loose with numerical data on other 
topics, whether the figures were requested or not. For Instance, 
on March 20, 19&5* in a broadcast conference, Johnson was asked 
about the number of "National Guardsmen" being called up and "how 
many police" were on hand in Alabama during a period of marching 
and violence in the state. The President replied with a half dozen
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specific, exact* and approximate figures. To another question on the 
number of marchers and the nature of "Federal service available . . . 
for medical care or that sort of thing," he responded to the second 
part of the query. He said, "We have a 75-bed hospital with 5 doctors 
and 5 ambulances, 43 aircraft, helicopters (5-ambulstory patient, 2 
litters with corpsmen) . . .  in Selma. At Maxwell Field we have a 
250-bed hospital, 50 doctors, 5 ambulances, 4 H-43 aircraft. . . ."
The data in both answers seem impressive, although Johnson failed to 
support an assertion that he had "reasonably accurate estimates" of 
the number of marchers to expect. An example of unsolicited statis­
tical data appeared in the same conference. The stimulus reads, "Mr. 
President, do you feel that the debate in the Congress concerning 
Viet-Nam, and especially those who have been urging quick negotiations, 
has weakened your position or this country's position?" Johnson 
used the question to digress on the topic of freedom of speech and 
his ability to communicate freely on the war issue. He said, in 
part, "I have met with 520, I believe. Congressmen and Senators for 
over 2 hours for over 11 nights, and each one of them could ask any 
question he wanted to. The Secretary of State gave them a thorough 
briefing— the Secretary of Defense, the President, and the Vice Presi­
dent, And as I stated, you have raised the question with me 47 times. 
So maybe the Senators and Congressmen have some speeches left in or­
der to be even with us." In this and in similar cases Johnson used 
figures to inform, amplify, and prove the points he was making.
Testimony
The President sometimes employed testimony or quotations in 
answering reporter's inquiries. This method is found in various
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answers* In news conferences Johnson most frequently quoted his own 
statements, but he also Invoked the words of others, such as previous 
government leaders and his contemporary advisors. Whether he specifi­
cally referred to his source or whether he quoted directly or indi­
rectly varied.
The habit of quoting himself appeared early in Johnson's presi­
dency. In his first televised meeting with the press, February 29, 
1965, he repeated parts of a telephone conversation he had recently 
had with the President of Panama. In answer to a question on Viet­
nam, Johnson recalled some of the points he had made in a talk at 
the University of California at Los Angeles the week before this 
conference. Some of the exact wording of the California speech ap­
peared in the February 29 press conference answer.
It is interesting that Johnson probably quoted himself on the 
issue of Vietnam more than on any other single issue in press 
conferences throughout much of his administration.
He apparently wanted consistency and was cautious in his replies. 
He also exhibited some concern for what other members of his adminis­
tration said. In one conference, February 2, 196B, a reporter in­
quired about a statement by Clark Clifford. Clifford had been testi­
fying before a senate committee which was considering his nomination
for Secretary of Defense, Johnson answered the question, saying,
" . . . Mr. Clifford said what I have said, what Mr. Rusk has said, 
what everybody has said, so far as the San Antonio formula is con­
cerned. The country should know once and for all this morning that
Mr. Clifford said just what I said at San Antonio."
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Johnson's April 25. I9&b» conference was with foraer President 
Harry Truman. A question In the meeting asked what L.B.J. said to 
the leadership of labor and management In a "railroad dispute." 
Johnson answered with three types of testimony. First, he indirectly 
repeated what, In general, he had told the disputants. Next, he 
quoted a statement which Sam Rayburn had once made on another topic. 
Finally, Johnson used a direct quotation from what he had said on the 
contract negotiation problem Involving rail workers.
That Johnson used quotations from statements of Elsenhower and 
Kennedy In voluntaries was noted In the previous chapter. The same 
pattern, but to a lesser extent at times, appear In answers. In 1965. 
L.B.J. referred to or quoted remarks of former President Elsenhower 
In twelve of his press conferences. In eight of those meetings the 
references or direct quotations appeared In answers, Johnson's stra­
tegy was to add the authoritative weight of former presidents to his 
own policies, especially those on the war In Southeast Asia. On 
April 8, the day after a major speech at Johns Hopkins University, 
L.B.J. presented his new advisor on Vietnam, Eugene Black. After an 
answer by Black to a reporter’s question, Johnson mentioned to repor­
ters that he had talked with Elsenhower about selecting Black for 
the post. With reference to the former chief executive, Johnson said, 
" . . . I talked to him and he said that he had listened to the speech 
last evening with great interest. And he commended my approval of—  
my selection of Mr. Black and the general statement I made with regard 
to his work, and he sent his good wishes to Mr. Black. ..."
The President also offered the testimony of others to support 
points he made in his answers. The 1968 "Report of the National
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Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders" and Johnson's response to it 
was questioned by a newsman on March 22 of that year. In a lengthy 
answer Johnson explained what he and the executive branch had done 
with the report. To prove that his reactions to the recommendations 
of the committee, expressed in directives to cabinet officials, had 
been carried out, he read aloud one report from the Department of Com­
merce.
Narration
President Johnson used narration from time to time. He some­
times liked to give details on the progression of events leading up 
to certain decisions, actions, or statements. For example, in the 
last three conferences on March 12, 1966, held In connection with 
the National Governors' Conference, Johnson was asked about "the 
unanimous support given . . .  by the Governors on . . . Vietnam 
policy." Johnson expressed his pleasure and recounted specific 
events, including the moving, seconding, and voting on the resolu­
tion which approved L.B.J.'s Vietnam war philosophy.
Comparison
The President sometimes used analogies or comparisons in develop­
ing his replies. In Johnson's conference of September 8, 1966, is the 
following exchange:
Q. Mr. President, is there any way that you can give us 
an idea of the specifics of what this action will take out of 
the economy in the way of dollars or percentages of increase?
The President. That would depend entirely on the individ­
ual. Some fellows that are building a big plant will go on 
building it anyway. Others will say, "Well, if I can postpone 
it a year I can get 7 percent, and I will wait."
We know only this: that we will not be providing a bonus
to someone to build something we don't want built.
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In the seme conference. In answer to a query on the economy, Johnson 
employed a common comparison. He said. In part, "When the accelerator
Is down you want to get up to the limit of 60. You were going ^ 0, and
you got up to 60. It is now 70 and on the way to 80. So we said 'Let's
take the foot off the accelerator until it gets back down to 60 and
we will look at It there . . ."'
Anecdotes
Once in a while, L.B.J. employed a type of support which seemed 
characteristic of some of his Informal speaking on certain occasions. 
Anecdotes, stories, and remlnlscenses of his own experiences (and 
those of others) appeared in answers from time to time.
After President Johnson's 1966 "Columbus Day Trip" he returned 
to Washington, D.C. and held a televised conference on October 13*
Near the close of the question period L.B.J. was asked for his reflec­
tions. He expressed pleasure for what he had seen and heard during 
his travel. Johnson Indicated that his reception in the places he 
had visited contrasted with the criticisms he had been reading back 
in the nation's capitol. He said, "I might be like Uncle Ezra, you 
know. The doctor told him he had to quit drinking If he would improve 
his hearing. When he went back, the doctor said, 'Well, are you still 
drinking?' He said, 'Yes.' The doctor said, 'I told you you would 
have to quit it to improve your hearing.' He said, 'Well, Doctor,
I like what I drink so much better than what I hear that I just didn't 
take your prescription!'" L.B.J. ended the conference, saying, " . . .  
when -I get out and see the people . . .  I like what I see and hear so 
much better than what I read that it may reflect itself."
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Conferences on occasions of personal Importance, such as birth­
days, sometimes led to reminiscing. On August 27, 1966, Johnson 
interacted with newsmen at his Texas ranch. He recounted "memories*1 
of his childhood and early political life. At one point he recalled 
that David Dubinsky had influenced him In the 1930's. He expressed 
pride in his own accomplishments over the years. Later on, he said, 
" . . .  when I get home and Mrs. Davis, who runs the ranch for us, 
tells me that her little Negro daughter is a runner-up in the Stone­
wall School, I get great satisfaction to see the progress that has 
been made." In the same "answer," which ran about twenty minutes, 
he went on to mention other experiences. For instance he talked 
about his recent trip to Denver and progress in providing housing 
for "Negroes." He mentioned conversations he had had with Senator 
Everett Dirksen and with a publisher in Denver. Still on the sub­
ject of minority housing, Johnson said, "My father supported Jim 
Ferguson for Governor in 191^ . He was running for office on building 
more red schoolhouses, building better roads to our market places 
and to our cities, and having a tenant purchase program where a 
tenant could go and buy his home. ..." Johnson continued by citing 
experiences he had had with various political leaders such as Senators 
Jacob Javlts and John Aiken, Attorneys General Robert Kennedy and 
Nicholas Katzenbach, and Presidents Eisenhower and Franklin Roosevelt.
Johnson also recounted recent experiences on occasion. In the 
brief conference of January 19, 1968, the announcement of Clark Clif­
ford's nomination was made and a few questions came up. In response 
to one question on why Clifford was selected, Johnson wanted to show 
that he had just that day made the decision. Toward the end of his
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reply, L.B.J. said, "I saw some squib that some speculative reporter 
wrote that indicated he £ciifford_37 might be under consideration 
for this assignment. I commented to him at a social affair one 
evening, *1 understand you are a candidate for the Secretary of De­
fense. 1 He flushed a little bit and said he was not a candidate; 
he was not."
Of course, Johnson used other types or methods of support in 
his answers. He used details, specific examples, explanations, 
literal comparisons and contrasts, and even visual supports from 
time to time.
But the development of his answers (when Johnson did develop 
points made in his replies) was enough like the development Johnson 
used in his press conference voluntaries that further attention to 
this aspect is probably not necessary here. What seems more interest­
ing and important is a treatment of the responses from another view­
point. Various techniques which are rather unlike traditional 
supporting materials or methods of development appeared so fre­
quently in Johnson's replies that they merit separate consideration.
Johnson's Responsiveness
Lyndon Johnson responded to questions in different ways in terms 
of style and content. To varying degrees he was able to answer ques­
tions and thereby satisfy the needs of the public and the press. How 
and to what extent he avoided questions fluctuated, too. Many of 
Johnson's replies were more of the nature of comments to reporters 
rather than statements on the Issues the correspondents raised in 
their inquiry. That is, in talking to reporters, mapy of his replies 
seem to have been designed either to control or to spar with the press.
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The nature of Johnson's replies, then, may be discussed In terms of 
his attempts at (1) controlling and (2) fencing with reporters, and 
(3) approaching and (*») avoiding questions. Each of these four general 
types of replying Is discussed below. Attention to more specific 
maneuvers associated with each type and examples are also given.
This approach to press conference answers permits a description 
as well as evaluation in terms of audience adaptation and with regard 
for the purposes of the press, the president, and the public.
Controlling
That Johnson wanted to exert control In his press conferences, 
including what he said In his voluntaries and answers, has been 
established, lhe President wanted to regulate the news conference 
In different ways. He determined scheduling and length. Voluntaries 
were used to control content and emphasis. L.B.J.'s answers frequently 
functioned to Influence what newsmen asked, how they asked, and what 
they did with the answers. The two main forms of controlling responses 
may be called "anticipatory" and "directive." Anticipatory responses 
reflected the President's planning and preparation. Directive respon­
ses were those aimed at the reporters themselves rather than at con­
tent of the questions. Further explanation and illustration follow.
President Johnson's replies often reveal planning. He anticipated 
answering certain questions by preparing statements, reading remarks 
aloud, interjecting answers, interrupting, and cutting off questions.
Some of the answers seem to have been carefully prepared. The 
questions on Clark Clifford's nomination (January 19# 1968) elicited 
biographical details which were extremely specific in an answer 
which was rather long. The preparation probably was fruitful. It
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has bean aeen hew handily L.B.J. could recite statistics. He probab­
ly briefed himself so that he could provide these data In the flow of 
his answers. Preparation helped Insure that certain Information would 
get to the news media. Such preparation can be desirable for all 
conference participants. It can provide accurate information for the 
public and the press, and may even convey a good impression of the 
president.
At times planning was even more obvious. The President read 
parts of some of his replies and recited quotations. In one impromp­
tu meeting with the press, February 27, 1967, L.B.J. read a long quo­
tation by former War Secretary Henry Stlmson and recited a statement 
by Lincoln in two separate answers on Vietnam. It appears that John­
son had planned these replies, even though the conference was without 
advance notice. The occasional reading and reciting of replies may 
have helped Johnson forward something he had prepared. Variety was 
added to the content. But whether all of what he read or recited was 
of value to the press or the public is in doubt.
Another type of anticipatory response was interjection. When 
Johnson was not asked a question for which he had prepared an answer, 
he sometimes simply interjected the statement. He did this on 
January 23, 196^ , on the subject of his personal finances. He 
seemed to be saying that since he knew that the press was interested 
In the topic, but for some reason had not asked, he would go ahead 
and supply the reply. Once in a while, if Johnson did not seem to 
like the implication of a question he might cut in and make a state­
ment. For Instance, in a conference on June 17, 1965. one reporter 
began, "Mr. President, since you made a recent speech, you expressed
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a willingness end acceptance of the fact that your foreign policy was 
very subject to public discussion and such open remarks as this— 1 
Johnson Interjected, "I have always believed that," as if to say the 
reporter was implying that L.B.J.'s "willingness" to grant "public 
discussion" was something new. A more formal kind of interjection 
has been considered in the previous chapter in which it was noted 
that sometimes Johnson put announcements and statements during or at 
the end of press conferences. Interjected voluntaries may have re­
sulted from having no stimulus questions at times. Again, inter­
jecting unrequested answers may have allowed Johnson to satisfy his 
own needs but not necessarily the needs of the press or public. What 
Johnson did interject does not seem important enough to warrant an 
interruption of a speaker or the flow of questioning. In fact, the 
device may have irritated reporters unnecessarily.
Anticipatory interruption appeared in several conferences for 
another reason. That is, the President occasionally interrupted a 
reporter because he apparently felt he knew what the reporter wanted 
to know and that there was little to be gained by hearing the com­
pleted inquiry. Whether he was anxious to tackle or reject the issue, 
or whether he felt sure he knew what the question would be, Johnson 
cut in and replied. An instance appears in the transcript for 
May 21, 1966, in which a correspondent asked about "diplomatic ef­
forts" to reach peace. During the question, Johnson interrupted and 
said " . . .  We are working on it every day. We will as long as I am 
President. I think that answers the only way I can now. I assume 
your next one will be to please tell what is going on." Apparently 
knowing what the follow-up question would be, he then answered that.
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On occasion the interruption was used to stop or disallow an 
lnquixy. In the July JO, 19^» meeting Helen Thomas began, "I just 
wanted to know if you thought elective office was sort of a— " 
Johnson stopped her, saying, "I don't think 1 want to get into that. 
You might place the wrong construction on something like that. I am 
doing vty best to keep you all active." The topic had been the quali­
ties L.B.J. expected in a vice presidential candidate. Johnson 
seemed not to want further discussion on the issue.
Most such interruptions appeared in non-broadcast conference, 
but not exclusively. For instance, on June 1, 1965t following 
Instance from a televised meeting occurred:
Q. Mr. President, I would like to ask you two questions 
about the Dominican rebellion, one dealing with its origin 
and one dealing with the possible future. Do you think that 
it would have been helpful if Juan Bosch had returned; and do 
you think he might have exercised a restraining influence on 
some of the left-wing extremists, or Communists, who are in 
there? And secondly—
The President. I will answer your first one. I don't 
want to get into personalities. Go ahead.
The habit of interrupting newsmen was probably not a contribu­
tion to good give and take. The device may have aided Johnson in 
some way, but it also may have revealed excessive anxiety about con­
trolling the questioning, if not the questioner. In fact, Johnson 
may have missed the intent of particular queries because his mind 
seemed set to expect a specific question and because he did not per­
mit a correspondent to complete an idea expressed interrogatively.
The anticipatory devices of preparing, reading, interjecting, 
and interrupting were used to control the questioning and to permit 
the President to disseminate material he was eager to release in 
press conferences. Most of those devices probably did little to
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■eat the needs of the press and the public, although they have helped 
Johnson on occasion.
A second type of control was more directive in nature. In a 
number of conferences the President tried to influence the press 
through less subtle means. He Instructed, requested, and appealed 
to newsmen on various matters in order to guide the questioning and 
the reporting which followed the conferences.
Sometimes President Johnson was didactic in his answers directed 
toward the press. That is, he told them what he wanted or expected 
them to do.
The President responded to some questions by saying that report­
ers should go to other sources, apparently in order to avoid answering 
in a press conference. On September 21, 1966, * newsman wanted to know 
"how much the war in Vietnam is costing and how much it has been cost­
ing from day to day," saying that Defense Secretary Robert McNamara 
and other ’’U.S. Officials” had been unable t.o provide the data. John­
son told the reporter to read the appropriate congressional reports, 
saying ” . . .  I would commend to you some homework. Go read the hear­
ings.”
In a number of Johnson's impromptu conferences the President direc­
ted reporters to what kind of questions (in terms of topics) were de­
sirable. He might say, as he did August 18, 196^ +, "I don't want to
get into a general press conference.”
In other conferences L.B.J. tried to explain to reporters how to
interpret his remarks to the public. For instance, on November 1, 1967,
a questioner wanted to know if his understanding of what L.B.J. had 
said in a prior answer was "fair to say.” Johnson replied, "No, 1 am
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not saying that. If you don't know what I said, I hope you will read 
It. I didn't say that at all. Hy Job, as I have said to my press 
friends so many times, is to prevent a fight, not to provoke one. You 
have a different responsibility. I respect your position on the mat­
ter. I recognise It and I feel It." (lhe "fight" Johnson referred 
to was Implied by the questioner's interpretation which implied that 
the President was blaming congress for a slump in the stock market.)
Since the President does control most aspects of his news con­
ferences, most of the instructive remarks seem harmless. Perhaps he 
might have been more tactful on occasion. To avoid confusion, he 
might have been more forceful In his announcement period on outlining 
what kind of questions were appropriate on occasions when he limited 
the scope of the questioning. Telling reporters how to report or in­
terpret what he said may have been self-serving, but may also have been 
clarifying for the press.
Another approach to directing the press was less didactic and 
more suggestive In style. Johnson sometimes made requests of report­
ers. For example. Instead of denying reporters the chance to ask 
questions on a particular topic, he might ask for postponement. L.B.J. 
did this on the topic of Vietnam In response to a question In the 
July 19, 1966, conference. He said, in part, "I would like to get 
in the war picture and Vietnam tomorrow, if I could." Indeed, he 
held a conference the next day and responded to several questions on 
the topic.
Perhaps a more important kind of request to reporters was one 
for clarification. An occurrence of this appeared in the September 2, 
1967, meeting in which Johnson interjected a lengthy announcement on
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a now authorisation to ship wheat to India. One newsman asked about 
the effect of the "closing of the Sues Canal" on the shipment. Johnson 
asked, " . . .  I am not sure what you mean by interference.' Do you 
mean delay or something?" ("Delay" was meant.) This sort of request, 
while rare in appearance, could be very valuable to the President and 
to the press since the wording of answers on important matters like 
foreign affairs can easily be misconstrued or misunderstood.
In some of his conferences L.B.J. seemed to be appealing to the 
press. For example, he might invite reporters to continue a certain 
line of questioning, as he did on February 27, 1967, in an impromptu 
conference. He had been talking about Vietnam in response to a follow- 
up question. At the close of his response, Johnson said, "Do you 
want to follow through on that?" When the correspondent said "no," 
L.B.J. said, "I don't think we have to be limited in this conference. 
One of the things I think about an exchange of questions like this, 
if you ask a question you can follow through, which you don't always 
get to do on TV." The reporter then explained to the President that 
he did not want to "follow through" because Johnson's answer had suf­
ficed. Other times the President seemed to appeal for a certain em­
phasis to be placed on his remarks as they were to be reported. In a 
conference on March 22, during the 1966 election campaigns, Johnson 
seemed eager to get across a point on his relations with congress.
A reporter asked if L.B.J. would campaign and "explain" those attitudes. 
The President replied, "I am explaining my attitude now, and that is 
why I want you to help me. My attitude is good. ..." He went on 
to develop the point.
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A final, and rather minor, form of directive remark which showed 
up In some conferences was made to Indicate a sequence of questioners 
when it appeared that some reporters were anxious to get in a ques­
tion yet, perhaps, feared they would be denied the opportunity. On 
occasion Johnson would Indicate that he understood the difficulty 
and promised to allow a given newsman or two a chance in a particular 
order. This was generally done in a brief, tactful remark and proba­
bly helped the press and the President.
Most of Johnson's directive controls were probably innocuous.
The didactic statements in answers usually were not highly valuable.
The best directives were probably those which requested clarification 
from the questioner. The unsubtle appeals for press aid, while proba­
bly spontaneous and honest, seem to have been unnecessary, at best.
Fencing
As Press Secretary George Christian noted (see Chapter Two), 
President Johnson enjoyed sparring with reporters. The press con­
ference seemed to draw out a debating approach to the situation. Many 
of Johnson’s press conference replies, whether eventually responsive 
to the topics brought up, seem to have been directed at the questioner. 
Johnson's fencing Included interrupting, demanding sources, brow­
beating, humoring, kidding and joking, being personal, arguing, counter 
questioning, correcting^ and attacking questions or questioners. These 
devices came up more frequently in the non-broadcast meetings. They 
also appeared often and throughout Johnson's administration. More­
over, they were too frequent and probably did little to better L.B.J.'s 
press or public relations. Johnson sometimes appeared abrupt and 
sarcastic, sometimes caustic and relentless, if not rather defensive
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and Insecure in his jousting. When he used tact and humor, however, 
the effect was probably honorific for all participants.
Fencing responses account for portions of particular replies or 
consist in all of what was said in answer to given questions. Below 
are examples of the various ways Johnson sparred with the press.
One method Johnson used was interrupting the questioner to find 
out the source(s) behind an idea. An illustration from the January 13» 
1966, conference is typical, and went as follows.
Q. Mr. President, in connection with the appointments 
in the Housing and Urban Development Department, there have 
been reports that a task force headed by Dr. Wood recom­
mended—
The President. What reports? I want to know who reports 
what so I can see if it is—
Q. There have been published reports in the newspapers.
The President. Whose?
Q. There have been published reports in newspapers.
The President. Who published it? That's what I want 
to know. I don't want to comment on something that--
Q. Well, I saw something in the Washington Post.
The President. All right, go ahead. The Washington 
Post. Now, what did the Washington Post say?
Q. That a task force headed by Professor Wood had 
recommended the transfer of the Community Action Program 
from the Office of Economic Opportunity to the new Depart­
ment, and there have been subsequent reports that you have 
decided against this. Can you make any comment on that?
The President, X would say that so far as the report 
that I have made a decision on the matter, I would say it 
is more propaganda than accurate. I have made no decision.
I have not been called upon to make any decision. We will, 
in the days ahead, consider a good many reorganization 
proposals, but the best authority for a Presidential deci­
sion is the President or the President's Press Secretary, 
and you can always get guidance on that, if you have the 
time or the disposition to obtain it.
Q. That's why I asked you.
The President. Well, you got it. /Laughter^/ That's 
why I told you!
A bit later in that meeting L.B.J. explained that he was "sensitive 
sometimes" when he ran across statements and decisions falsely attri­
buted to him in the news media. So, often, when a reporter mentioned
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* source In a general or vague way, Johnson was not reluctant to seek 
out the source.
Questioning sources gave Johnson, on occasion, an opportunity 
to avoid questions with an apparent lack of factual basis. For exam­
ple, at noon on the Saturday before Johnson's announcement not to 
seek reelection, a newsman raised an inquiry based upon "a story a 
week ago" which predicted that L.B.J. would not announce his politi­
cal plans "until the August convention in Chicago." Johnson got the 
questioner to admit that the source was a "dope story." The President 
said he would not discuss such reports.
Interrupting and probing correspondents for sources may have been 
useful to the President, considering his own goals. Again, however, 
more tact might have helped him get along with even hostile reporters. 
Since Johnson was not known to react too tactlessly in broadcast con­
ferences, his image with the public probably was not directly affected. 
The interruptions may have inhibited those reporters who did not like 
to mention their sources. Such reporters may have felt reluctant to 
confront the President with certain kinds of information, perhaps 
important data, because of the possibility of being challenged.
Another fencing device was sarcasm. It usually appeared in the 
way Johnson responded, rather than as an answer alone. For instance, 
on April 25, 1968, a reporter asked L.B.J. to reveal what he had said 
to a group of congressional aides in a speech earlier in the day.
The President replied that his meeting had been "off the record."
Ending the reply, he said, "I didn't tell them anything you haven't 
already known for a long, long time— so don't feel sorry for your­
selves ."
2^1
Another Instance came up In the February 11* 1966, conference.
The press pushed Johnson for the title of Bill Moyers, asking exactly 
who should be considered "Press Secretary." After six questions to 
get Johnson's answer, L.B.J. finally said that Moyer's title was "Spe­
cial Assistant to the President." He continued, "It has always been 
that. You can call him Press Secretary, though, if it gives you any 
thrill." Still pressing the issue was the next question, "Mr. Presi­
dent, I would like to know your preference." Johnson finally con­
ceded that he had understood the problem and that he really did not 
"object" to naming Moyers "Press Secretary." Although the entire 
exchange took only three or four minutes, it was probably wasted time. 
Further, Johnson's phrase, such as "nursing the press," seems tact­
less.
Johnson's sarcasm more frequently prevailed in non-broadcast 
conferences. In any event, it probably added little to presidential 
relations with the press generally or with a good question and answer 
period in a specific meeting.
At times Johnson's sparring with the press resembled debating.
In a number of conferences Johnson seemed to "turn the tables" on 
his questioner, attack the question or the questioner in some way, 
or label the question in order to dismiss it.
Sometimes President Johnson became defensive. In a broadcast 
conference on March 13, 1965, he was asked why he had waited almost 
a week to meet reporters and discuss problems in Selma, Alabama. 
Johnson answered that "nothing . . either required or justified" his 
meeting reporters sooner. He went on to point out that he "should 
have some leeway" in deciding when to have conferences. He said he
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had had "46" of then already and that only he would decide on the 
timing, location, and content of his conferences.
To answer some queries Johnson told reporters to decide for 
themselves. On September 1, 1967, a correspondent asked L.B.J. to 
respond to some remarks made by Governor George Romney. Johnson's 
answer was, "I'll just let you judge that statement. You could be
more objective." In another meeting, August 9, 1966, a reporter
presented some seemingly contradictory figures on an economic issue. 
Johnson retorted, "I would let you reconcile it," and then went on
to admit that he was unable to answer the question.
Two month's after Johnson's March 31* 196B, peace proposal,
Robert Pierpoint asked Johnson about statements made by Nguyen Van 
Thleu and Dean Rusk which "seemed to have changed the administra­
tion's position" on the proposal. Johnson began his reply by saying, 
"Mr. Pierpoint. I would think the key word in your question is 
'seem.' It does not seem that way to Secretary Rusk. As Mr. Chris­
tian informed you yesterday, it does not seem that way to the Presi­
dent." Johnson was apparently saying, why ask a question you already 
know the answer to? But he talked for about five minutes on the general 
topic, perhaps to prove that nothing had changed in his policy.
President Johnson held a conference, with several governors pre­
sent, on September 29, 1966, in which some rather testy replies ap­
peared. To one inquiry about a forthcoming conference on the war, 
Johnson twice told reporters that they had already been briefed on 
that topic. The second time Johnson said, "For the eighteenth time 
I will repeat: Mr. Moyers will tell you as soon as 1 have made any
plans." To another question on "some confusion . . . about the Viet­
nam budget" L.B.J. said, "Yes. I learned about that about 25 years
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ago. Bill Whits used to represent the Associated Press long before 
he got demoted by going to the New York Times. He used to come In 
my office and he was always confused. By the time I got him uncon­
fused I found a big story on the front page involving me that took 
me a week to get myself unconfused." Johnson went on to say that he 
had already answered the question before. He made a long attack on 
"people's impressions" and on "speculation." The attack became almost 
vitriolic. At one point Johnson said, "In the meantime anybody that 
gets an impression, intimation, hunch, dream, or a little marijuana 
is going to mislead somebody because I don't know myself." Ending the 
reply, he said, "Is that true, Governors? Do any of you have any com­
ment on it? If you have any impressions, give them here now."
A variation of requesting sources was attacking statements which 
supplied content for questions. An inquiry on the possibility of 
Robert McNamara's resignation came up on September 1, 1967 • L.B.J. 
said, "That is the most ridiculous nonsensical report that I have 
seen, I think, since I have been President."
The President sometimes argued that questions were unanswerable 
because they were hypothetical, strictly speaking. On April 20, 196*f, 
a newsman wanted to know what Johnson would do if a current railroad 
strike could not be settled by negotiation. Before the reporter could 
finish the question, Johnson cut in and said, "That is an 'iffy' ques­
tion, and you know I don't want to admit it is about to fail to work 
or predict it wouldn't work. ..." Having labelled the question, 
Johnson then went on to say what he probably would do if the strike 
could not be settled without his intervention.
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Die President also corrected reporters on occasion. IVrice in his 
November 1, 1967» meeting Johnson seemed to be attacking the press in 
his corrections. In a reply to a question on legislation which had 
not passed, L.B.J. said, " . . .  Now, the press this morning called 
these measures 'must bills' and that is your credibility, not ours.
You call them priority bills. I have gone through this for about 35 
years. ..." In answer to a later question, he replied, "First, I 
want to correct you before you get a credibility charge. I didn't say 
anything about a stable economy. I spoke of a prosperous economy." 
Johnson continued by explaining the distinction.
Much of Johnson's fencing with reporters left a pejorative im­
pression. In some conferences, however, Johnson seemed to have been 
more personable. Although the transcripts indicate that Johnson 
rarely addressed his Inquisitor's by name, except in the televised 
conferences, he sometimes appears quite friendly with reporters. In 
some conferences he was even a bit playful, or humorous, in his re­
plies.
In January of 1966 Senator Mike Mansfield, speaking for the 
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Issued a report of a visit to 
Vietnam. The President devoted a good deal of his "State of the 
Union" speech to Vietnam on January 12, 1966. On January 13, a report­
er asked, "Mr. President, do you think that your report to the Nation 
coincides with Mansfield's report on Vietnam?" Johnson responded, "No-- 
lt was somewhat later." Later in the same news conference was a ques­
tion about "women in the military service." The questioner said that 
he had heard that some of these women were "distressed" because they 
were not being sent to Vietnam. In reply, L.B.J. said, "Well, there
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Is slvays a ohance of anything taking place when our women are suffi­
ciently distressed. ..."
The President's last press conference in the year 19^7 showed 
some of Johnson's wit. At the beginning of the meeting L.B.J. had 
announced the appointment of Leonard Chapman to Commandant of the 
Marine Corps. Someone asked, "Mr. President, is he being nominated 
for four stars?" Here Is Johnson's reply, including explanatory 
notes in the transcript: "The Commandant may carry that— I'm not
sure. I don't know how to— / At this point. Deputy Press Secretary 
Robert H. Fleming handed the President a note. 7 He says not to 
touch the mike. Stand here. / Laughter. 7 Don't want any specu­
lation to start. I have heard about these notes being passed before, 
so I want to clear that up right now." Another question was whether 
Johnson would "see Mr. Vance tomorrow." The reply was, "Yes, if he 
is here." The next question referred to Joseph Alsop's column that 
day. Alsop had reported the "fact" that Johnson's cabinet had "made 
a promise to . . . stay through the 1968 elections." Johnson began 
his answer, "I don't recall it," which again evoked laughter in the 
December b conference.
Generally, most of L.B.J.'s fencing with the press showed up in 
non-broadcast, impromptu conferences. His interruptions, demands for 
sources, corrections, debating, and sarcasm simply may have reflected 
his personality or mood. While the sparring may have been harmless, 
it also may have shown some unwarranted defensiveness. These tactics 
may have alienated some correspondents. Perhaps more tact, humor, 
and even a more personal approach in the informal meetings might have 
improved Johnson's rapport with the press and thereby increased his 
general effectiveness with media representatives.
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The view of Johnson's controlling and fencing techniques gives 
partial Insight into how he responded to questions, especially how 
he reacted to the press in the conferences. The next two sections 
treat Johnson's responsiveness to questions in terms of his abilities 
to supply the press and the public with useful facts and opinions.
Approaching
When Johnson wanted to answer a question, he was apparently 
quite effective at times. Although he frequently generalized, he 
usually went beyond a mere "yes" or "no" when he chose to fulfill 
reporters' needs. He also was quite effective in answers serving his 
own specific alms. Examples of answers which served those alms and 
the discussion of Johnson's methods of development revealed much of 
how the President went about providing answers which were, to varying 
degrees, positively responsive to the questions. The present dis­
cussion reviews and extends what was said in connection with L.B.J.'s 
purposes and supporting materials.
While a good many of correspondents' questions were phrased so 
that, technically speaking, a "yes" or "no" would have been a legiti­
mate response, President Johnson frequently went beyond that kind of 
reply in order to explain or justify. Johnson's more responsive answers 
may be characterized as "backgrounding," repeating, expanding, exhaust­
ing, generalizing, arguing, and appealing. These terms point to what 
Johnson did in his answers. Explanations and illustrations of each 
technique appear in what follows.
"Backgrounding" refers in part to the answer categories which 
prior presidents, such as Franklin Roosevelt, used. Johnson rarely 
Invoked the "background," "deep background," or "off-the-record"
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answers In his official news conferences. The few times he did were 
In 1964 and early in 1965. Because he and his staff met reporters 
for "backgrounding" sessions rather frequently. It may have seemed 
unnecessary to classify the responses in the official press confer­
ences. Not employing the traditional answer types may have prevented 
confusion, awkward shifting from category to category, and a sense of 
uncomfortable delay between question and answer.
Since It is not specifically known what Johnson said in his "deep 
background" or "off-the-record" replies, evaluation is not appropriate 
here. On the other hand, a number of Johnson's answers were of the 
background style. Such replies provided the press with details on 
the President's activities and programs and may have helped reporters 
prepare materials for news stories. Like Johnson's voluntaries which 
briefed correspondents, narration, Itineraries, and explanations 
appear.
Frequently, President Johnson responded to questions with a repe­
tition or restatement of something he had said to another group or in 
another situation on the same topic. Whether as part of an answer or 
as all of what he said, repetition and restatement were used most com­
monly in reply to questions on policy, questions looking for previously 
unannounced data, and questions which repeated or followed up previous 
inquiries. This method of reply probably added little to public infor­
mation and in most cases did not aid the press in getting news. John­
son apparently used the device for rhetorical effect only.
On July 24, 1964, Johnson began a press conference with opening 
statements, including remarks on American policy in Southeast Asia.
The voluntary was rather general. It included this statement: "Other
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friends suggest that this problem must be moved to a conference table. 
..." but that "The North" did not seem able to "honor existing agree­
ments." A newsman asked Johnson to respond to a proposition by Charles 
de Gaulle which suggested that the United States and France, Communist 
China and the Soviet Union "all . . . get out of Indochina and leave 
them to settle their own problems themselves. . . " L.B.J. simply 
repeated the point he had made in his voluntary about "those who are 
ignoring the agreements reached at the conference table."
Again, on March 2, 1967, a reporter queried Johnson on policy in 
Vietnam. The answer began with a repetition of previous arguments 
Johnson had made. For example, Johnson said that North Vietnamese 
"violation of two solemn agreements" (195^  and 1962 "Geneva Declara­
tions") had caused American intervention and that "they" had made 
no effort to settle the war because of continued "aggression." The 
points Johnson made were not at all new and seemed only to reinforce 
what L.B.J. had said many times before.
Beyond mere repetition in answers was the technique of expanding 
a point. That is, Johnson frequently wanted to go further than a "yes" 
or a "no."
President Johnson sometimes felt the need to explain or justify 
his actions. For instance, on September 30, 1967, he was asked if he 
planned to request congress for "specific cuts in programs." In a 
lengthy reply L.B.J. explained that he had not asked for cuts because 
he was waiting for congressional action on various bills. The answer 
shifted the responsibility for action to congress and seemed to justi­
fy his waiting to trim the appropriations. A simple "no" might have 
been unresponsive without the exposition. Further, Johnson's reply
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might have helped the press and the public understand how the President 
Interacted with congress in budgetary matters.
Sometimes the expansion of a reply was used to amplify or heighten 
what was said. For instance, on January 13. 1966, the day after L.B.J.'s 
"State of the Union," a newsman queried the President on the "reaction" 
to the speech. The response was "very good," according to Johnson.
He went on to show why he felt the response was favorable, mentioning 
"50-odd applauses," "messages," and "wires."
Generally speaking, most of Johnson's attempts to expand what he 
said were apparently useful. While this type of answer probably did 
not provide exciting "news," it supplied reporters with materials for 
stories and sometimes helped explain Johnson's reasoning.
A less useful device is called "exhausting." In this type of 
response Johnson seemed to seize an issue and talk at length without 
really providing new insights. He seemed to be trying to cover as 
many aspects of an issue as possible, to answer all major objections 
to a policy, or to review all salient arguments he could make. He 
was, in effect, giving a speech on a broader topic than what the 
stimulus question had brought up. It is possible that by this Johnson 
felt he could end discussion or questioning on a particular subject.
Or, perhaps, he wanted to demonstrate his ability to speak on the 
issue. By speaking for five or six minutes, he was limiting the time 
available for other topics, Just as he had done with some of his ex­
tensive voluntaries on Vietnam and the econony. In fact, those two 
Issues were commonly the subjects of bombardment in some of L.B.J.'s 
replies. Further, the content and style of such replies were very 
similar to that of the voluntaries which had similar aims behind them.
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Less preparation and polish appeared In some of the protracted answers 
than in the laborious voluntaries. Johnson was evidently able to 
speak at length, either extemporaneously or on an impromptu basis, 
on certain themes. Indeed, he had done so on the economy and on the 
war so often that little preparation was probably necessary for his 
short speeohes which existed in the form of answers. This device 
of exhausting a topic appeared Just as often in Johnson's televised 
conferences as in his less formal meetings. In the broadcast meetings, 
however, employing this device probably was not effective except in 
terms of Johnson's own purposes. The types of reply seem to have 
been inappropriate for press conferences because the aim was usually 
propagandists (and probably obviously so to the press), usually too 
time consuming, and usually not very responsive to the basic needs 
of the press and the public. The exhaustive replies may have aliena­
ted the press and bored the public because they were long and often 
little more than restatements of other Presidential communications.
The President sometimes moderated the length of these replies, but 
the "over kill" effect seemed to predominate anyway.
President Johnson's May 3. 1968, broadcast conference Illustrates 
how he sometimes employed the device. In that meeting the opening 
statements took only about two minutes. The length of Johnson's re­
plies allowed only eleven questions. None of the questions were longer 
than the average of fifteen to thirty seconds a piece. In answer to 
one query regarding the possibility of a tax increase's passing con­
gress, L.B.J. began with a point on budgetary "needs" for the tax.
He then reviewed his economic policies and practices, describing some 
of his requests in 1966 and 1967. Next came a detailed discussion of
251
currant works in the congressional committees responsible for the tax 
Mil. Johnson used the opportunity to chastise legislators for "this 
continued procrastination" and to argue, again, the need for the tax. 
The reply took about six or seven minutes to deliver. With this rather 
typical type of response the news conference became a public forum for 
presidential persuasion.
Another instance occurred in the June 1, 19&5* news conference. 
Johnson announced the removal of Marines from the Dominican Republic. 
Many of the q\iestions had to do with the situation in that country.
The last questioner inquired about Juan Bosch's role in the conflict 
and about the future of government in the Dominican Republic. John­
son had already reviewed some of the activities involving the United 
States in other replies and in his voluntary on the topic. Neverthe­
less, he took the opportunity provided by the last query to spell out 
again, in more detail, events of the crisis. The answer seemed to be 
a defense of United States involvement. L.B.J. said, for example,
"Our citizens were under the beds and in the closets and trying to 
dodge the gunfire." Narration was colored with emotion. Inter­
spersed was praise for the military and diplomatic personnel. John­
son neither discussed Bosch nor did he speculate on the country's 
future. He merely dramatized and justified American involvement.
The justification may have been called for, not by the question, but 
by criticisms. Johnson's explanation was suasory in nature and did 
not relate to foreign policy rationale, except for Johnson's hint 
that "Communists . . . were active" in the hostilities. Further, the 
answer's content seems to have provided little new information. End­
ing the conference with this long response also postponed further or
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other Inquiry, which might have proven valuable. Once more the Presi­
dent's needs seem to have been met at the expense of the press, if not 
the public as well.
Generalizing was a technique related to repeating and exhausting. 
That is, repetitive responses and exhaustive replies sometimes totally 
or largely were made up of generalizations, summaries, or broad state­
ments of opinion. The President answered in generalities in many re­
plies. He did not go beyond broad statements and supply specific 
development. Johnson could generalize briefly or at length. More­
over, such answers were often expressions of policy or philosophy.
Answers which were partially or wholly general were probably 
antithetical in terms of reporter's interest. As for the larger audi­
ence, this type of reply probably added little knowledge. For those
who were unaware of Johnson's policies, however, some of these replies 
may have provided capsulized summaries, especially when the President's 
policies or philosophies emerged. Like repeating, the device appar­
ently was used for emphasis or to provide a semblance of response when 
more concrete data was not at hand.
A few days before a visit to the United States by India's Premier, 
Mrs. Indira Gandhi, Johnson met reporters. In this press conference, 
on March 23, 1966, a correspondent asked about what Johnson and Mrs. 
Gandhi planned to discuss. Here is the answer:
Q. Mr. President, can you say anything at all about 
what you may be discussing with Prime Minister Gandhi?
The President. . . .1 am looking forward with a great 
deal of pleasure to seeing the Prime Minister again. We
have met on several occasions. Mrs. Johnson and I spent
some time with her when we were in her country in 1961. I 
had lunch with her Ambassador today, and spent a good while 
visiting with him about the agenda.
We will be talking about our relations and what the 
American people can do, working with the people of India,
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to promote peace end prosperity. I went to hear about 
her Ideas and any suggestions she may have as to what 
we can do that we are not doing In these fields.
We will, of course, talk about some of the things 
that were on the agenda last year when a visit was 
postponed, and again when I planned to see Prime Minis­
ter Shastrl and was prevented from doing so by his 
death. We will take up where we left off there. We 
look forward to a very pleasant and very productive 
visit.
The "agenda" was probably no surprise to anyone. Neither did it 
contribute much in the way of news or valuable information.
On February 1, 196**» Johnson was asked about the future of 
South Vietnam. In a brief reply L.B.J. reiterated an argument 
that "Communist aggression" prevented "neutralization;" he con­
cluded," ... I think the course that we are following is the most 
advisable one for freedom at this point." Johnson had not made a 
major policy statement on Vietnam this early in his administration, 
although he had made the argument in previous statements. This was 
the first time in an official press conference that a request for a 
policy statement had come up. The answer appears to show that John­
son had not yet formulated much of a "perspective," as the reporter 
put it. His answer, then, merely summarized an attitude he had 
expressed previously, for example, in his "New Year's Message to the 
Chairman of the Military Revolutionary Council in South Viet-Nam," 
(released to the press on January 1, 196*0. It Is doubtful, however, 
that the reply helped either the public or the press to better under­
stand American aid to Vietnam, let alone what lay ahead.
That Johnson used the press conference for propaganda has been 
seen. A number of times he used his answers for arguing. He accused 
or blamed others for problems or apparent failures. This technique 
helped fulfill his goal of defending his administration. But Johnson
also Argued to attack his political enemies. Caustic retorts to such 
politicians as Barry Goldwater, Richard Nixon, and to those Republicans 
who opposed his Great Society programs were made in several press con­
ference answers, especially in 1964 and in 1966. Although reporters 
frequently "baited" Johnson with the criticisms of his detractors, the 
President seemed unable, especially in election years, to curb what 
was probably a natural or instinctive response. Such reactions may 
have served L.B.J. well. He could vent his feelings and, at times, 
place the blame for passage of legislation on his opponents. He may 
have been able to win public support for his own candidacy or for his 
party. Further, he often gave reporters material which probably al­
lowed the heightening of a conflict.
This type of response seems, at times, to have been undignified
and inappropriate. In April of 196^ , Richard Nixon gave talks criti­
cizing L.B.J. Nixon had returned from a trip to the Far East. In a 
press conference on April 13» a reporter asked if Nixon's remarks in 
one speecn were "based on erroneous information about Viet-Nam." John­
son replied in part, "I don't know what it was based on. I haven't
talked to Mr. Nixon. I assume that he spent a good deal of his time
out there looking after Pepsi Cola's interest. I don't know how much 
real information he got. But at least, that is what he said he was 
doing." L.B.J. went on to say that he would like to talk with his op­
ponents. He said, "I would like to have a relationship with the Repub­
lican nominee similar to the relationship I had with President Eisen­
hower, during the 8 years I was leader ..." Johnson ended the reply 
with an appeal for bipartisan efforts in foreign affairs. Had Johnson 
avoided the attack on Nixon, the answer might have appeared more pala­
table. Moreover, attempting to quiet criticism of foreign policy may
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not have been in the best interests of the public. It is understand­
able that Johnson wanted "unity," even in a political campaign, but 
attacking opponents in an attempt at unity may not have helped anyone 
but Johnson.
A final technique of Johnson's strategy is called "appealing." 
Johnson used emotional appeals to get support for his policies in his 
speech making, in his press conference voluntaries, and often in his 
answers to the press. In these answers, he approached topics for 
rhetorical purposes, circumventing the probable desires of newsmen. 
These appeals, once more, seem misplaced. It is doubtful that corres­
pondents wanted public speeches in answer to their inquiries. Never­
theless, Johnson took the opportunity a number of times to use the 
occasion for long, passionate pleas. Given the many other channels 
of communication available to a president, the use of this technique 
in the news conference probably hampered Johnson's effectiveness, 
especially with the press corps.
On March 9. 196?, Johnson used his first "live and in color" 
broadcast conference to respond to a criticism made by Arthur 
Schleslnger, Jr., on Johnson's peace efforts. L.B.J. talked about 
"the other side" which "continues to kill our men, to lob their mor­
tars into our air bases, to seize South Vietnam by force." Johnson 
continued,
But I do not think it is fair to ask an American Comman­
der in Chief to say to your men, "Ground your planes, tie 
your hands behind you, sit there and watch division after 
division come across the DMZ, and don't hit them until they 
get within a mile or two of you."
I don't think that is fair to American Marines or 
American soldiers.
We have talked before while acts of war continued. We 
did that in Korea. We had the blockade on in Berlin while 
we had conferences.
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So we are willing to talk unconditionally, or we are 
willing to talk conditionally. All we ask Is equity and 
fairness, and that the other side do likewise. We don't
think you ought to ask the American boys to do one thing
while other folks do nothing.
Generally speaking, backgrounding, repeating, expanding, exhaust­
ing, generalising, arguing, and appealing were President Johnson's 
chief devices for approaching questions. For the most part the re- 
qaonses appear to have been more designed to meet L.B.J.'s aims than to 
serve the press and the public. Often the use of the techniques led
to answers which do not seem to have been appropriate for the presi­
dential press conference.
Avoiding
Whether an answer approached or avoided a question involves de­
grees. The preceding section shows how Johnson seems to have responded 
in approaching Issues. As many, if not more of Johnson's responses 
may be said to have avoided rather than approached Issues. Some of the 
devices he used for dodging are explained in this part of the chapter.
President Johnson's answers proved that he was adept at avoiding 
Issues. His abilities and the extent to which he passed over ideas is 
interesting and significant. L.B.J.'s frequent, apparent unrespon­
siveness was not surprising considering his attitudes toward the press, 
his press conference goals, and his practices of control, secrecy and 
surprise. From the standpoint of reporters, what Johnson said in his 
answers probably had less news value than what he said in opening 
statements and announcements. While questions often got "reactions," 
getting new information or significant replies was even more difficult.
Johnson employed a wide variety of devices to avoid answers.
These devices may be grouped Into three categories. Basically,
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Johnson refused to answer, referred a question to another source, 
or circumvented an Issue.
First, the President had a number of ways of refusing to answer 
questions. He eschewed the "no comment" wording, although if asked 
whether he would discuss a particular issue, he sometimes simply said 
"no." Other devices included stalling for time, discouraging a type 
or area of inquiry, rejecting or cutting off a specific question, 
denying an ability to answer, and withdrawing or generally retreating 
from questions.
One refusal technique was to stall for time. That is, Johnson 
was able to evade by telling a reporter that the question was prema­
ture. For instance, requests for names of nominees, before official­
ly announced, were usually met with the reply, "When we know, we will 
let you know." This was commonly used and Johnson rarely went beyond 
that. He did not discuss who might be under consideration or when 
the press could expect the answer. Johnson also stalled on issues 
asking for speculation or prophecy. He did, however, often express 
hope and optimism for a happy outcome on those issues,
Johnson was frequently asked about his campaign plans. In 
1964, he was asked whether he would debate the Republican nominee on 
several occasions. The question came up in L.B.J's second press 
conference, December 18, 1963. Johnson said that when he was nomina­
ted, he would decide whether to debate. He was thus able to table 
the issue for eight months.
On the question of progress in arranging peace talks, which came 
up in the October 24, 1968, meeting, Johnson put reporters off. He 
said that the October 16 statement by his press secretary was the latest
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word. Next he told of how much he wanted peace and said he was 
doing all he could toward that end. He then said, "We do not want 
to make news until there is news. And we realize that many times 
diplomacy can be more effective in private than to have all your 
discussions, recommendations, and prophesies carried in the press."
He repeated that nothing had changed and sald,"When there is anything 
to report, you will be informed."
Another refusal technique was to discourage certain kinds of 
questions. Sometimes the device worked. Other times, reporters per­
sisted. Johnson liked to discourage guessing.
In a conference held December 21, 1966, a reporter said, " . . .  
how do you feel about the speculation that you may not run again in 
1968?" Johnson replied, "I feel about that like I do most speculation. 
I have other things to do." After two other inquiries, on other af­
fairs, the question came up again. Johnson answered, " . . .  I have 
expressed myself on speculation. ..." The next question was, "I 
wonder if you could make it more direct.’ Do you intend now to run 
in 1968?" L.B.J. rephrased his reply, too. He said, "I will cross 
that bridge when I get to it. This is not 1968." There followed a 
question on whether the appearance of Attorney General Ramsey Clark 
meant Johnson planned to say anything about Clark. Johnson said, "Not 
at all. When I have an announcement, as I said, you will be the first 
to know it." No more questions on Clark's presence occurred, nor did 
L.B.J. say why his Attorney General was there.
Certain kinds of questions on Vietnam, especially those asking 
for specific answers, were frequently rebuffed. For instance, on 
June 18, 1966, this question came up: "Mr. President, would you please
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explain for us why It's wrong for us to bomb the capital in North 
Vietnam, and who has ordered this theory Into policy?" Johnson dodged, 
saying, "I don't think I would want to comment on the tactics or 
strategy at this point."
In a question and answer session on July 18, 1967, a reporter 
said, "Can I ask you about Chancellor Kiesinger, Mr. President?" 
(Johnson had just announced that Kiesinger would visit the United 
States in August). Johnson said, "Yes." The reporter asked, "Did 
you write a letter to him?" L.B.J. responded, "I dorft discuss corres­
pondence."
Another technique, rejecting, was also used. That is, Johnson 
cut off or dismissed particular questions, sometimes without explana­
tion. Johnson did this in his January 27, 196*4-, meeting. A reporter 
asked, "Do you agree with Wright Patman— " Interrupting, Johnson said, 
"I have not discussed Mr. Patman*s ideas with him or anyone else."
Then L.B.J. told reporters that this was a "formal press conference" 
and that he wanted to help them. Nothing was "secret" except "some 
things which may fall within the national interest which must be kept 
secret." Next he told the press, "I will see you next week." A report­
er asked where. Johnson said he didn't know and that saying he would 
meet them was "good enough." Another reporter asked, "Will it be on 
Saturday Mr. President?" L.B.J. made no reply at all, according to the 
transcript.
On July 9, 1965i a correspondent asked Johnson, "to what extent" 
he was getting news about a British peace attempt "and what opportuni­
ty .. . for a peace talk" might exist. Johnson responded, "We are 
informed about it."
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Another evasive device to refuse answering was denying adequate 
knowledge or specific information to answer. The argument might go, 
"How can I answer if I haven't seen the report you are talking about?" 
For Instance, Johnson was asked to comment on an article from "a 
French magazine." The article apparently reported a communication 
of Ho Chi Minh to Russian leaders which involved the possibility of 
United States aid to China. Johnson passed over the question, saying 
only, "I haven’t read tie Paris magazines."
One last kind of refusal was total withdrawal from a question or
issue area. The effect was a "no comment" response. The reply was 
usually a brief "no." That is, he did not explain or justify his 
refusal to answer. In a few conferences Johnson appears to have been 
almost totally unresponsive.
On October 13, 1966, Johnson met reporters in New York City 
(in the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel) and introduced Prince Souvanna Phouma, 
Prime Minister of Laos. After the opening statements, the first 
question was met with "No. Any other questions?" Seven more ques­
tions followed, all answered by "no." In only two of the eight nega­
tive responses did Johnson go beyond the "no."
Johnson announced Chief Justice Earl Warren's resignation in his 
June 26, 1968, conference. Johnson heard nineteen questions on dif­
ferent subjects. To most he was unresponsive and had no comment.
Perhaps less unresponsive was the second general technique, called 
"referring." The use of this device was probably for evasion at times. 
L.B.J. generally referred the press to previous or current statements 
or to other sources. Among others, he told reporters to take their 
questions to attorneys general, to government leaders and agencies.
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and to persons or organisations mentioned as the sources behind 
certain questions.
It was seen that President Johnson often repeated or restated 
old ideas or materials In his answers. On occasion, however, he 
Just referred questioners to previous statements. Usually the device 
was in a brief recommendation. Other times, the referral was developed 
with a summary of what had been said. Johnson referred questions to 
previous speeches, to prior press releases, to previous press con­
ference statements and answers, to handouts such as biographies avail­
able at the time (or at the end) of the conference, and to volun­
taries or answers just presented in a conference.
Channeling questions to others was somewhat less common than sug­
gesting that a reporter go back to a prior statement.
Just over a week before L.B.J. was nominated by his party in 
1964, Johnson held a press conference (on August 18). Reporters were 
naturally inquisitive about his plans. One asked if he would discuss 
his "plans for next week." Johnson told the newsman to ask Jack Va­
lenti, L.B.J.'s aide. Johnson also said, "With regard to the conven­
tion, I expect to go up later Thursday evening— I don't know what time—  
if I go at all." A moment later a reporter said, "Mr. President, did 
I understand that you might not go to Atlantic City at all?" John­
son said, "No." The reporter replied, "I misunderstood." L.B.J. said, 
"Evidently. I didn't say I would, or wouldn't." Whether Mr. Valenti 
knew Johnson's plans, when apparently the President did not know, is 
problematic. Johnson might have offered to provide the information 
at a later and specific time.
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In his nesting with reporters on June 18, 1966, the following 
exchange occurred:
Q. Mr, President, can you give us your thinking, sir, 
on the propriety of a United States Senator going abroad 
and making critical comments about the Internal policy of 
another nation?
The President. I think that it would be a better policy 
to let the Senators judge the propriety of their own actions.
It is not for the executive branch to be passing upon state­
ments of Senators.
There are a great many statements made by the Senate 
that an Executive will approve of, and some maybe that he 
will disapprove of. But I don't think as a general policy, 
it is wise for us to set up any censorship down here. I 
just have to leave it up to their judgment.
The answer further illustrates a referral which allowed Johnson to 
dodge a question.
A third general avoidance strategy was circumvention. That is, 
President Johnson avoided direct comment but talked, anyway. When 
he did this, he often shifted to another topic, substituted an answer 
on the general topic for a response to a specific inquiry, ignored 
the question and interjected an announcement, digressed, equivocated, 
groped for an answer, repeated or restated answers, rationalized, 
transferred blame for failures, appealed to laughter, used semantics 
to evade, and "forgot." Not all of these eleven devices warrant dis­
cussion here because some were similar to devices mentioned in connec­
tion with the other three response strategies. Below are illustrations 
of a few of the devices used to circumvent Issues.
Johnson sometimes shifted from a point in a question to a person­
ality or to another issue in response to questions. For instance, on 
November 4, 1966, (close to election day), a newsman asked about a mis­
understanding of the policy set forth in the Manila Conference on the 
war in Southeast Asia. The reporter mentioned that Richard Nixon's
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interpretation would mean that the Intention of a withdrawal plan 
proposed at the meeting "would leave South Vietnam to the mercy of 
the Vietcong." Johnson, rather than explaining the proposal, began 
his reply with an attack on Nixon, whom L.B.J. called "a chronic corn- 
plainer." Johnson later said, "you can read the communique.1 He 
then went into a defense of the motives of the participants in the 
Conference, especially the United States. He talked about why the 
communique "shouldn’t be confused." He closed the long answer by 
saying, "... When the aggression, infiltration, and violence 
ceases, not a nation there wants to keep occupying troops in South 
Vietnam." And to reshift emphasis, he said, "Mr. Nixon doesn't serve 
his country well by trying to leave that kind of impression in the 
hope that he can pick up a precinct or two, or a ward or two."
Johnson also substituted general replies to questions requesting 
specific or other information. A common response was to ignore the 
specific issue and express hope. For instance, in his August 3* 1967, 
conference, L.B.J. was asked for a progress report on a nuclear non­
proliferation treaty. Johnson said, "progress" had been made and he 
expressed optimism. In a similar question on the progress of the 
Paris peace negotiations, asked in L.B.J.'s October 2k, 1968, meet­
ing, Johnson's response was to express hope and to assert that efforts 
toward peace were continuing daily.
Good examples of other substitutions of interjections and of di­
gressions came up in informal press conferences. Johnson's birthday 
press conference in 1966, for instance, illustrates how the devices 
could be used. L.B.J. was asked how he felt and if he had "any spe­
cial problems." He avoided "problems" and reminisced for approximately
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twenty minutes. Although the length of the reply was not typical, 
the style of the digression was.
Equivocation was also used. One example was the answer on his 
convention plans in 196**, described above. In another session with 
the press corps, August 2**, 1967, a newsman asked Johnson to predict 
the outcome of congressional elections. In his reply, L.B.J. referred 
to a report in the Christian Science Monitor showing "an average gain 
of **1 seats in off-year elections since 1890." Johnson talked about 
the general possibilities of gains or losses and then said, " . . .  I 
don't expect to see any unusual changes from what you would expect 
normally in an election this year." He went on to downgrade current 
predictions by Republicans and closed, saying that the indications he 
had showed no certainty of "change above the expected change in an 
off-year election." A correspondent then asked if the "**1 seats," 
would then be acceptable as a "norm" in L.B.J.'s prediction. The 
President replied, "No. No, I don't know of any /norm_7* ..." 
Johnson did not want to be held to a prediction although he apparent­
ly had not minded talking "around" the idea.
On some occasions Johnson seemed to be "thinking out loud" or 
groping for an answer while talking. Sometimes this occurred with 
fairly simple requests. In one instance, Saturday, April **, 196**, 
he seemed to be teasing. One question was, "Mr. President, are you 
going anywhere today?" L.B.J. responded, "Not that I know of. I have 
no immediate plans. But I would not want to preclude getting out, if 
I got through with the matters at hand and got my desk clear. I would 
like to take a little walk. I might go out. I do not want to schedule 
anything." (The next question was: "But how far, sir?" Johnson said,
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"as far as I could, away from hare,") Johnson's raply seams of little 
usefulness. Further, a simple "I don't know, but I have no plans," 
might have been more responsive.
One circumvention technique was transferring blame. When particu­
lar problems were presented to the President in questions, he was quick 
to lay blame. For the inability of his administration to bring about 
peace in Vietnam he blamed the "enemy." For domestic difficulties he 
censured congress or accused critics in the press or in the Republican 
party for creating or adding to existing problems. For instance, 
Johnson was questioned about a veto during his August 25. 1965. broad­
cast conference. Johnson argued that because his "best legal advisers" 
and the Attorney General had determined that the act in question was 
"repugnant to the Constitution," L.B.J. had no other choice. The im­
plication, of course, was that the Congress was at fault rather than 
the President.
Another technique to dodge a question was to appeal to laughter. 
One illustration appears in the President's September 8,1966, press 
session, as follows:
Q. Mr. President, you have used the phrase which has 
been repeated over and over again in regard to Vietnam, which 
has become a measure of your determination in the Vietnam 
war. You have used it in this message by saying: "This ad­
ministration is prepared to recommend whatever action is 
necessary to maintain stable growth," et cetera.
Does this represent a similar degree of determination 
on the domestic stability issue?
The President. Ask your question again. I know what I 
said but I am not clear what you said. What question are 
you asking? /Laughter_7
Q. You have used the phrase "whatever is necessary" 
to carry on the war in Vietnam over and over again. It 
has become a measure of your determination to 3ee the 
Vietnam war through to the necessary conclusion.
Now you have used that same phrase "whatever is 
necessary" to keep domestic stability in this message 
with respect to keeping the domestic economy stable.
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My question was singly: Does this represent a similar
degree of determination on the whole economy?
The President. When I say "whatever is necessary/'
I mean whatever is necessary. I mean It whether It is ap­
plied to Vietnam or to the domestic situation or to 
answering your question. J_ Laughter _7
Although Johnson's poking fun may have been justified, considering 
the wording of the question, he apparently did not want to spell 
out possible means of promoting economic stability.
In the conference just cited is an example of using the phrasing 
of a question to avoid an answer. In this particular case, a report­
er asked, "Mr. President are you sorry, the way some economists say 
you should be, that you did not raise taxes last spring?" L.B.J. 
said, "I am not aware of any economists who have said that to me." 
This represents a twisting of the intent and phrasing of the ques­
tion, or "semantic evasion." Another example occurred in the Presi­
dent's July 31, 1967, meeting. One question was, "Mr. President, it 
was reported on Saturday that Marshal Tito received a personal mes­
sage from you. I wonder if you would say anything about that."
Rather than not consenting, Johnson said, "Yes. We are in communica­
tion from time to time with the leaders of other nations. We have 
communicated with President Tito on occasion." Indeed, Johnson said 
something. But he probably did not offer what the newsman wanted.
The circumventional techniques were varied and clever. They 
were used extensively throughout President Johnson's years in office. 
Tactics of evasion probably fulfilled the President's aims only, 
except when "the national interest" was a justifiable excuse for 
avoiding reply, or when questions were of so little import that no 
real response was demanded. The press probably knew what Johnson was 
doing, if not why. Correspondents often ignored circumventional
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responses and repeated specific queries. Prom time to tine Johnson 
was asked why he avoided answering on particular topics, or If the 
public would not better be served by a more responsive reply. John­
son's ready argument was that he would accept the responsibility of 
determining what was in the national interest, which was his function 
as the President of the United States.
Audience Adaptation
The extent to which Johnson's responsiveness to his audiences is 
reflected by the means of controlling and fencing with the press, 
and approaching or avoiding issues reveals a lack of effectiveness 
from the standpoint of audience adaptation. This seems true of the 
use of announcements, as well. In terms of Johnson's goals, the 
aims of the press, and public needs, Johnson distorted, to a degree, 
the functions of the presidential press conference with his replies.
He was not the first or only chief executive to use the particular 
devices studied in this chapter. Neither were his goals and methods 
of development necessarily unique. President Johnson apparently often 
gave useful answers in a manner that would benefit the public and the 
press. On balance, however, it seems that even more often Johnson's 
answers were too calculated to meet his own purposes, especially his 
aims of publicity, promotion, defense, ethos enhancement, and control 
over the press. Many of Johnson's news conferences and a general 
view of his answers leave an Impression that this president was not 
very effective in adapting to his immediate and eventual or distant 
audiences, the press and the public. This does not mean that vigorous 
attempts to win public opinion for the sake of productive leadership 
and power are inappropriate in presidential press relations, because
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the White House has so many other avenues to accomplish that aim, 
Johnson probably went too far to achieve his own ends in answers 
at his press conferences.
CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
Impetus for this study came from two basic voids. First and 
most Important was the lack of serious attention given to the 
presidential press conference by rhetorical critics. Second.
Lyndon Johnson's news conferences have not been studied carefully 
by speech critics.
The Presidential Press Conference
The president of the United States is not required by law or 
by the Constitution to communicate with the press. The presidential 
news conference is an institution which evolved with the growth of 
news media and with changing styles of presidential leadership.
The chief executives of the nation have determined the nature and 
extent of their press relationships. More specifically, they have 
decided how, when, and why to meet newsmen in person.
Among controls which a president exercises over the press con­
ference are timing, frequency, location, content, and even who may 
attend. Recently, presidents have chosen whether the conference is 
broadcast to the public. Moreover they have determined which ques­
tions to answer, which correspondents might inquire, and whether and 
to what extent the press could use the president's answers.
The functions of the news conference involve the goals or needs 
of the participants. Among presidential aims are informing, persuading,
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•nd especially Influencing public opinion. For the representatives 
of the media, the conference provides the commodity of "news." The 
press also functions as a vehicle of feedback by asking questions 
which express public concern and Interest. Another, related theory 
sees the press as a "fourth branch" of government because of its 
influence on the decisions and actions of a president. The confer­
ence may also serve the public's needs to monitor its leaders, to 
gain understanding of presidential policy and action, and to learn 
more of contemporary White House affairs.
The presidential press conference is unlike the question period 
of the British House of Commons. Among several important differences 
is the extra-legal nature of the news conference. The participants 
and the formats differ considerably.
Presidential press relations before the administration of Wood­
row Wilson led to the establishment of the modern news conference.
Prior to the Civil War, most American presidents relied heavily 
on partisan, political publications for persuasion. Until Jackson's 
election, most presidents had little direct contact with reporters. 
Andrew Jackson was probably the first president to use the press di­
rectly and aggressively. The presidents between Jackson and Lincoln 
were undistinguished in their press relations.
Abraham Lincoln had considerable journalistic experience before 
reaching the White House. He, like Jackson, learned the intricacies 
and potential of what was emerging as a powerful arbiter of public 
opinion in America. Lincoln succeeded at establishing productive 
contacts with reporters, editors, and publishers. He read newspapers 
avidly. He contributed articles and copies of his speeches to papers
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to further his effectiveness* Lincoln wts Accessible to newsmen end 
sometimes granted interviews.
After Lincoln, the next president who was enterprising in using 
the press was Grover Cleveland. But most of the time Cleveland rele­
gated to his staff the task of dealing directly with newsmen.
Theodore Roosevelt became one of the most able chief executives 
in rallying support in the news media. He provided the first White 
House press facility, wrote articles, prepared releases, and met with 
selected correspondents in Informal exchanges.
William Howard Taft had held fruitful weekly news conferences as 
Secretary of War but did not fare well with the press when he attained 
the higher office.
The evolution of the modern presidential news conference began 
with Woodrow Wilson. President Wilson is credited with having estab­
lished the presidential press conference, because, among other reasons, 
he set his meetings on a regular basis and refined formal regulations 
which provided patterns for later presidents. Because of his personal­
ity and questions of national security, Wilson's conferences deteriora­
ted and were finally discontinued in 1917.
Warren Harding reinstated the institution, invoked a rule requir­
ing written queries, and met regularly with reporters until the 
end of his administration when his press relations waned.
Calvin Coolidge was cunning in his handling of the media. He 
met correspondents twice weekly but responded mainly on an off-the- 
record basis. He used the conference to make announcements and to 
build rapport with his questioners. He disallowed quotation, but for 
his political aims he encouraged reporters to embellish and dramatize 
the relatively unimportant information in his answers.
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Herbert Hoover, like Taft, had begun good press relations as a 
cabinet officer. However, the White House press corps posed such a 
challenge that Hoover was Ineffectual and finally quit seeing them 
directly.
Franklin Roosevelt was a sharp contrast to previous presidents. 
F.D.R. took the press practices of his term as Governor of New York 
to his White House office. His lively, frequent exchanges were evi­
dence of an accomplished speaker and leader. He met correspondents 
two times each week for Informal, oral questions and answers. F.D.R. 
used four reply categories of which one, indirect quotation, seems to 
have been his own invention. Roosevelt was quite effective in promot­
ing his administration through his news conferences, as he was in 
other communications. More than any previous chief executive, Roose­
velt realized the full potential of the presidential news conference.
Harry Truman followed a number of F.D.R.'s practices with a good 
measure of success. He faced the press corps once a week and responded 
to the increasing size of that body by moving his meetings to an 
auditorium. In 1951» he allowed the release of recorded excerpts 
for radio broadcast. This was an innovation.
Dwight Eisenhower also contributed to the presidential press con­
ference. After his once weekly meetings his staff Issued edited tran­
scripts to newsmen. Elsenhower allowed television films of his con­
ferences to be broadcast. He was the first to permit a live broadcast 
of a press conference, Eisenhower was somewhat aloof and formal, and 
was unimpressive in ways. He probably did not achieve the success 
that F.D.R. and Truman had in press meetings.
John Kennedy jolted the public and the press with live, televised 
conferences. Kennedy established good rapport with his inquisitors
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and cane across well on television. His meetings apparently were effec­
tive In maintaining a favorable public Image and In sustaining support 
for his leadership. J.F.K. carefully prepared for his press meetings. 
After brief opening statements, he faced about four hundred corres­
pondents and deftly handled about two dozen questions In the thlrty- 
mlnute sessions. Later, he sometimes watched a taped replay with aides 
to assess his own skill.
Lyndon Johnson took reporters back to the Roosevelt era with his 
frequent, informal, and Impromptu meetings. His approach was experi­
mental, especially during his first two years as president. He tried 
a variety of formats, including broadcast meetings, walking confer­
ences, and appearances with important guests. He seemed most happy 
with "surprise" conferences held in his office. L.B.J.'s relations 
with reporters were mercurial. Johnson became the butt of much 
criticism and even personal attack in newspaper and magazine re­
ports. Nevertheless, he continued to meet the press and vigorously 
attempted to exploit the industry and the news conference to fulfill 
his leadership alms.
Richard Nixon, too, has experimented with ways to communicate 
with newsmen. But Nixon generally has avoided direct contact with 
reporters and has held few news conferences. He prefers direct, 
broadcast communication with the public, letting his aides deal with 
questions from media representatives. Nixon's failure to face repor­
ters has been criticized and has postponed refinement of the presi­
dential press conference as a means of leadership and communication.
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lyndon Johnson and the Press 
President Johnson's early Interest In oratory, debate, politics, 
and journalism may have Influenced his presidential press relations.
He was active at participating In those fields as a college student. 
For a while, he taught and coached debate.
Many years In government at the national level gave L.b.J. the 
opportunity to observe successful leaders as well as the chance to 
develop his own press relations. As Johnson rose to power in the 
Senate, he established a style of handling the press which was charac­
terized by a domineering manner. He preferred Informal and impromptu 
get togethers with small groups of newsmen. Senator Johnson never 
distinguished himself as a public speaker, although he gained in 
prominence within the Democratic Party. His press relations during 
the years before he became president were not spectacular. He was 
secretive and unduly sensitive to criticism.
In developing his approach to the press conference, Johnson may 
have emulated F.D.R. Further, he may have been influenced by a desire 
not to be compared with Kennedy. There is some evidence that Johnson 
distrusted the "eastern establishment" press which apparently had had 
so much rapport with Kennedy.
Johnson's attitudes toward the press were complex. He seemed to 
be fascinated with the news media. L.B.J. read several newspapers 
and monitored broadcasts daily and with much interest. He was highly 
conscious of the value of publicity and instructed his staff to make 
calculated efforts at getting press attention to the achievements of 
his administration, Johnson got along well with some individual news­
men and cultivated relationships with others. He expected loyalty and 
service. He even attempted to trade favors with some writers.
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President Johnson had many dislikes. He was bothered by reporters' 
mistakes, personal criticisms, speculative and interpretative writing, 
exaggerations, and "leaks" which he had not originated,
Although Johnson probably had no formal press conference philo­
sophy, his practices led to some habitual ways of approaching the 
speaking situation. He was pragmatic and purposive. He preferred 
Informality with reporters and direct communication with the populace. 
Broadcast conferences were uneasy events. Further, he liked to sur­
prise the press with meetings and with occasional dramatic statements. 
The secretiveness of his senate days carried over to the presidency. 
L.B.J. wanted control over the reporters who covered him and over the 
format for communicating with the press. He also exhibited an almost 
impulsive need to experiment with different kinds of meetings with 
media representatives.
President Johnson met the press just about every day and in an 
interesting variety of ways. He met with small groups for briefing 
and off-the-record sessions. He granted private and televised inter­
views. His official conferences varied in location, planning, for­
mality, length, and timing. He was unpredictable in ways. He was 
also well prepared for his conferences even if the press corps was 
not.
Johnson's Press Conference Content 
President Johnson's opening statements and the reporter's ques­
tions were the main constituents of the content in the conferences. 
Johnson made extensive use of announcements in his official news 
conferences. He discussed executive affairs, domestic issues, foreign 
relations, and personal matters.
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Johnson's favorite area of announcement was executive affairs. 
L.B.J. often used the press conference to announce changes in the 
personnel of the executive branch. He also talked about the results 
of recent meetings. He described itineraries, reviewed dally and 
weekly plans and activities, announced decisions, and Issued state­
ments of policy. At times, Johnson Invited cabinet and military 
officials, governors, and visiting dignitaries to make statements 
to the press.
The President also made announcements on domestic Issues. During 
his first two years in office he was prone to dwell at length on the 
prosperous state of the economy. Sometimes he used voluntaries to 
promote his legislation. Current events directly stimulating his ac­
tion were touched upon.
Foreign affairs also came up, but not frequently. Johnson gave 
statements on the war in Vietnam from time to time. He occasionally 
spoke on current relations and agreements between the United States 
and other countries. American involvement in the affairs of Panama, 
the Dominican Republic, and the Middle East were discussed periodi­
cally.
In a few conferences Johnson initiated discussion on personal 
matters, especially his health.
The specific Issues raised by reporters' questions involved 
similar topic areas. Newsmen were interested in Johnson's public 
and private life, in current domestic events, in politics, and in 
foreign affairs.
Correspondents queried Johnson on the subject of Vietnam more 
than any other topic. In fact, the general area of foreign affairs 
was most popular with the press.
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While Johnson was often questioned on his official activities, 
reporters seemed just as curious about his political life.
Relatively speaking, the press asked few questions on the 
nation's econotqy and on legislation. They did, however, frequently 
inquire about specific contemporary events in the United States.
A profile of an average press conference might show four ques­
tions on the presidency, five questions on domestic matters, six 
queries on foreign relations (with four on Vietnam alone), and at 
least one miscellaneous inquiry.
Johnson's Opening Statements
President Johnson used his announcements for six specific pur­
poses. He wanted to explain, to get publicity, to promote the achieve­
ments of his administration, to defend his leadership from external 
criticism, to improve his image with the public and the press, and 
to control the press and the news conference. Most of his goals and 
most of what he said in his voluntaries were for persuasion, to 
mold public opinion, and to gain support for his policies and pro­
grams.
Johnson used a variety of traditional methods of development and 
supporting materials in his opening statements. His materials were 
similar to the development of ideas used in his formal addresses. 
Further, he generally used appropriate means to carry out his alms.
He commonly employed statistics, details, narration, and testimony.
He used repetition and restatement for amplification.
L.B.J. had an assortment of special devices to meet the conference 
format. His techniques related to frequency, length, timing, issue
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Avoidance, anticipation, Interjection, and guest participation in the 
opening statements.
Johnson controlled the content of his conferences with the devices 
of scheduling and length. He generally avoided Issues reflecting fail­
ures of his administration. His approach was to present good news as 
often as possible and not to mention bad news. Johnson attempted to 
anticipate reporters' questions. Sometimes he interjected announce­
ments In the question period or at the close of his conferences. He 
also asked guests appearing with him to make comments to correspon­
dents. He was so expansive in using voluntaries that often a fourth 
to one half of an entire conference was taken up by long preliminary 
remarks.
Johnson's aims, methods of development, special techniques, and 
extensive use of voluntaries showed more regard for his own needs than 
for the needs of the press. Johnson used reporters as a captive audi­
ence for short orations, long promotional remarks, and defensive at­
tempts to answer his critics. Much of the material he presented was 
not newsworthy because it was repetitive of older or prior state­
ments. On the other hand, Johnson sometimes made dramatic announce­
ments and gave Informative explanations of interest and value to the 
press and the public.
Reporters' Questions
The content of the questions was timely, important, appropriate 
to the situation, and responsive to the needs of the public and the 
President. Reporters may have been too interested in current domes­
tic affairs at times, but as a whole, the inquiry was highly appro­
priate.
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Pour types of questions predominated. Queries were used to ob­
tain date, to elicit opinions, to evoke reactions, and to supplement 
other questions or follow up voluntaries. At least half of the in- 
quliy was of the supplementary or follow up variety. In general, the 
types of questions were well suited to the conferences.
The stylistic qualities of the questions Included clarity, tone, 
conciseness, and appropriateness.
The questions seemed generally clear, for only occasionally did 
the President ask for restatement. Usually, he responded without any 
apparent hesitation due to misunderstanding or not understanding a 
query.
The tone of the questions, at least on paper, was mostly neutral. 
A number of questions were hostile and hard hitting, just as many of 
the questions were rather friendly. The press was Invariably polite 
and generally respectful of the presidency.
In terms of conciseness, the average question took about fif­
teen seconds to deliver. In the broadcast conferences questions were 
somewhat longer. Further, the queries were seldom verbose. In some 
Instances, multiple questions were asked at one time by a newsman.
On rare occasions, correspondents presented rather lengthy background 
statements before actually asking their questions.
Generally, Inquiry was appropriately worded and was free of tech­
nical terms or jargon unfamiliar to the President.
Questions in the broadcast conferences were more polished and 
better suited to both the President and the public than the ques­
tioning at the Impromptu conferences. This was probably due to the 
factor of preparation. As a whole, the questioning was excellent.
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Johnson's Answers
President Johnson's replies, ss was true of his voluntaries, 
aimed at explaining, publicising, promoting, defending, and enhanc­
ing the Image of his administration. The goal of regulating the con­
ference was especially Important because L.B.J. hoped to control the 
flow of inquiry as well as the reporting of what he said in the press 
meetings.
Johnson's alms In his answers were generally for persuasion.
The same methods of development used In the voluntaries appeared 
In Johnson's answers. Further, when L.B.J. was responsive to ques­
tions, he used a variety of appropriate support. His development was 
probably best when he answered queries on his favorite topics. Wheth­
er Johnson would amplify and develop a generalization or a mere "yes" 
or "no," was not predictable. Again, when Johnson had good news to 
report, he tended to become expansive and could be quite effective 
in developing replies. Notably, he used statistics, testimony, narra­
tion, comparison, and anecdotes.
In some of Johnson's answers he tried to control and fence with 
newsmen. Other replies approached or avoided issues to varying de­
grees. Specific techniques were employed to accomplish each of the 
basic types of replies.
In attempting to control reporters, Johnson used some devices to 
anticipate and others to direct the press. In anticipation of some 
questions, Johnson had prepared answers. He even read some responses. 
He also interjected replies If the question he anticipated was not 
asked. Johnson interrupted reporters at times apparently because he 
felt he knew what the rest of the question would be. He probably
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overused these devices et times, especially when he denied reporters 
the opportunity to finish Inquiries and to the degree that his expec­
tations may have deterred his careful listening.
Johnson used directive answers to talk to the press rather than 
talk on an issue. He Instructed the press at times as to what he 
expected and what they might expect of him. He also made requests.
Some answers, but not many, were appropriately aimed at clarification. 
In general, however, Johnson's didactic approach was probably unwar­
ranted.
In fencing with correspondents, Johnson employed a number of tech­
niques. L.B.J. interrupted and demanded sources. He replied with 
sarcasm. He attacked questions and questioners. Johnson corrected 
and debated with the press corps. Sometimes he relied on humor di­
rected toward newsmen. Most of Johnson's fencing maneuvers were in 
the Informal conferences so that the public seldom saw this side of 
the President's press relations. But even in the informal meetings 
his lack of tact and the hard, debate-like nature In sparring proba­
bly did little to improve his rapport with reporters.
President Johnson approached issues with the techniques of back­
grounding, repeating, expanding, exhausting, generalising, arguing, 
and appealing. Most of these techniques are not unlike traditional 
types of development. They reveal In a different light the ways that 
President Johnson could deal with Issues with varying degrees of effec­
tiveness. It is Interesting that Johnson frequently used a question 
as an opportunity to give brief talks approximately four to eight 
minutes long. Exhaustive replies usurped valuable time for other 
questions. These talks probably bored the press and even the public.
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His lengthy answers were usually no wore than redundant summaries of 
previous statements or were emotionalised petitions for support which 
did not seem appropriate as answers In the press conference setting. 
L.B.J. sometimes sought to use the news conference for political 
advantage and to blame political opponents for slowing his "Great 
Society" programs.
While Johnson often gave useful and effective replies, his ways 
of approaching Issues were so obviously calculated to promote rather 
than explain that correspondents may have become weary, If not wary.
In terms of providing news, Johnson wanted to be the Initiator.
So he presented most of what was really useful to the press and the 
public in his voluntaries, not In his replies. Correspondents con­
sequently were often placed In a role of providing the stimulus to 
incessant, and somewhat Invaluable, rhetorical response. Since John­
son had many other avenues available for promoting his alms, his 
approaches to issues were too often out of place In the press con­
ferences.
Johnson used a more extensively variegated style to avoid is­
sues. He employed three strategies to dodge problems raised by 
queries: refusal to answer, referring the question, and circumvent­
ing the specific Idea of the question.
In most cases, L.B.J. carefully worded his reluctance to reply.
More specifically, he stalled for time, discouraged topic areas, re­
jected particular issues, denied adequate knowledge to answer, and 
completely withdrew from questions. A second strategy was used to 
dodge inquiry. Johnson referred questions to other sources or to 
previous statements from the White House. The most common and frequently
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used strategy was circumvention. For axaaq>le, he would shift topics, 
substitute answers on a general topio for replies to a specific issue, 
digress, equivocate, grope, transfer blane, appeal to laughter, and 
twist a question's intent or wording.
Because President Johnson used devices to avoid issues so exten­
sively, his general ability in the press conference seems unresponsive 
to the needs of the press and the public. In terms of audience adapta­
tion, he adjusted his replies as well as his opening statements and 
other factors of his press conference style to accomplish his own ends 
with less apparent regard for those who Interacted with him.
In Lyndon Johnson's first press conference he expressed a will 
to be "flexible" in his relations and meetings with the press. He 
achieved that aim only in a technical sense. Had he been more under­
standing of and responsive to the needs of the press, he might have 
been more successful in his dealings with newsmen, and, in turn, he 
might have been more responsive to and effective with his primary 
source of power, the people.
Suggestions
This study has demonstrated that press conferences can be evalua­
ted from a rhetorical perspective. Other studies might easily do the 
same.
News conferences are held by so many government officials, nation­
ally, and locally, and in such countries as Canada, Germany, and Vene­
zuela, that a ripe body of speech materials representing an effective 
means of communication exists.
zm
Knowing tho oxtont to which «nd how othor loaders of public 
opinion use this speaking situation could add breadth to current 
knowledge on how wan best coawunlcates.
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